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THE CRITERION

الْفُرْقَان

Among the alternative titles for the Qurʾān, Al-Furqān is perhaps the most intriguing. The expression conceals a wealth of significance which, on investigation, may be seen as truly apposite for meditation in the April, or Easter, issue of a journal devoted to the Christian concern for Islam. We do well, surely, to strive after an understanding of the Christian faith, epitomised in the great festivals, as such an apprehension may be illuminated and sharpened by Muslim concepts. For though the content of the two faiths differs profoundly, there is much profit in studying the terms of the one in the light of the other.

In every area of life and its debate, we encounter the problem of criteria. Oftentimes in history a standard by which other things were once judged has itself been brought under judgement, not seldom by the very things it once condemned. The criterion of the true philosopher, for example, by which the medieval schoolmen with their subtle niceties were so highly rated, was itself despised when the course of thought became empirical and inductive. Types of oratory once hailed as tremendous have survived to be dismissed as tedious, when the standards changed. The most pointed example of all is probably Messiahship. The foes of Jesus crucified Him for His conscious antipathy to all they thought Messiahship should be: fidelity to the tasks of Messiahship as He knew them underlay His readiness to suffer. The two contrasted concepts met in the Cross, considered as what men did to His concept and what He did by it. In the issue, the recognition of Jesus as the Christ entailed the acceptance of a revolution in the popular view, in which the Cross

ceased to be incompatible with the Messiah and became His supreme glory. Ever since, the Cross has been proclaiming the majesty of the love that suffers and transforming the criteria of greatness.

Everything, then, depends upon the criteria. It is into this realm of guidance in judgement that we are led by the Quranic title: Al-Furqān. Scholars have differed about the precise sense and source of this word. But there can be little doubt as to its general significance and its present connection with the Arabic root *faraqa,* meaning "to separate." It signifies anything which makes a distinction, between truth and falsity, right and wrong, good and evil. These contrasts, and the means rightly to identify them, may belong to ideas, to doctrines or to communities. The rising of the *furqān* is an Arabic phrase relating to the brief interval before daybreak when the sun makes certain things discernible even before its dawn.

Al-Furqān as a term is applied to the Qur'ān (according to the general interpretation) in Surahs ii. 181; iii. 2; and xxv. 1. The last of these verses says: "Blessed be He Who hath sent down unto His servant the Criterion, that he may be a warner to the worlds." In Surahs ii. 50 and xxi. 49 it is Moses and Aaron who are said to have received the Furqān, the Law of Moses being plainly the intended sense. In Surah iii. 2 the Gospel appears to be linked with both the Law and the Qur'ān as also Al-Furqān. In verses 29 and 42 of Surah viii, however, the term is used in such a way that its application to the 'scriptural' revelation is impossible. The context here is the Battle of Badr which is described as the 'day of the Furqān'. The late Professor Richard Bell writes in this connection: "The victory at Badr was not only a 'deliverance' of the small band of Muslims who had gone out with Muḥammad expecting to intercept a caravan and had found themselves face to face with an army. It was a final separation between Muḥammad's followers and the unbelieving Meccans; after the bloodshed . . . there could be

nothing but enmity. It was also a sign of the acceptance of the Muslim community in Allāh's eyes and of the rejection of the unbelievers." Certainly there was a new distinctiveness, a new assertion of uniqueness, on the part of Islam after that encounter, not only in relation to Mecca, but vis-a-vis the Jews of whose approval in Medina so much had been hoped. God, so to speak, had 'discriminated' in the Battle, so that the finality and validity of Islam could be indubitably known. The day of discrimination was a day of arms. It is also within the sense of the passage that, thanks to their obedience in following the Prophet into this situation, the believers would be enabled subsequently to discern the shape of their duty, and would come to stand in God's mercy.

Increasingly in the evolution of Islam this fidelity to the Prophet as the repository of the Divine guidance came to be more and more expected, more and more habitual. Obedience to Muḥammad, even when—as at Al-Ḥuḍaibiyyah—there seemed strong grounds for calling it in question, became steadily more implicit. The attitude, as is wellknown, was projected into all future history by the confidence underlying the rise of tradition, the conviction that in Muḥammad's person and example lay the ruling criteria for all true conduct. Generations of Islam came to discriminate as they believed their Prophet had discriminated, in all matters, great and small.

But such traditional imitation and discipleship were always subdued to the authority of the Qur'ān, wherein the 'scriptural' Furqān lay. The Kitāb, or Book, was the Furqān, the means whereby the will of God could be inerrantly identified. There has been some tendency to regard the two terms as not strictly synonymous, and to view the Kitāb as the actual revelation and the Furqān as the faculty of reason—the great discerner—whereby the revelation was apprehended. This view, expressed, for example, by Abū-l-Kalām Azad in his Qur'ān Commentary, would open the door somewhat to freer understandings of the will disclosed in the Book.

Whatever precise interpretation is favored, there can be no question that Islam is to the Muslim the means of verifying the right and the good. It is, as another verse has it, "a guidance for mankind." All issues are to be discerned, distinguished and determined by reference to the touchstone of Book and Prophet.

The faith likewise that flows from Christ has its Criterion. "Fidei coticula crux" runs the old saying: the Cross is the touchstone of faith. "Except I see in His hands the print of the nails, I will not believe" cried Thomas, re-echoing our Lord's own choice of token in showing "to them His hands and His side." The faith of the Church hinges on the Cross. Here it learns to take the measure not only of the plight of men (in that they perpetrated it), but of the amazing love of Christ, in that He endured it, reconciling the world through death. The Cross thus becomes in turn the Criterion of the Church. "If any man will come after Me, let him take up his cross and follow Me." As love in sacrifice became the principle of the world's redemption, so it also the pattern of the Christian's life.

And so the Resurrection becomes the pledge of the eternal Kingdom. The soul at Easter cries:

> "Meet it is that the heavens should rejoice: and that the earth should be glad, and that the whole world, visible and invisible, should keep the feast. For Christ is risen, the everlasting joy.
>
> "Now all things are filled with light, heaven and earth and all the places under the earth. All creation doth celebrate the Resurrection of Christ.
>
> "Rejoice O creation, and bloom like a lily, for Christ as God has risen from the dead! O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?
>
> "As God, Thou didst arise from the grave in glory, and with Thee didst raise the world."

Easter is, indeed, the day of discrimination: a day whereon the power behind the universe comes into the open and is known as deathless love.

> "Death's mightiest powers have done their worst,
> And Jesus hath His foes dispersed;
> Let shouts of joy and praise outburst: Hallelujah. !"

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ABRAHAM

Whatever changes in tactics may have been forced upon Muḥammad as his mission developed, there seems little doubt that he started on his prophetic career with a certain well-defined aim which was nothing less than the task of welding into a unity the heterogenous compound of warring elements and conflicting religious faiths which made up the Arabia of his day. The fact that at the time of his death he had largely succeeded in imposing at least a superficial and outward unity, if not a willing obedience, reveals him as a man of outstanding ability. The conflicting religions with which he had to deal were, of course, Judaism, Christianity and Arab paganism. His mission, as he viewed it, was to found a universal monotheistic faith which would include and supersede them all. From a very early period he had had abundant opportunity of contrasting the paganism in which he was cradled with the two monotheistic religions and the former was shown to be inferior under the impression created by the latter. His attitude to paganism was never in doubt; he was utterly convinced, from the very start, of the necessity for its dissolution and destruction, and the evidence goes to show that once only (under the stress of persecution) did he waver from this conviction.[1] In the earlier years of his mission he sought to establish a modus vivendi, now with the adherents of one monotheistic faith, and again with those of the other. That Muḥammad believed the doctrines of Islam and Christianity to be essentially the same at this period is shown by the permission granted to his followers to emigrate to Abyssinia, where they would be welcomed and be safe from temptation.[2] What made the Jews and Christians so important in his eyes was their possession of sacred Books (the idea of a Book for Islam did not come till later).[3] The Qurʾān shows, however, that he was more influenced by floating legends, both Jewish and Christian, than by the actual contents of the Scriptures as we have them, for the simple reason that these Scriptures had not yet become current in Arabia.[4] His main sources of information about Jews and Christians were the versions of the Talmud and the Apocryphal Gospels current in the Arabia of the seventh century. Between the rival claims of the two religions whose adherents were engaged in a bitter but barren controversy Muḥammad tried to find common ground. This stage in his development was reached after

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[1] Tradition says that Muḥammad, after mentioning al-Lāt, al-ʿUzza and Manāt in Surah liii. 19, 20, had originally inserted: "These are the exalted swans whose intercession is to be hoped for." This, for the time being, reconciled the Meccans, and led to the return of some of the emigrants from Abyssinia. The story is related by Ibn Isḥāq but omitted in Ibn Hishām's rescension (Ṭabarī i, 1192, 4 sqq.).

[2] Ibn Hishām i. 208 (Wust.).

[3] Bell. *Translation of the Qurʾān,* Pref. vii.

[4] Blair. *The Sources of Islam,* 10, n. 4.

a period of study had convinced him that neither, as it existed in Arabia, was capable of providing the materials for the building of a universal monotheistic faith. Judaism was by nature exclusive and was not acceptable to the Arabs. Christianity he came to regard as a modified form of polytheism. Some of the accusations which Jews and Christians were constantly hurling at each other, Muḥammad was able, in later years, to use against both. One of these was the charge that both Jews and Christians, while not guilty of directly falsifying their records, had nevertheless concealed and omitted certain passages which bore reference to himself.[5] So in his effort to find a basis for the new universal faith Muḥammad was eventually driven behind the Jesus of the Christians, behind Moses the Jewish Lawgiver, to Abraham, "the Friend of God and the Father of the Faithful." His final adoption of "the religion of Abraham" was not to come till after the Hijrah and when it came it was in the context of an assertion of his independence of Jewish claims.[6] By his choice of Abraham, who for quite different reasons is venerated both by Jews and Christians, the Prophet of Islam pressed into the service of his cause the one personage common to the two monotheistic faiths of Arabia.

The fact that the Abrahamic heritage was not shared by the Arabs does not seem to have presented any major difficulty. There are Traditions which assert that they were already familiar with him as the founder of the Kaᶜbah and the initiator of the rites practised there. There does not seem to be any real historical evidence to support this assumption and it may be regarded as a pious 'reading back' of Islamic belief regarding Abraham into the pre-Islamic era. For example, two Jewish Rabbis are made to express a typical Islamic belief to Asᶜad Kāmil, when, on the advice of some Hudhalites who wished his destruction, he resolved to attack Mecca, for the sake of the treasures which the House contained. The Rabbis warned him off, telling him that destruction awaited any who should violate its sacred precincts for it was the House of God. Instead they enjoined him to worship at it and reverence it in the usual way. The king said: "What then prevents you from doing this yourselves?" They replied: "It is the House of our father Abraham, but we are debarred from it by the idols which the people have set up around it, and by the sacrifices which they make at it, they are polytheists, unclean," or words to that effect.[7] Ibn Isḥāq tells us that the practice of worshipping unshapen stones among the Arabs took its rise from the rites of the Kaᶜbah. When any of the people of Mecca were compelled to leave because of hard times, each of them carried with him one of the stones of the sacred precincts and these they set up and circumambulated just as they did the Kaᶜbah itself. With the passing of time they came to worship every goodly

[5] Surahs iii. 72; v. 16-18; cf. iv. 48.
[6] Surah iv. 124.
[7] Ibn Hishām i. 15 (Wust.).

stone they saw until "they changed the faith of Abraham and Ishmael into the worship of images." [8] Muir remarks on this: "It is more probable that it (stone worship) gave rise to the superstition of the Kaʿbah with its Black Stone, than took its rise therefrom." [9] When Abrahah announced to ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib that he had not come to fight the Meccans but merely to destroy the House, he replied: "We seek not war for which we are not able. This is God's House and the House of Abraham His Friend! if He abandons it we have no means of defending it." [10] When Muḥammad entered the Kaʿbah after the Conquest of Mecca he saw there amongst the pictures of the angels and the other beings the picture of Abraham with the divining arrows in his hand making distribution by lot, and he said: "May Allah destroy them! (the Meccans). They have made our Shaikh cast lots with arrows. What has Abraham to do with divining arrows? Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but he was a Ḥanīf, a Muslim; he was not one of the polytheists." Then he ordered those pictures to be effaced and it was done. [11] The story is not well authenticated. It is given by Ibn Hishām "on the authority of one of the scholars."

The Arabic form of the name Abraham (Ibrāhīm) has not been found in any authentic work anterior to the Qurʾān and therefore must be due to Muḥammad himself. [12] Margoliouth suggests that it owes its form to the names Ismāʿīl and Isrāʾīl. [13] The name was probably acquired from Jewish sources, but whether in Mecca or Medina is not easy to determine. But, though the name Ibrāhīm was new to the Arabs, the same is not true of the monotheistic idea with which he is connected. The nation had lapsed into idolatry, it is true, but still there were signs that the idea of the divine unity had not entirely faded from their minds. Along with their worship of minor deities there was associated, in some vague way, the idea of Allah Taʿālā (God, Most High), in relation to Whom the other deities were regarded as inferior, and with Whom they sometimes played the role of intercessors. Jeffery says: "It is possible that the expression 'Allah Taʿālā', is of S. Arabian origin..." [14] The name Allāh, he also points out, occurs in N. Arabian and S. Arabian inscriptions, as well as in pre-Islamic oath forms. [15] In Arabic poetry the word Allāh frequently occurs, [16] though here there is always the possibility that, under Islamic influence, it has been substituted for al-Lāt. [17] There is also the evidence afforded by proper names before the time of Muḥammad whose own father was called

[8] Ibn Hishām i. 51 (Wust.).
[9] Life, Introd. p. civ.
[10] Ibn Hishām i. 33 (Wust.).
[11] Ibn Hishām ii. 821 (Wust.).
[12] Jeffery, *Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurʾān*, p. 45.
[13] Schweich Lectures, p. 12.
[14] Foreign Vocabulary, p. 67.
[15] ibid., p. 66, 67.
[16] e.g. the Muʿallaqāt.
[17] Nicholson, *Literary History of the Arabs*, p. 134.

ᶜAbdallāh. Ibn Isḥāq states that the Quraish in their religious ceremony called 'Ihlāl' used these words in addressing the Deity: "Labbaika, Allāhumma!" "Here we are O Allah! Thou hast no partner except such partner as Thou hast. Thou possessest him and all that is his." He goes on to say: "Thus they asserted His Unity in the Talbiya, but then along with Him they introduced their idols and placed what they possessed under His power." [18] This practice, he tells us further, called forth the protest from Muḥammad: "The most of them do not believe in Allah without giving Him associates." (Surah xii, 106).

There was sometimes an unfair division of the votive offerings as between Allāh and the lesser deities. Ibn Isḥāq tells of a tribe who had an idol to which they gave a part of their cattle and grain, a part being reserved for Allāh. "But if some of the portion allotted to Allāh got into the portion which they had set apart for ᶜAmm Anas (the idol), they left it with the idol, but if any of the portion allotted to ᶜAmm Anas got into the portion alloted to Allāh, it was given back." [19] Against this practice Muḥammad uttered his protest. [20] He found the monotheistic idea still alive under the abuses of pagan worship and his main protests are directed against the "association" of other gods with Allāh.

It is becoming increasingly recognised that Muḥammad's thought of Abraham holds a key place in the re-arrangement of the Quranic materials. There are two hypotheses, (a) Muḥammad gained his information about Abraham from Jews at Medina but, failing to win acceptance from them, broke with them, and declared himself a follower of Abraham of whom he had learned at Medina. Professor A. Guillaume may be quoted as an exponent of this view. "It is interesting to observe," he says, "that the Meccan Surahs contain no reference to Abraham, and, as he occupies a position of paramount importance in the Kuran, as a faithful Muslim, it is natural to conclude that Muḥammad had not heard of him before he mixed daily with the flourishing community of Jews in Medina." [21] (b) In Medina he was merely expanding, and adapting to present circumstances an idea with which he had been familiar in his Meccan days. For example, Professor A. J. Wensinck traces the development of Muḥammad's thought with regard to Abraham in this way: "In the earlier Surahs [22] he is an Apostle of God, fills the usual apostolic role of warner to his people, but he does not yet appear as the founder of the Kaᶜbah or the first Muslim. In the Medinan Surahs, on the other hand, he is called Ḥanīf,

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[18] Ibn Hishām i. 52.
[19] ibid., 1. 53.
[20] Surah vi. 136.
[21] Article on "The Influence of Judaism on Islam" in *The Legacy of Israel*, p. 132.
[22] Surahs li. 24; xv. 5 sqq.; xxxvii. 81 sqq.; vi. 74 sqq.; xix. 42 sqq.; xxi. 52 sqq.; xxix. 15. Encycl. Islam ii. 432.

Muslim and the founder of the Kaᶜbah." Wensinck explains this by saying that in Mecca Muḥammad had appealed to the Jews but in Medina they left him, and so being forced to find other support he gave the Patriarch a new role. He was now the first Muslim and the pre-cursor of Islam. [23]

There seems to be sufficient evidence to warrant assigning some of the Abrahamic references in the Qurᵓān to the Meccan period of his ministry, although it would be unsafe to assume a Meccan background for all the passages listed by Prof. Wensinck [24] and others. The language of Surah vi. 74, for instance, giving Abraham's dispute with his people, would seem to be analogous to Muḥammad's situation at Mecca, since the dispute is about the worship of idols. Bell seems inclined to place vv. 74, 80, 81, 82, in the Meccan period, and 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83 in the Medinan. The whole passage he classifies as "Meccan scraps, revised in Medina." [25] The role of Abraham vis-à-vis the idolaters of his day is parallel to that of Muḥammad confronting the polytheists of Mecca with the demand to worship God alone. The next passage (Surah. xxi. 52 seq.) mentions the persecution which befell Abraham because of his opposition to the religion of his people. Another version of this, given in Surah xxxvii. 81-113 is probably a Medinan revision with later additions superimposed. [26] Bell says vv. 100-107 "were inserted probably as a substitute for vv. 108-113. Here, without mention of the name, the story of the sacrifice of Isaac is used to suggest a basis in 'the religion of Abraham' for the sacrifices at the Pilgrimage." [27] The former passage Bell describes as "late Meccan (?) with Medinan additions." In these two passages at least we detect not only knowledge of the Patriarch but the beginning of a process of identification with him. The Prophet's fight with polytheism in Mecca is in the same category as Abraham's contest with Namrud. They mark the early stages of Muḥammad's interest in Old Testament characters.

It is after Muḥammad has settled in Medina that we get the most significant references to Abraham. The Jews have refused to accept him and his utterances about the Patriarch undergo a marked transformation. There now comes the definite adoption of the 'religion of Abraham;' [28] his association with the Kaᶜbah; [29] and the change of Qiblah as his answer to the Medinan Jews. [30] This naturally evoked their protests and an appeal to their Scriptures (or rather legends) to which Muḥammad replied that they had deviated from the pure

[23] ibid.
[24] ibid.
[25] Translation of the Qurᵓān i. 122.
[26] Bell, Trans. Qurᵓān ii. 445 f.
[27] ibid. 441 f.
[28] Surah ii. 129.
[29] Surah ii. 121.
[30] Surah ii. 139.

religion of Abraham, and both they and the Christians were guilty of concealing and misinterpreting parts of the revelations given them.[31] The assertion that the religion of Abraham had once been practised at the Kaʿbah would please the Arabs, who hitherto had labored under the stigma of paganism. This stigma was now rolled away from their race, for was not Abraham, the father of Ishmael, the ancestor of the Arabs? A second result achieved was that Islam was now provided with a firm historical basis; 't was no longer an innovation, or an adaptation of Jewish and Christian ideas. Islam now asserted its spiritual independence of all contemporary faiths for it claimed to be the re-establishment of the faith of Abraham and Ishmael which had once been practised in the land, but was now set aside. Islam was now in a position to claim the allegiance of men in its own right, and this right it owed largely to the figure of Abraham.

The most important fact about Abraham is that he is known throughout the Near East as "The Friend of God" (Khalīl Allāh), and this designation of the Patriarch is common to Judaism, Christianity and Islam. It occurs twice in the Old Testament and once in the New. King Jehoshaphat, in his prayer, speaks of "Abraham, Thy Friend"[32] and Isaiah, speaking in the name of Yahweh says: "Abraham, My Friend."[33] The Apostle James, after his account of the deeds by which Abraham was justified, adds: "And he was called the friend of God."[34] The title is no doubt derived from the account in Genesis xviii where Abraham spoke to the Lord as a man speaks to his friend. Philo, indeed, renders v. 17 of this chapter: "Shall I hide from Abraham, My Friend, that which I shall do."[35] It occurs in one place in the Qurʾān: "Allāh took Abraham as a friend."[36] Thus he is known as one of the greater prophets of Islam by the name Khalīl Allāh, just as Moses is called Kalīm Allāh (the Spokesman of God),[37] or Jesus Kalimat Allāh (the Word of God).[38] The Quranic name, however, may have some connection with his victory over Namrud when he vindicated the worship of Allah. Be that as it may, no other Old Testament character has made quite the same appeal to Jews, Muslims, and Christians.

The Friend of God has indeed become the Father of many nations who claim him as their spiritual ancestor in one way or another. The Jews of the New Testament, in controversy with our Lord, claimed physical descent from the Patriarch, but He pointed out to them that if they were the "children" of Abraham (as distinct from being his

[31] Surah iii. 72. Muḥammad did not charge the Jews and Christians with corrupting or altering the text of their Scriptures, but of suppressing those passages referring to him, vide also Surah v. 16, 18.
[32] ii Chron. 20. 7.
[33] Isa.xli.8.
[34] James ii. 23.
[35] Gen. 18. 17.
[36] Sūrah iv. 124.
[37] Sūrah 19. 53; xx. 11-50.
[38] Sūrah iii. 40.

descendants) they would do his works.[39] Both our Lord and the Apostle Paul draw a distinction between "children" and "descendants." As the Rev. E.F.F. Bishop has said:[40] "It is only as children that relationship with Abraham becomes worth-while, and friends of God are brought into being pulsating 'with the warmth of close human relationships'." That is not brought about through ancestry, or on a sudden. Modern Jews cannot establish any physical connection with Abraham but it is still possible for them to enter this relationship which alone is worth-while. Islam, too, includes within its fold many people in many lands, who could not by any stretch of the imagination be called descendants of Abraham, but whose chief bond of unity is the Kaʿbah at Mecca, which Islamic Tradition says was built by Abraham and Ishmael. Paul apparently felt it necessary to establish Christianity on a secure basis, and as Muḥammad was to do later, he went behind the Law of Moses to the Faith of Abraham, and "made Abrahamic sonship safe for Christianity on spiritual lines alone, with the right to have our names inscribed as children of Abraham, if we like, through faith that is in Christ Jesus."[41] Faith was prior to the Law and therefore superior to it. The promise to Abraham turned on Faith, that he might become the spiritual father of all who believe and that others besides Jews might have an equal claim to the promise. It had nothing to do with Law.[42] All those who have Abraham's faith are blessed with him; they are his children. Thus he has his spiritual children in all three faiths. But they are not yet friends. Indeed, relationships between them in some senses were never worse.

The faith of Abraham was willing to sacrifice "things" for the sake of a relationship. Here we all can learn from the Patriarch. Is it not the desire to hold on when we should let go that has brought about the present unhappy state of affairs between the three monotheistic faiths? Things matter more than people. The principle of exploitation has lain underneath too many of our contacts. This idea could be carried into other spheres, such as that of tradition and dogma. Abraham abandoned a tradition, the worship of idols of wood and stone. In order to follow him in his faith it may become necessary for all concerned to lay aside certain idols of the mind, and untrammelled, fare forth into a fuller fellowship becoming those who would be sons of Abraham. The glory of Abraham consists in that he abandoned belief in all the safe things when he felt the call to seek something higher. There is always the danger of resting complacently in one's faith and that seems to be the trouble both with Islam and Christianity. The urge to make changes that may prove costly is stifled. It is surely part of faith to cast overboard even those things which make us feel

[39] John viii. 39.
[40] In an unpublished paper.
[41] op. cit. I am indebted to this paper for much of this paragraph.
[42] Rom. iv. 13-17.

secure if they are standing in the way of the realisation of a fuller fellowship, which in turn would create happier human relationships.

Had Abraham allowed the call of kindred and community to stifle the greater call he would never have been in any sense the Friend of God and the Father of the Faithful. It meant for him a decided breach with his community and its ways of life. The charge brought against Muḥammad by the Quraish was that he had broken away from the community and in this at least he was a follower of Abraham; whether consciously or not we have no means of knowing. In the Easterner the call of community is too loud and persistent to be denied. He is first and foremost a member of a community. If the Muslim is to enter into the heritage of Abraham he too must be willing to take the leap in the dark. The modern form of this community consciousness is nationalism in which religion is retained only for its value as a political weapon, and a deplorable situation arises when religion becomes the hand-maid of politics. The real value of any religion consists in what it means for its followers and not in the utilitarian ends it may be used to achieve. To follow Abraham means the abandonment of what may be considered moral and material safeguards; it could mean the breaking away from the past in which we are all so deeply rooted, and the ruthless cutting away of those prejudices which keep men apart. To be the friend of God in any sense of the words is to be the friend of man. Those who lay claim to being the children of Abraham must do the works of Abraham.

This is no attempt to 'get behind' Jesus Christ as Muḥammad did. The faith of Abraham provides a pattern which might enable a greater degree of fellowship between Muslims and Christians (at least between individuals on both sides). While it is no substitute for the Christian Faith, given good-will on both sides, there is no reason why it should not eventually bring Muslims more truly "within the orbit of Jesus Christ."

Wishaw, Scotland. A. GUTHRIE

We record with sorrow the passing in January last of one of our most valued Advisory Editors, Mr. F. Lyman MacCallum, for thirty years a well-loved-Christian friend and servant in Istanbul. His duties as Field Secretary of the Bible Societies gave rich scope for the many gifts of heart and mind by which he was endeared to a wide circle of Muslims. This Quarterly is grateful to have had a place in the interests of one whose painstaking and discerning kindliness was always a benediction.

VI

The credit for the 'Renaissance' itself, however, is not to be given solely to the toleration of the orthodox institution. Even in its intellectual and religious aspects, much of it was due in a positive sense to unorthodox and sectarian influences, and to the widespread growth of material culture resulting from economic development and prosperity. These also, during the preceding centuries, had been developing independently of the orthodox religious culture; and at the time when they came to fruition, in the 4th century A.H., the orthodox were the less able to control their intellectual or material activities because, from the 4th to the middle of the 5th century, almost the whole of the central Islamic lands were governed by Shi'ite princes.

There may be a certain causal relation between these facts and a very remarkable feature of the Islamic Renaissance: the personal and individual character of most of its cultural achievements. Orthodoxy from the first stressed the 'collectivity' as against the individual; even the individual personalities who played a leading part in the evolution of the religious institution were more often representatives of collective tendencies than creative thinkers. The great biographical dictionaries of orthodox scholars are concerned very little with their individuality as persons, but only with their contributions to the transmission of the collective heritage. It is a tempting conclusion that it was the other currents of intellectual activity, outside the orthodox institution, which were mainly responsible for the appearance and activity of those individuals whose personal contributions swelled the total of achievements of medieval Islamic culture, even when they themselves were orthodox.

It may be surprising, at first sight, that many of the most active movements and personalities in the 3rd and 4th centuries have Shi'ite attachments, since Shi'ism in its organized dogmatic institution is even more authoritarian than orthodoxy. But Shi'ism at this time was more of a widely diffused emotional or intellectual tendency, sometimes combined with Sunnī orthodoxy, and it is erroneous to visualize hard and fast lines of sectarian division as already solidified in the 4th century. It was natural that individuals who were emotionally or intellectually opposed to the developing tendencies within orthodoxy should find more freedom in the looser and vaguer current of Shi'ism. Moreover, although the orthodox institution had asserted its spiritual independence of the political institution, it still continued to be associated with the civil authorities, partly because of its horror of disunity, and partly owing to the government's control of religious patronage. For similar reasons, the bureaucracy and the feudal landowners were, as a whole, strongly orthodox, and thus the leaders of orthodoxy not

only were classed, but classed themselves, among the élite (*al-khāṣṣat*), in contradistinction to the merchants, troops, artisans, peasants, and nomads (*al-ᶜawāmm*). Many religious leaders and teachers, as will be seen later, were embarrassed or dissatisfied with this situation, and while their strong feeling for the cohesion of the Community kept most of them loyal to orthodoxy, the more extreme or more independent were liable to be attracted into one or other of the opposition movements.

The phenomenal expansion of industry and commerce had in the meantime created a network of cities in the eastern provinces, with a highly developed urban life and prosperous merchant communities, possessing knowledge of the world, intelligence, boldness and independence. Their interests (as usual in flourishing commercial civilizations) were mainly secular, even while they remained attached to orthodoxy; but they no longer found adequate intellectual nourishment in Persian romances or the classical Arab humanities. With the political unification of Western Asia and the multiple interactions between its cities, there came a rapid and widespread revival of the traditions of Hellenistic culture, followed by a general expansion of intellectual curiosity, the transplantation into Arabic literature of the physical and natural sciences, astrology, Hellenistic themes in tales and romances, and a new interest in geographical works and travels in foreign countries.

At the other end of the scale was an urban proletariat of poor artisans, freedmen and slaves. In between, there grew up a floating population of commission-men, agents, travelling teachers, poets, and vagrants of all kinds. The social and economic grievances of these classes were exploited by the Shiᶜite opponents of the orthodox institution, but their successes among the beduins of the Syrian desert, the cultivators in Lower Iraq, and the proletariat of the cities created only nuclei of social disorder, without constructive objects or cultural ideals. Far more important for the development of Islamic culture was the 'reformed' Fāṭimid Ismāᶜīlī movement towards the end of the third century, which deliberately aimed at building up a new religious institution on the basis of the integration of Islam with Hellenistic culture, and at enlisting the new educated classes in its support. The leaders of the movement set up regular centres for systematic instruction and organized an extensive missionary propaganda. The popular masses were not neglected, and in the city lodges or guilds were constituted for craftsmen.[1] By the date of the transfer of the Fāṭimid Caliphate from Tunisia to Cairo (973 A.D.) the whole Muslim world was honeycombed with Fāṭimid agencies.

The significance of the Fāṭimid movement in the Islamic Renais-

[1] The evidence for this is inferential, but fairly convincing; see B. Lewis, "The Islamic Guilds," in *Economic History Review*, vol. VIII, no. 1, Nov. 1937.

sance is not to be measured only by the contributions of its professed adherents or sympathisers (such as Al-Rāzī and Al-Fārābī in philosophy; ᶜAlī b. Yūnus in astronomy; Ibn al-Haitham in physics and optics; Māsawaih and ᶜAlī b. Riḍwān in medicine; the treatises of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā in the natural sciences), but by the encouragement which it gave to intellectual activities of all kinds, even among its political or religious opponents, and its influence long survived the fall of the Fāṭimid Caliphate in 1171 A.D. It spread a spirit of free enquiry, individual endeavour and interaction of ideas, which expressed itself in the works of almost all the outstanding writers of Persia and Iraq in the fourth century, and most notably in Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), and found echoes even in Muslim Spain, in spite of the restrictive tendencies of the orthodox Mālikī school and the Almoravid rulers.

For a short time, this advance and diffusion of learning took on something of the character of an organic movement, spreading to every part of the Islamic world, irrespective of political and sectarian boundaries. A new power of intellectual organization was manifested, new methods or combinations were tried out, new types of production evolved in which to present the results of scientific study and literary culture in intelligible form to men of general education, [2] great libraries were built up and observatories founded. The old social divisions between Arab and non-Arab were obliterated in the new civilization and even those which separated Muslims from non-Muslims were softened. Jewish and Christian scholars participated in all intellectual activities on an equality with Muslim scholars; this reflected also upon their social status, and admitted them to an honourable place in the bureaucracy and the public services, though they continued to be exposed from time to time to popular excesses. The leaders of orthodoxy themselves were drawn into the general current to the extent of underpinning its dogmatic foundations by a natural theology derived from prevalent scientific theories; but they were fully conscious of the heretical tendencies present in many branches of study and maintained a jealous independence of the inverse efforts of men like Ibn Sīnā to relate the prevailing philosophical theories to the principles of Islam.

In general, therefore, the consequence of this intellectual expansion was to broaden the whole range of the Arabic humanities by the incorporation of the legacy of Hellenistic culture, which survived as a permanent element in the Arabic-Islamic cultural tradition, uneasily yoked with the religious and old Arabic disciplines. In the arts and architecture also there was a parallel expansion, as the old pre-Muslim arts, Hellenistic, Syrian, and Persian were revived, developed, and diffused, with the requisite adaptations, to create a new Muslim art,

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[2] See F. Rosenthal, *A History of Muslim Historiography*, Leyden, 1952, p. 171.

whose cultural foundations and significance, however, have not yet been adequately studied.[3]

The Islamic Renaissance suffered, on the other hand, from serious weaknesses. It was a culture and a civilization of the city, which confirmed the already marked urban character of the orthodox culture, arising out of the association of the orthodox institution with government. The immense economic development of the cities completed this process by the concentration of wealth and intellectual activities in them, to the exclusion of the countryside, which had little or no share in the developing civilization, and remained divided from the cities by a widening social gulf. Furthermore, even within the cities, the instability and inorganic character of the political institutions, and the social tensions which prevented the development of municipal institutions, offered a constant threat to cultural activities outside the range of orthodoxy, which itself maintained an ambiguous attitude towards them. Hence, with all the remarkable intellectual achievement of the Islamic Renaissance, its foundations remained shallow, rooted neither in the deep soil of the Islamic movement nor in strong social organisms. It was confined to a narrow (if for the time being widespread and prosperous) layer of urban society, and dependent on temporary factors. So long as a flourishing urban civilization existed, local retractions in one region might be counterbalanced by expansion in another, but its survival was bound up with the survival of the temporary factors to which it owed its existence.

VII

The orthodox revival in the 5th century of the Hijra (the 11th of the Christian era) marks the turning point in the history of Islamic culture. It began as a systematic effort to remove or counteract all the factors of instability and disunity political, social, religious and moral, within the Muslim Community, but led ultimately, as will be seen, to a thoroughgoing revolution.

The peculiarly inorganic character of the political institutions during the two preceding centuries was due partly to the conflict with the orthodox institution in the 3rd century and partly to the composition of the military forces. The result of the former had been to delimit sharply the functions of the political institution, confining the activities of the governors to maintenance of order and public security, military policy and financial administration. All other functions—the administration of law, [4] education, social institutions—remained the jealously-guarded preserve of the religious authorities. The religious institution

[3] See, e.g., Sir T. W. Arnold, *Painting in Islam, A Study of the place of Pictorial Art in Muslim Culture,* Oxford 1928; Ernst Kühnel, *Die Arabeske,* Wiesbaden, 1949; Arthur Lane, *Early Islamic Pottery,* London, 1947.

[4] Except for special administrative courts for the army and bureaucracy.

thus interposed between government and subjects, and claimed their exclusive loyalty as the true representatives of Islamic authority. So long, however, as the army was recruited from among the subjects directly, or though the association of the feudal nobles with the government, there still remained a positive link between rulers and people. When this was removed by the formation of professional armies of slaves and mercenaries no organic relation was left; the only remaining connection was the tax-gathering function. It has been well said that in medieval Islam there were never real 'states' but only 'empires' more or less extensive, and that the only political unity was the ideological but powerful concept of the *Dār al-Islām,* the common homeland of all Muslims. [5]

The indifference, passing into hostility, of the general population to the political organizations made the existence and survival of rulers, dynasties and régimes dependent, with rare exceptions, on the quality of their military forces. Since the religious institution was, for the reasons already given, precluded from acting effectively as a mediating force, the political history of the later 3rd and 4th centuries was mainly occupied by the struggle between Caliphs, princes, and armed forces for power eventually won, in every case, by the army commanders. Thus the 4th century saw the complete breakdown of the political organization built up by the Caliph on the Roman and Persian foundations. [6] The final blow was given during the century of Shiᶜite governments in Western Asia, an era of widespread misrule and anarchy, which bore most heavily on the countryside, although the disorders and ideological divisions affected the cities also in varying degrees.

The urban communities in all parts of the medieval Muslim world have one remarkable feature in common: the development of more or less organized popular parties, and the frequency of violent outbreaks either between them or against the government. This may be explained partly by the nomadic heritage of many citizens, partly by the existence of a large proletariat, whose grievances were championed or exploited by local reformers or agitators, often in combination with anti-Sunnī movements. Examples may be found in the standing feud in Baghdad between the Sunnīs and the Shiᶜites, and the anti-Ismāᶜīlī riots of the Karrāmites in the Persian cities. [7] But as often the rival parties were of the same sect, or of different orthodox schools, as in the feuds between Ḥanafites and Shāfiᶜites in Khūrasān. Lawlessness on the part of the troops led repeatedly to the

[5] J. H. Kramers, *Proceedings of the XXII International Congress of Orientalists,* Istanbul, 1953, p. 94. See also the article "Dār al-Islām" in *Encyclopedia of Islam.*

[6] It survived under the Fāṭimid Caliphs in Egypt until the middle of the 5th century, but then broke down there also.

[7] See R. Levy, *A Baghdad Chronicle* (Cambridge, 1929), esp. pp. 160, 171, 179; and *Encyclopedia of Islam* s.v. Karrāmīya.

formation of citizen organizations for defence and reprisals, which sometimes became no more than robber gangs. This lack of internal unity in the cities, sharpened by the mutual suspicions of proletariat, merchants and governors, even found physical expression in their organization in separate and independent quarters, with their own defences. In such features, as well as in the absence of leadership by the merchant classes (who were inclined to keep out of public life), are probably to be found the reasons for the failure of the medieval Islamic cities to develop organized municipal institutions.

The orthodox revival began at the end of the 4th century in Khūrasān, the one important region in Western Asia which had not fallen under Shiᶜite government, apparently in response to the challenge of the organized missionary activities of the Fāṭimids on the one hand, and the consolidation of 'Twelver' Shiᶜism into a rival religious institution during the century of Shiᶜite rule in Western Persia and Iraq. Early in the 5th century, the Shāfiᶜites were organizing orthodox colleges (known as *madrasas*) in imitation of the Fāṭimid missionary institutions. [8] But the revival had also a political aim: the liberation of the Caliphate from Shiᶜite control. In pursuance of their object, the Sunnī leaders formed what amounted to an alliance with the Seljuk leaders of the immigrating Turkish tribes from the East, an alliance formally ratified by the Caliph himself after the Seljuk conquest of Western Persia and Iraq (1055).

The renewed association under the Seljuks of the ruling and orthodox institutions was drawn still closer by the initiative of the vizier Nizām al-Mulk in founding Nizāmīya *madrasas*. These were not only religious seminaries for directing and systematizing higher education, but training colleges in the Arabic humanities for a new class of administrators, the "orthodox bureaucracy" which replaced the former secretarial class, and in the Seljuk empire and its successors held a place as directors of civil administration alongside the military governors of provinces and cities. Yet at the same time the functional division between the ruling and religious institutions was more sharply defined than ever by the formal constitution of the Sultanate, as the organ of political and military administration, alongside (though ideally subordinate to) the Caliphate, as the head of the religious institution. It was the same Nizām al-Mulk who reaffirmed this duality by restating his *Siyāsat-nāma,* [9] the old Persian tradition of monarchy, with its independent ethical standards based on force and opportunism, thus perpetuating the inner disharmony which has always proved to be the principal weakness of Islam as a politico-social organism.

Nevertheless, by the device of forming an administrative class be-

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[8] The lead in this development had apparently been taken by the now obscure Karrāmite sect.

[9] Edited and translated by Ch. Schefer, Paris, 1891-3.

longing to the religious institution and setting it alongside the secular governors, it is probable that something more was aimed at than a merely formal link between them. It is reasonably certain that one object was to preserve the spiritual independence of the orthodox institution against the increasing power and absolutism of the temporal princes, and at the same time to maintain (or to recreate) the unity of the Community. Each party was expected to find its own interest in supporting the other; "kingship and religion are twins." A further measure of Nizām al-Mulk indicates his strong sense of social order. Both the military organization and the bureaucratic institution were assimilated to the old (and by now almost extinct) Persian landowning class by a reconstructed feudal system. Thus by the dual means of association with the religious institution and tying the army to the soil, the ruling institution would regain in some measure the organic character which it had lost. By the same association the religious institution would gain the support of the ruling institution in its efforts to recreate unity; for it must not be forgotten that the orthodox revival was a deliberate reaction against the experience of division during the period of Shi'ite governments.

The same pursuit of unity is manifest in the gradual concentration of all higher education, both for religious and public service, in the new *madrasas*. It is improbable that this was deliberately designed to narrow down education and circumscribe intellectual activities, by control and patronage, to the religious and philological sciences. The fact of narrowing down was rather the natural consequence of this concentration combined with other factors. Firstly, it was inevitable that the attempt should be made to bring all other studies into an organic relation with the religious and literary interests of the *madrasa*; this involved some degree of standardization, and the teaching of these standardized materials in the authoritarian manner already described. Secondly, once the Hellenistic elements were assimilated into the Arabic humanities there were no new elements from outside which could be brought into Islamic culture to challenge the established disciplines or give a fresh impulse to intellectual development.[10] Thirdly, the inner decline of urban culture (to be described later) brought with it a narrowing down of intellectual interests.

For some centuries however, the influences of the Islamic Renaissance remained active within the orthodox institution, and were not entirely crushed out by the process of standardization. Intellectual energies found new outlets in place of philosophical, scientific and secular studies. It is instructive to observe the consequences of the Sunnī revival movement in Syria and Egypt under Nuraddin and

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[10] The only exception to this was the Chinese influence mediated at a later date through the Mongols, but this was fleeting and peripheral, and left an effective mark only in the domain of art in the further Eastern provinces.

Saladin and their successors (under whom a powerful orthodox bureaucracy maintained an exceptionally close association with the rulers). After the general decay of cultural life in the later Fāṭimid period, the introduction of the organized Nizāmīya type of education brought an outburst of intellectual life, literature and cultural activities of many kinds, including a revival of art and architecture. For two centuries they remained at a high level before beginning to be affected by the germs of decay from standardization and the increasing subordination of the orthodox institution to the Mamlūk military aristocracy.

At the same time, the Sunnī revival aimed at eradicating Shiᶜism not only as a political force, but as an element of moral disunity. This proved to be, on the whole, surprisingly easy. In the intellectual field Shiᶜite dogmatics were smothered by the formulation of orthodox dogmatics in final and authoritative treatises. Among the general public the earlier sympathetic attitude towards Shiᶜism was largely dissipated by the century of Shiᶜite misgovernment and the weakness of the later Fāṭimids. But the orthodox leaders wisely gave satisfaction to the emotional attachment felt for the house of ᶜAlī by incorporating the Shiᶜite shrines as objects of veneration within the orthodox Community. Shiᶜism survived only in fragmentary groups, particularly among the tribesmen of Lower Iraq; and the activist movement of neo-Ismāᶜīlīs or 'Assasins,' organized in the mountainous fringes of Northern Persia and Northern Syria, gained no following in spite of its terrorist campaign against the orthodox rulers and bureaucracy, but rather strengthened the movement of Sunnī reunion by the hostility which it aroused.

The Sunnī revival, linked with Seljuk expansion, achieved by these means a striking success in reuniting and integrating at a common level the whole urban culture of Western Asia and Egypt. The rapidity of the process, however, and the solidity of the results indicate that it did not so much create this unity as bring to fruition already existing trends. The foundations had in fact been laid during the preceding centuries by the slow but persistent pressure of the standardized Sharīᶜah law in remoulding the social ethics and institutions of all Muslims, and substituting its common processes and attitudes for their divergent older traditions. There still remained, however, the problem of the social divisions and antagonisms within the cities, and, related to it, the problem of extending the influence of the orthodox religious movement to the populations outside urban radius.

VIII

Among the established agricultural populations within the Islamic lands, it is generally possible to trace the gradual advance of the in-

fluence of the Sharīᶜah.[11] But from the 5th century conditions were radically changed in all parts of the Muslim world by the resurgence of the nomads: the irruption of Turkish tribes in East and North Persia, Mesopotamia and North Syria, Arab tribal movements in Syria, Egypt, and North Africa, Berber movements in North Africa. In large areas the substitution of pastoral for agricultural economy led to economic retrogression; and although the nomads were kept in relative check at first by Seljuk imperial power, from the middle of the 6th century they were throwing off all control, and reducing the cities in Persia and the northern provinces to islands of 'oasis culture,' dependent for their survival on armed garrisons of imperial troops or the forces of local princes. Thus at the very moment when the orthodox institution had succeeded in integrating the urban culture of Islam under its aegis, that culture itself was increasingly hemmed in by the nomadic expansion and endangered by the immigration of new Turkish tribes who were not even nominally Muslim.

In these circumstances, the leaders of the orthodox institution began to realize the value of the revivalist missions led by Sūfī preachers among the urban proletariat and in the countryside, which they had hitherto regarded with some suspicion and hostility. The pietist missionaries who laboured to produce conversions among the artisans and proletariat were inclined to share the proletariat's suspicions of the orthodox institution, as too closely identified with the political powers, even if they were still more strongly opposed to sectarian divisions and activist movements of all kinds. They disliked, moreover, the intellectualizing tendencies in orthodox theology, which seemed to emphasize external profession to the detriment of personal devotion. The orthodox leaders, for their part, distrusted the mystical and gnostic currents which were flowing into Sufism from the older Asian religions, the theosophical claims to union with the Divine, and the organized religious exercises for its adherents which threatened to displace the mosque rituals.

But the spiritual vitality of the Sūfī movement could not be denied, and indeed some accommodation w'th it was forced upon the orthodox leaders by imperative circumstances. Long before the Seljuk invasion, Sūfī missionaries had extended their activities into and beyond the frontier areas, and had been instrumental in the conversion of the Turkish tribes, among whom consequently, their influence was greater than that of the orthodox doctors. The association of the Sunnī reaction with the Seljuks thus reopened the question of the relations between the Sūfīs and the orthodox institution. It was not an easy problem for the theologians, however, in their quest for unity, to integrate the Sūfī movement in the orthodox religious institution, until the great

[11] For example, in the disappearance of Qarmatism in Iraq and of dualistic heresies in Persia, and slow conversion of the Copts in Egypt.

theologian Al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), in his most important work,[12] demonstrated the truly Islamic foundation of Sufism, and reconciled both by the argument that orthodoxy without the revivalist leaven of Sufism was an empty profession, and Sufism without orthodoxy dangerous subjectivism.

Henceforward, in the movement of reunion the religious institution is represented both by the orthodox institution (including the religious bureaucracy) and by the Sūfī shaikhs, with the special function of missionary work in the cities and countryside. Everywhere Sūfī convents were founded simultaneously with *madrasas,* and on the whole the leaders of both wings co-operated with relatively little friction or jealousy. Gradually however, the Sūfī movement, organizing itself as a rival institution, drained the orthodox institution of most of its vigour and vitality, and finally, when the dwindling of the religious bureaucracy in face of the encroachments of the ruling military classes in Egypt and India reduced the orthodox institution to a dangerous dependence on the ruling institution, finally found itself the champion of spiritual independence against both the rulers and the official ʿulamāʾ.

From the 7th-13th centuries, moreover, Sufism increasingly attracted the creative social and intellectual energies within the Community, to become the bearer or instrument of a social and cultural revolution—a process hastened on by the destruction of the still vigorous centres of Islamic culture in North Persia during the Mongol invasion of 1220, and the Mongol occupation of all Western Asia (except Syria) after the capture of Baghdad in 1258. The orthodox institution was eclipsed under the rule of the heathen princes, and though it gradually revived in the following century its social and political foundations were too weak to allow it to recover its former influence. Its function of maintaining the unity of the Community thus passed to the Sūfī movement in new and difficult circumstances. This fact itself determined that the Sūfī methods of operation would differ from those of the orthodox institution, but was also in keeping with their own historical origins. In contrast to the orthodox institution, the Sūfī movement was based on popular appeal, and its new structure of religious unity was built on popular foundations. It would be difficult to prove (or even to imagine) that the Sūfī leaders consciously formulated a plan of action, and the result was achieved in a manner which gives the impression of spontaneous action initiated independently and almost simultaneously in both eastern and western lands of Islam.

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[12] Entitled *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn,* "The Revival of the Religious Sciences." In his earlier works Al-Ghazālī had summed up and consolidated the intellectual foundations of the orthodox revival in relation to dogmatics, the Hellenistic sciences, and the argument against the Shiʿites. See A. J. Wensinck, *La Penseé de Ghazzali,* Paris, 1940.

This development arose out of two cardinal elements in Sufism: the close personal relation between the Sūfī shaikh and his disciples, and its missionary spirit. Whereas in the early centuries, the Sūfī circles were individual and dispersed units, the loose proliferation of individual activities was now replaced by more organized structures. Regular colleges were founded, with the aid of benefactions and alms, by particular shaikhs, who commissioned their leading disciples, after training in the special rites and rules of the "order," to organize daughter colleges in other centers and regions, and these maintained a close association with the original college and the successors of its founder.

Such networks of affiliated colleges and convents constituted a "path" (*ṭarīqa*). Their function was not only to train initiates but to serve as centers of religious instruction and spiritual influence among the general population, who were associated with the order as "lay members." At some stage, not yet definitely established, lay membership was integrated with the guild organizations of artisans and other professions, each guild or corporation being affiliated to a particular *ṭarīqa,* and extended also to village and tribal areas. While many *ṭarīqas* had only local importance, the greater orders (such as the Qādirī, Shādhilī, and Suhrawardī) spread over the whole or a large part of Islamic territory. Thus they contributed, even more effectively than the orthodox institution (but at the same time building upon the foundations laid in earlier centuries by the common authority of the *Sharīᶜah*) to maintain the ideal unity of all Muslims, in spite of a very few Shiᶜite *ṭarīqas* and of deviation from strict orthodoxy among the initiates of some more extreme orders.

It was not only the physical expansion of the great *ṭarīqas,* however, that served the cause of unity. Teachers and disciples journeyed from end to end of the Muslim world, bearing the seeds of interchange and cross-fertilization within the Sūfī framework. While this had been a characteristic of Islamic culture from the early centuries, its importance was now immensely increased. One consequence of the Turkish immigrations and Mongol invasions was to harden the division of the Muslim lands into separate Arabic, Persian and Turkish linguistic regions, between which literary intercommunication was confined to restricted circles of the educated. Although the effects of this division can be seen also in the distribution of the *ṭarīqas,* the activities of the Sūfī teachers did much to counteract them by furnishing a means for the transference of ideas across linguistic frontiers and guiding their further development on parallel lines.

How effective the communication of ideas was between the initiates in every region is strikingly shown by a development which was to prove of decisive significance for the future cultural action and influence of Sufism—the evolution of its own intellectual system and literature. In its pure essence, Sufism, being a personal religious

attitude emphasizing intuitive experience against rational knowledge, could in so far as it added to or diverged from the *Sharīᶜah* basis of Islam, present no common body of doctrine. But it was inevitable that as institutional forms developed with organized teaching certain doctrinal tendencies should crystallize within them. The general trend was towards pantheism; but in the major orders these tendencies were stabilized in one or other of two related philosophies. One was illuminationist, deriving ultimately from Asiatic gnosticism and systematized by Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī;[13] the other was monist, deriving from popular Hellenistic philosophy (probably through the Fāṭimid literature), and expounded by the Spanish Arab Muḥyi⁾l-dīn Ibn al-ᶜArabī.[14] The former was widely disseminated in the eastern provinces; the latter at first in the Arabic and Turkish orders, but later also in the East.

The intellectual consequences of this were extremely grave. Instead of revitalizing the inert matter of scholastic instruction in the *madrasas,* it drew intellectual energies off into subjective and antirational speculation, leaving the former more inert than ever and supplying no rigorous intellectual discipline in its place. On the other hand—emphasizing the social function of Sufism as an expression of cultural unity—these mystical institutions and adumbrations were enshrined in a new poetical literature, which utilized popular literary forms (wine-songs, love-songs, romances, apologues) and transposed or transformed their imagery into religious symbolism. These productions, spread over all the Muslim world, in Arabic, Persian, or Turkish, were appreciated by all classes and for several centuries all but monopolized literary and aesthetic creation. The greater part of prose literature followed in their wake, furnishing in its higher ranges commentaries (in the true scholastic tradition) on the works of the masters and their successors or on the great Persian poems, and in its lower ranges lives and legends of saints and other devotional works.

Finally the Sūfī movement, in spite of its original quietism and pacifism, took too firm root in the social organization of the Muslim peoples not to have also political effects. Especially in regions, such as Persia and Anatolia after the collapse of Mongol rule, where centralized political institutions had broken down by dynastic disruption of nomadization, the Sūfī brotherhood was often the only form of social organization left. It naturally served, in consequence, as the basis of association for self-defense against the violence of local tyrants or tribesmen, and in favorable conditions developed into a fighting force, emulating the achievements of the primitive Muslim armies "in the

[13] Executed for heresy at Aleppo in 1191. See *Shihāb-al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī: Opera Metaphysica et Mystica,* ed. H. Corbin, vol. I, Istanbul, 1945, Introduction.

[14] Died at Damascus 1240. See A. E. Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid dīn-Ibnul ᶜArabī,* Cambridge, 1939.

path of God." The inner history of northern Persia in the 14th and 15th centuries is obscure, but it seems probable that most political movements had Sūfī affiliations of some kind. In contemporary Anatolia, the town artisans were organized in *akhī* guilds, the tribal revolts led by Sūfī shaikhs, and most of the small principalities were "*ghāzi* states," devoted to war against the infidel and organized in corporations led by amīrs but frequently, if not in all cases, associated with a Sūfī *ṭarīqa*. Of the two great empires which were to divide Western Asia between them until the 20th century, it has been shown fairly conclusively that the Ottoman Empire began as such a "*ghāzi* state," [15] and there is no question that its rival the Safavid kingdom of Persia, was created by the shaikhs of the Safavī suborder of the Suhrawardī *ṭarīqa*. [16]

Thus through the influence and activity of Sufism the Islamic world was entirely transformed from the 13th century onwards—spiritually, morally, intellectually, imaginatively, and even politically—and only the orthodox *madrasas* preserved a tenuous link with the cultural tradition of medieval Islam.

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[15] See on this, and on conditions on Anatolia generally, P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire,* London, 1938, especially pp. 33-40.

[16] See W. Hinz, *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert,* Berlin-Leipzig, 1936.

THE CHRISTIAN MISSION AND TURKISH ISLAM

It is now thirty years, or one generation, since Christian missionaries in Turkey began conducting their work under severe government regulations which curtail the explicitly religious activity in which they may engage. As fruits of this more or less experimental period, a variety of proposals are appearing for future Christian strategy in Turkey. These seem to fall in three clusters, three fairly distinct alternatives. This paper undertakes to examine the potential effectiveness and success of each of these alternative strategies. It leaves untouched, as do most of those who make these proposals, the more ultimate theological questions. The present paper is less concerned with what *should* be done than with what *can* be done. Dealing as it does with the meeting of minds and spirits, the study will lean heavily on psychological analysis.

The three clusters of proposals can be identified as follows:

1. Straightforward Christian proclamation. At every opportunity, set forth the fundamental Christian *kerygma* exactly as it has been received. It may be impossible to press for immediate conversion, but nevertheless, every Turk must hear the story of what God has done in Christ, as best the missionary knows that story.

2. Explicit religious sharing. Go before the people as one with a vital and dedicated religious concern, as one whose work is clearly directed at the aim that all men may know and believe and act aright, but also as one who is willing and able to listen and share as well as to teach. Give your witness as one of religious importance, but as a tentative conviction, open to change. It is the hope that the Turk will listen in a like spirit.

3. Implicit religious teaching. Do not identify your work as primarily religious. Avoid words and deeds that are identified by the Turks as religious teaching. Convey the Christian message in a context and in terms which the Turk will understand and to which he may respond positively. The religious philosophy, loyalty, and behavior of a student can be greatly shaped, even though he never recognizes any of his teaching or guidance as religious.

I. STRAIGHTFORWARD CHRISTIAN PROCLAMATION

Those who urge that the Christian's primary task in Turkey is to present the central orthodox Christian doctrines would push to the limit every legal opportunity available for setting forth these traditional doctrines. In and out of existing institutions they would press to tell the good news of Jesus Christ, as they themselves have learned it and experienced it.

Advantages: Taking such a message to Muslim people gives them

a clear-cut opportunity. Here is something fairly simple and direct in which they are asked only to believe, in order to assure their salvation. They are accustomed to considering right belief as a key to salvation, and it is conceivable that a number of people would be willing to consider the possibility that this new belief might be more correct than the old. Hell is vividly and dangerously close for the Muslim, and his life is dedicated against taking any chances.

At the same time that the Muslim is motivated to find the right belief, the present day Turk, more than any other generation, may be less sure that he already has it. In modern Turkey, the formerly impervious structure of Islamic faith has been battered, until it no longer serves as the integrating center of life. At the same time, complexities have been introduced into the Turk's life, which might well have taxed the capacities of even a thriving Islamic faith to comprehend. This double movement has left the modern Turk/Muslim in a generally distructured, non-integrated state of spiritual turbulence, psychologically ripe for the acceptance of any new faith which promises to organize and give meaning to the many strange facets of life. [1] This is the opportunity, as well as the challenge, for this direct approach, as it is also to a lesser extent for the other approaches.

Disadvantages: Against these factors which encourage the proposed direct method, there are arrayed all the difficulties which have made "direct evangelism" generally fruitless in the past.

Although belief is important for Muslims, they are accustomed to considering ritualistic actions even more important for salvation. The Muslim is psychologically conditioned to feel the need to be *doing* something as a means of winning Divine favor. The Christian message has no directions of this kind.

Similarly, the Muslim regards the personality and deeds of the prophet as much less significant than the laws he delivers. Traditions about the prophet tend to be considered *ḥadith* and peripheral. Yet the Christian missionary proclaiming the fundamental Christian doctrines concentrates precisely on such accounts *about* Jesus Christ.

These two differences represent a fundamental distinction between two *kinds* of religion. The difference may make Christianity a higher religion, but the important point here is that it takes it out of the Muslim's reach. He needs a lift up, something to stand on, before he can grasp it. He needs to have his whole understanding of the nature of religion changed before he can respond appropriately to this direct presentation. (To serve these needs is the purpose of the second and third mission alternatives, as discussed below.)

More familiar obstacles, of course, lie in the resistance to Christianity built up through a succession of encounters. The Turks are so

[1] For a number of historical reasons, Communism does not seem to be a live alternative for the Turks as it is for many people in similar spiritual plights.

conditioned that as soon as they identify a speaker discussing Christianity, they respond not with interested attention, but with inattention or hostility.

The Muslim has particular reason to be sensitive about the superiority of his own faith. Islam has grown up as the self-designated fulfillment of the other major world faiths. It was commissioned to rule the world in God's name. Its book and prophet brought a final revelation, which corrected the errors of Christianity and Judaism. Proselytizing has always been a particular problem in Islam, and the average Muslim may be looking for proselytizing even where none is intended.

One further important aspect of this type of missionary method must be considered in detail. Christianity, in its aim, is essentially an integrating, unifying influence. Christian love must bind men together. Christian faith must integrate and channel the resources of a personality, relating the whole man with his Creator. Yet we find that this direct evangelistic method commonly leads to disintegration and divisiveness and thereby defeats its own ends.

(1) It separates the convert from his community or appears to be attempting such separation.

(2) More significant is the division within the personality of a convert. The old cannot simply be wiped away and the new substituted. The old religion and its manifold social and cultural components are represented in the individual by complex habit structures over which he has little, if any, conscious control. These persist, even as the person verbally and consciously tries to adopt new habit structures and thought patterns. This conflict must produce tremendous anxiety within the personality, particularly dangerous and disruptive because subconscious. It is doubtful whether a person suffering this strain can in fact attain the peace and sense of "oneness with God" and the other religious benefits which he is seeking.

(3) This method separates the missionary from the community in which he is living. This may be complete physical separation, or it may be merely a lack of close *rapport* with the people who see that the missionary sets himself as one apart, possessing unique and different truth. It is self-defeating, because it prohibits the missionary from understanding and speaking to the actual spiritual climate in which he is working. It also prevents him from entering in and exerting a Christian influence in many areas of community life where his contributions might otherwise be welcome.

The possibilities of relationship between Christianity and the other religions are far richer than the simple one of hostile exclusiveness with all its exhilaration and its appeal to the love of clear-cut-ness. [2]

In this spirit new proposals are forthcoming, in harmony with the

[2] Page 175, W. E. Hocking, *Living Religions and a World Faith.*

realism of this situation yet dedicated ultimately to the fundamental truths of the Christian proclamation.

The proposals which fall in what are regarded here as alternatives two and three are alike in considering the situation as primarily a problem of communication: How break down the barriers to communication which the Muslims have always maintained? How bring the Muslim hearers truly to understand, with their whole heart and mind, the basic Christian truths? How solve the problem of translation of truths expressed in one historical, temporal context into a different historical context?

Advocates of alternatives two and three alike are insisting on teaching the essentials of Christianity in the language which the Muslim best understands. In the case of two, this is in a definite religious context. But the point is to achieve its expression in terms of the Muslim's spiritual understanding, not the Christian's.

In the case of three, it is recognized that many educated Turks have no serviceable religious vocabulary and thought structure and that any approach in religious terms to many Turks can stimulate only misunderstanding and hostility. So the effect is to express the Christian message, as far as possible, in "secular" terms, such as in science, child care, or politics.

II. EXPLICIT RELIGIOUS SHARING

Here is a type of missionary enterprise which approaches the Muslim on equal terms. The Christian says, quite sincerely, to the Muslim: Let us each try to enhance his religious understanding and experience by trying to comprehend the insights and the experience of the other. It is not inconsistent for the Christian to enter into such a mutual relationship with an open, inquiring mind, fully prepared to accept whatever helpful insights his Muslim friend may have to offer, at the same time as he confidently anticipates that he, the Christian, will in fact have much more to give than to receive.

Such a mutual spiritual search may be highly formalized in organized inter-faith study, discussion, and devotional groups. Or it may simply characterize the more informal and casual associations which the missionary has in the course of his dealings with Turkish people. It is the attitude, the method of approach, which is here discussed not any particular form of organized work. The essence of this approach is that the missionary declares himself as primarily concerned with religious matters, that he regards the spiritual welfare of his Turkish friends as well as of his Christian friends as of the most urgent importance, that he wishes to pursue this urgent matter at every opportunity, and that he wishes to do this in the spirit of mutual searching and sharing and wishes to be a learner as well as teacher.

This line of action would seem to solve many of the problems of

religious approach to Muslims, but also opens up a number of potential difficulties.

Its chief accomplishment is its success in breaking down the barriers of inattention and belligerence which have almost always confronted any effort to speak of Christianity to Muslims. In psychological terms, instead of presenting Christian doctrine within a total pattern of stimuli (e.g.: preaching and exhorting) to which the Muslim has learned to respond with hostility, the same doctrine can now be presented within a new pattern of stimuli—free discussion—to which many Turks have learned in other experiences to respond positively and with enthusiasm. This is true not only among modern Turks educated in democratic traditions, but also among the villige men, who are accustomed to gather for evening discussion, often on religion. Through this approach, the missionary may be able to get inside the Muslim's religious experience, where his religious life is actually lived and where it can be affected, rather than simply be pounding against an impregnable defensive exterior.

The main danger in any such inter-faith communication is the twin temptation to stress superficial similarities between the faiths and to stress superficial differences. The task is to get at the heart of the religions concerned.

Controversy over such things as the doctrine of the Trinity can be avoided by the expedient of "agreeing to disagree." But this defeats the very purpose of the exterprise, which is to explore and share the essential elements of each faith.

The controversy can also be avoided by deliberately plunging deeper than these rather superficial distinctions. [3] Instead of arguing whether the Qurʾān or the Bible is the true revelation, we must study the deepest meaning of revelation itself. Instead of arguing about whether God is one or triune, we must probe much deeper into the basic questions which these concepts of unity or trinity feebly try to represent. Instead of arguing which religion is true, we must discover together what is the real essence and meaning of religion.

Difficult as these too readily apparent differences are, the greater problem and much more subtle danger lies in overemphasis of superficial similarities. The temptation is to discover more and more of these similarities as proof that the faiths, or their adherents, are drawing together. There are many parallel elements in the monotheism, the role of prophets and scriptures, and many other aspects. But it is the mark of intellectual and moral complacency and laziness to dwell on such "similarities." The fundamental theological differences represented in these elements are too great.

To express this danger of finding parallels and similarities is prob-

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[3] This paragraph follows Luṭfī Levonian, Christian Apologetics in Relation to Islam, *Union Seminary Quarterly Review,* Nov. 1951.

ably the same as to point out the semantic danger which is so often emphasized. The Muslim uses many of the same religious words as the Christian. When the latter tries to express his message in these words, he finds that they carry to the former a large pattern of connotations with which he has associated the word in his experience, but which the Christian never intended.

It is also the same as to warn of the over-rationalization inherently possible in this kind of pursuit. It may lead to a sterile scholasticism or "scribism," without a firm experiential base in the deeper essentials of religion. But there is no fundamental reason that the sharing cannot proceed in matters of devotion, worship, and personal testimony of experience, though this is more difficult.

But to get to the heart of their spiritual concerns, the Muslim and the Christian must start with that which they have most in common and which is perhaps of principal significance: their common plight as humans in the 20th century. To recognize each other as fellow men with similar hopes and dreams and with similar frustrations imposed by common circumstances—then they are proceeding with what is vital and central and may be on the way toward real resolutions and discoveries, in the essence of religious experience.

III. IMPLICIT RELIGIOUS TEACHING

The technique of implicit, perhaps even covert, teaching of religious and moral truths within the framework of nominally secular activities is the method which has in fact been chiefly followed in Turkey for the last 30 years. But the principles and presuppositions of this type of work have not been clearly formulated by those who practiced it. Many, in fact, have not even recognized it as a legitimate alternative, but only as a stopgap measure.

The rationale underlying this approach seems to be no different from that of any great religious teaching or preaching, including the Old Testament prophets and Jesus Himself. It is simply to communicate the Christian message in whatever terms the hearer can understand, to make the demands and affirmations of the Gospel meaningful to the situation in which the person actually lives. The effort is to effect the behavior and attitudes of people, to orient their lives toward the loving Father who is their Creator and Redeemer, even before they are able to comprehend or accept rationally all that this means. It is the process of most religious development that rational and verbally expressed convictions follow, not precede, experiences and attitudes.

Almost any area of life is susceptible to interpretation within a religious perspective. Any area, that is, may become a stepping-stone for a person to move toward the discovery of the loving Father.

As parent-teacher groups associated with mission schools examine problems of child development, they would come face to face with the basic Christian estimation of man and his place in the universe.

Many current educational principles have embodied, although disguised, Christian perspectives. These are readily available for presentation in non-religious vocabulary.

Teaching agricultural methods to village farmers and health measures to their wives involves a great shift in their conceptions. The new methods imply a change from an inscrutable, unpredictable, heartless, uncaring Allāh to creative forces in the universe which are accessible to men and which are willing to help them in their own ends, and which can be depended on to operate consistently. If the farmer is behaving as though he believed in a trusted, loving God, there is some reason to hope that he may eventually profess such a belief with his lips, too.

American movies and books flood Turkey, some of which carry an essentially ethical or religious message, which is usually not evident in the translation. Reviews in the popular press could make the religious values in them much more apparent to Turkish readers and viewers, without ever deliberately stating the religion in specific terms.

Schools abound with possibilities for affecting deeply the religious attitudes of growing minds. In the science classroom, for example, one can humble the boy before the intricacies and majesty of all Creation. But that is only the beginning. He slowly begins to discover that these forces of the universe about him—even though not spelled with a capital F—are willing to cooperate and aid him if approached on their own terms. (Or, in other words, "Ask and ye shall receive..."). He is impressed with the importance of each individual organism within the total scheme. ("Consider the lilies...") He finds that in dealing with these things, he is proceeding on large measures of faith, faith in certain postulates which he accepts as basic to his decisions and actions even though they remain unproved. He is impressed with the history of great men who have proceeded on such supra-rational faith to great works in truly devoted cooperation with these great Forces in which they believed. ("...ye shall say unto this mountain, remove...") In the laboratory, he begins to experience a true mystic sense of communion with the creative purposes of the universe, purposes which must be greater than his own mind, because he has learned the scientific principle that every entity—his own mind, for example—has a cause and that results cannot exceed their causes. ("The servant is not greater than his Lord...")

Science teaching, like religious, is a process of relating the particular problem which the boy faces to greater principles, and these in turn to more ultimate principles. The boy finds science to be a continual pursuit of basic Truths that are not immediately apparent but only slowly apprehended, partly through their own self-revelation and partly through man's search. He finds that such pursuit has required the most steadfast dedication of great men who were willing to obey the Truth, rather than yield to popular superstition, personal discomfort, public

ridicule, or frequent disillusion. The effect of this lesson is not greatly reduced because the names happen to be those like Galileo and Curie instead of Francis and Luther.

Or move with the boy from science lesson to English class, where he may be receiving inspiration from biographies of those who have followed God's will in one way or another; examining the moral issues at the heart of much great literature; discussing the deepest meaning of such terms as forgiveness, conscience, unselfishness, humility, love, brother; or writing essays which compel him to bring up out of unconscious reservoirs these new, vague concepts he is discovering and to make them more explicitly, more consciously his own accepted philosophy.

Certain weaknesses in this approach are immediately apparent, some of them basic theological problems, some of them within the scope of this paper, which is concerned with evaluating effectiveness. Four of the latter are:

(1) The lack of a sharp, clear-cut issue, an easily discernible content and program, not only reduces the motivating energy of the missionary, but also reduces the effective comprehension on the part of the Turk. It is much harder to learn if you do not know what you are supposed to learn or even that you are supposed to be learning anything. However, unconscious learning can take place. In fact, it may be that most of any person's basic habit structures, modes of perception, and other such subverbal behavior are acquired through subconscious conditioning. Here is the psychological area in which this procedure would aim to operate.

If this lack of clarity is an educational weakness, it seems to be the price that has to be paid for this type of indirect, penetrating approach. It is also harder for the Turk to resist learning when he does not know that he is learning. Resistance has generally been on the conscious, verbal level, which is largely circumvented by this method.

(2) The method frankly relies on non-spiritual cultural supports. It can not work if people are not eager to go to American schools, learn English, see American movies, learn Western science and Western methods of farming, raising children, etc. This dilutes immeasurably the actual spiritual communication and also holds out little promise for anything enduring beyond the duration of American popularity in Turkey. The hope of meeting this is to direct work which will move into the more specific spiritual concerns of alternative two. This does provide some hope of outlasting the cultural and political popularity of Americans.

(3) In the case of the many Turks with definitely anti-religious prejudices and convictions, such infiltration of Christian principles into their secular frame of values only fortifies that secular philosophy from any direct attack by religion. The secular idealist, like the devout

Muslim, will find less disparity and less motivation to change once his own position is strengthened by this permeation or inoculation.

(4) Because ethics, character training, and moral values are much easier to convey in non-religious vocabulary than is theology, there is a real danger in this plan of inculcating an ethical system without a theological foundation.

The basic strength of the approach lies in its realistic appraisal of the nature of Islam, of the problems of religious communication, and of fundamental religious psychology.

(1) The plan meets the challenge laid down by many Christian critics of Islam who stress the need for fundamental shifts in the Muslim approach to religion. The basic level of religious thinking must be raised to new planes, totally new perspectives, new dimensions, new categories. Islam needs a much more radical change than is possible as long as Muslims continue thinking and talking in their familiar rigid theological categories. This plan sets out to break these categories and to attack the grossest deficiencies in Muslim thinking about the universe and man's relations to it. Until these are modified and elevated to new dimensions, there is no use proceeding any further; and these can be modified only by fundamental changes in the philosophic and cultural context of the community.

(2) By avoiding that which the Muslim considers religion, this method avoids the pitfall of fruitless controversy over superficial, less important matters. It does not meet the Muslim on the grounds on which he is strongest and at the same time most sensitive. It is an encircling action to get around his defenses—not for the purpose of undermining them, but for the purpose of seizing him unawares and lifting him above them so that he can see more distant horizons and greater perspective, all before he has a chance to man his defenses.

(3) Better than any of the other alternatives, this method recognizes the inescapable educational principle of starting where the person is and leading him from that point, building on his past. The Turkish people generally are far more interested in farming, politics, movies, science, child care than they are in religion. It is at these points that they are doing their thinking, hoping, planning, feeling; and if the missionary wants to find access to the inner life of the people, he must find it here. The mere fact that the missionary himself may never have related religious truths to these matters is not sound reason to suppose that this cannot or should not be done.

This approach poses clear theological questions which cannot be ignored. But neither can they be answered easily. To what extent are popular Christian formulations absolute and final truths and to what extent are they symbols, configurations, human and limited approximations of the divine Real? This is the chief question. No single form of church building is considered absolute but is adapted to native architecture and symbolism as Christianity moves around the world.

The figure of the Lamb of God is objectionable to the Japanese, and the image of the Good Shepherd is repugnant to a Turk, for whom shepherding is a task left to the village idiot. The truths expressed for us in these forms can be and have been re-phrased in forms understood by others. Is there something absolutely final and ultimate, or is there still an element of humanly conditioned symbolism even in the vocabulary which expresses the most central Christian doctrines. If in any sense these things can be considered as human approximations and configurations of more ultimate truth, if in any sense they can be considered as symbols for the truth, rather than the truth itself—then the Christian missonary has the sacred calling to consecrated two-fold effort: to grasp the essential truths here symbolized and to communicate them to his people. Can the fullness of the personality of God and His rich, out-going, many-sided relation with His creation be expressed in any form more meaningful and more real to the Turk than the strict statement of the doctrine of the Trinity? Can the selfless, outpouring, redeeming love of God be understood by anything within the Turk's grasp of comprehension which will lead him to the truth which we perceive in the events of the Crucifixion?

The essence of the problem is to find that within the personal or social experience of the Muslim Turk in which, with the missionary's help, he can recognize God's voice. The appeal of the Christian missionary must be to that which has transpired within the experience of his hearer, and not necessarily to that within the missionary's experience. The Turk does not come with a clean tablet waiting for religious revelation. He comes to the missionary with a fully developed personality. If there has not been something in the developing experience of that personality which represents the redemptive love of God, God's demand for spiritual allegiance, and whatever else the Christian feels he has to tell the Muslim—then God is more limited and confined in his dealings with men than the Christian believes Him to be.

Hendrick Kraemer speaks of repeated "incarnations" of Christian truth. [4] Christian revelation first was communicated through the New Testament story. Later the same truths were incarnated in new contexts, in Greek thought forms, in "Augustine's philosophy of history, in the medieval synthesis of Christian, Greek, and Germanic elements, in the various national expressions of Christianity in Protestantism." What is suggested here is one further "incarnation."

Carried to such a development, alternative three (with its evolution into alternative two) poses a tremendous task for the missionary, requiring mastery of Christian and Muslim theology, sociology, and psychology. But it is also a gloriously consequential task. Here is where Christianity can significantly confront and affect modern Islam.

[4] *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World,* 1938, p. 312.

SUMMARY

This paper has examined the potential effectiveness of each of the three alternatives for missionary action which seem open to the Christian representatives in Turkey.

The most important problems can be summarized under two headings: (1) the overt opposition to Christian preaching which is peculiar to Islam because of historical conditions and because of certain elements within Islam; and (2) the difficulty of communicating with understanding the essentials of the Christian faith. This latter problem results, among other things, from the many superficial similarities between the two faiths, from the utterly different thought dimensions which the two faiths use, and from the distinct cultural backgrounds which the Christian and Muslim bring to their contact.

It is contended that the missionary plan of attack which endeavours to "reincarnate" the essence of Christianity into the "secular" life and thought habits of the modern Turk best transcends these difficulties. As this process gradually overcomes these problems of resistance and communication, it will tend naturally to evolve into the program of explicit spiritual reconstruction of faith for the Turkish people which has been called alternative two.

The first plan, alternative three, has within it certain weaknesses (depending on non-religious cultural supports, temptation for ethical teaching without theological support, and the practical difficulty of communicating religious truth in secular vocabulary) which are overcome by the second. The second, however, cannot operate successfully until certain preparation has been made by alternative three (elevating the theological dimension of thinking; increasing the confidence and respect of the Turks in the Christians as persons; creating a sense of lack of an integrated religious perspective, which is the necessary motivation for religious pursuit).

The start must be with the Turkish individual as a person, with his needs and interests and his already available resources. Building from there, the controlling purpose must be to help him to construct out of his own experiences and insights (God's revelations to him, as it were) the religious expressions, belief, and conduct which most truly meet his particular needs and bring him as an individual into closest harmony with God.

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AḤMADIYYAT IN PAKISTAN

Rabwah and the Aḥmadis

Near the town of Chiniot in the Punjab the Chenab river passes through low rocky hills. On the west bank of the river and at the foot of the hills is an arid salt flat which appears to be most inhospitable tract of land in the entire district. In the normal course of events one would expect to have found such a place devoid of life, with only an occasional scrub bush or hardy clump of grass to break the dry monotony. But life in the Punjab in recent years has been far from normal. An international boundary has appeared, cutting through the heart of the province, dividing Muslim Pakistan from India. As a result millions of Punjabis, amidst great social upheaval, moved their homes from one side of the border to the other. Now, six years later, this dusty flat supports a community of four thousand people known as Rabwah, a town which functions as the new center of the Aḥmadiyya Movement.

The Aḥmadiyya Movement, once described as "not important in Indian Islam," [1] has been involved in doctrinal disputes with the non-Aḥmadī Muslim community of India ever since the founder, Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad of Qadian, made his controversial claims to have been the recipient of a new revelation from God. Lately this dispute has crystallized in the form of a political agitation which in March, 1953, erupted in violent rioting in most of the important cities of the Punjab. Peace returned to the province only after the establishment of martial law. The political repercussions of the agitation, which are still being felt, caused the downfall of the provincial government of Mian Mumtaz Daultana and were influential in the replacement of Khwaja Nazimuddin as prime minister. In addition to this direct impact on the political life of the nation, the riots have served to focus attention on the role the Aḥmadis are playing in the development of the concept of an Islamic state in Pakistan. This indicates, also, that Smith's judgement as to the importance of the Movement is no longer valid.

The new circumstances which have made the Aḥmadis a national "problem" take their rise in the intimate connection of Islamic religion with Islamic polity. During the period of British rule in India, when the government was committed to a policy of religious neutrality, sectarian movements in the religious communities of the nation were of relatively minor political significance. The fact that many orthodox *ʿulamāʾ* considered Aḥmadiyyat to be a heresy had no direct bearing on the process of government or on the national political structure. The creation of Pakistan, however, altered the situation in a fundamental way. Islamic religion now became the ideological foundation of the new

[1] W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1946), p. 298.

state. In their continuing attempt to establish the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" political leaders are translating tenets of religion into concrete patterns of political, social, and economic life. In this situation any reinterpretation of these tenets of Islam, such as the Aḥmadis are accused of making, is bound to have a disturbing effect on the other spheres of national life. This is particularly true of the present time, during which the delicate constitutional problem remains to be finally resolved. In these circumstances the Aḥmadis are finding it impossible to maintain themselves as a strictly religious organization, although their claim to be just that is clearly stated. [2] The political implications of a reform movement, with a membership numbering a quarter of a million [3] and represented in the public consciousness by a person as prominent as Foreign Minister Zafrullāh Khān, are too obvious to be ignored. [4]

It is not a new thing to find the Aḥmadis involved in controversial issues. From the beginning the founder's extravagant claims brought him into disputes with the major religious communities of India. [5] In addition to these external disputations, there arose an internal controversy over the issue of leadership which resulted in a division of the Movement. Although there were internal tensions during the term of the first *khalīfah,* Nūr-ud-Dīn, an open break was prevented by his willingness to remain under the guidance of the Movement and not assert his personal authority. The break did occur when Ghulām Aḥmad's son, Bashīr-ud-Dīn, the present head of the Movement, was elected the second *khalīfah.* Part of the motivating force behind the division was personal animosity, but involved, also, was a difference of opinion on a political issue; namely, whether or not some Aḥmadis should have joined with the Muslim League in a protest to the British government over an incident in Cawnpore in which a portion of a mosque was demolished in order to clear the right-of-way for a road.

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[2] Bashīr-ud-Dīn, *What is Ahmadiyyat?* (Rabwah: Nashr-o-Ishaat, n.d.), pp. 38-60.

[3] This estimate was given by Bashīr-ud-Dīn to the Punjab Disturbances Court of Inquiry (*The Pakistan Times* [Lahore], January 16, 1954).

[4] Yakūb ᶜAlī Khān, Counsel for former Punjab Chief Minister Daultana, expressed this point of view in his argument before the Court of Inquiry: "Stating that religious emotion of the Muslims had played a predominant role in the establishment of Pakistan and that the very conception of the two-nation theory had made creed and faith relevant to the determination of nationality, he submitted that both the objectives of 'freedom for the Muslims' and the ideal of 'an Islamic State' had concentrated attention and emotion on a religious ideology. The Counsel made out that since the feeling of devotion and patriotism were evoked and centered around the concept of *'millat'* [nation in the spiritual and ideological sense] rather than of *'waṭan'* [nation in the geographical sense], it was inevitable that in such an atmosphere religious issues should gain greater significance, and that attention should come to be focussed on matters of faith and creed and religious differences should begin to over-step into the political field." (*The Pakistan Times,* February 9, 1954).

[5] Ghulām Aḥmad claimed that he was the Promised Messiah of Christianity, the tenth *avatar* of Krishna, and the Mahdi of Islam. Thus, he considered himself to be the fulfillment of the apocalyptic expectations of three great religions.

Ghulām Aḥmad had repeatedly advised his followers to stay out of politics and support the government in power.[6] Bashīr-ud-Dīn took a similar stand, and criticized the important Aḥmadī missionary to Great Britain, Kwaja Kamāl-ud-Dīn, for becoming involved in these political issues. The result was that, after the election, Kamāl-ud-Dīn and Muḥammad ᶜAlī, the editor of the Aḥmadi journal, *The Review of Religions,* left Qadian with a group of their own supporters, and established a new organization in Lahore.

The achievement of independence and the partition of the Punjab was accompanied by a communal hatred which engulfed the province in a tragic war of extermination. Hindus and Sikhs left their ancestral homes west of the Radcliffe Line to take up residence in the new truncated India. On the other side Muslims who chose Pakistani citizenship found themselves to be despised "foreigners" as they migrated westward. The Radcliffe Line ran midway between Lahore and Amritsar, giving the former city to Pakistan and the latter to India. As a consequence, the Lahori Aḥmadis found themselves placed within the new Muslim state. Such was not the case with the Qadianis. Qadian is situated in Gurdaspur district, which was given, except for one tahsil, to East Punjab. It meant that Qadian would be situated in India and that the Aḥmadi community there, suffering depredations by the Sikhs and feeling spiritually united with Pakistan, would have to move.

For one who has seen Rabwah the question immediately arises as to why the Qadianis decided upon this inhospitable site for their new settlement. Interestingly enough, the reason given us in the course of a recent personal interview with the *khalīfah* was a religious one.

About two years before partition Bashīr-ud-Dīn had a vision in which Qadian was attacked with such force that he had to evacuate the Aḥmadī community. It was revealed to him that the Aḥmadis would find refuge in *nila gumbad,* which means "blue dome." Since there is a section of Lahore known as Nila Gumbad, the name being derived from a mosque in the vicinity whose dome at one time was covered with blue tiles, the *khalīfah* assumed that the vision referred to a future refuge in Lahore. However, when the forced evacuation actually did take place, emissaries of the *khalīfah* discovered that the community would not be welcomed in Lahore, and they were left with the problem of finding a place to go. Reports came in that the Rabwah site could be purchased, a location bounded on two sides by hills. Bashīr-ud-Dīn was reminded by his advisers that the published report of his vision had

[6] Ghulām Aḥmad's expression of friendliness toward the British can be easily understood in the light of the fact that it was British tolerance of the Movement which permitted it to survive. This attitude has been another point of issue with other Muslims. When Bashīr-ud-Dīn was questioned directly on this point, he replied: "Gratitude is a moral obligation and has nothing to do with politics. It is true that we are beholden to them [the British] for the justice they have done to everybody including ourselves" (*The Pakistan Times,* January 17, 1954).

contained a reference to hills, also. Furthermore, he now realized that *nila gumbad* was the blue dome of the open sky. With the certain feeling that God had revealed to him the destination, the *khalīfah*, like a modern Moses, brought his people out of India to the promised land of Pakistan.

In the choice of the Rabwah site there were, undoubtedly, other considerations in addition to the religious one. It has been suggested that one contributing factor to the choice of this site is its defensive possibilities.[7] It is reasonable to assume this to be true, since the history of the Movement has been punctuated by persecutions and the community had just emerged from the dreadful partition communal conflagration.

Hazrat Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd Aḥmad, second *khalīfah* of the Promised Messiah, lives in a brick and plaster palace, *Qasr-i-Khilāfat*, which adjoins the Mabarak Mosque. He has four wives and a large number of children. At least three of his sons occupy prominent positions in Aḥmadī institutions. One is Nazīr Aḥmad,[8] principal of Taʿlīm-ul-Islām College; another is Dr. Manawar Aḥmad of the Nur Hospital. A third son is Mabarak Aḥmad, Chief Secretary of Foreign and Domestic Missions. A private secretary arranges interviews with the *khalīfah*, whose office is located on the second floor of the palace. The *khalīfah* is stocky and of medium height, and he possesses a full jet-black beard. His manner was courteous and pleasant. Our conversation moved along easily in English. Since his public pronouncements are invariably in Urdu, his good knowledge of English surprised us.

"Hazrat Sahib," as his followers call him, spoke in a very matter-of-fact way about his visions and his close relationship to God. He told us that, as he speaks, he often feels God take possession of his tongue, forming the words, and, while writing, God often guides his pen. When this occurs the spoken and written words are God's while the *khalīfah* merely functions as an instrument of revelation. There are framed quotations on the mantle above the fireplace in his office which bring to mind former visions. One bears the words, "William the Conqueror," and is a reminder of a vision thirty years ago, when the *khalīfah* saw himself landing at Hastings with the Norman invader and driving the English forces to defeat. Since coming to Rabwah, one important vision dealt with the matter of water supply. The precise location of the only successful tube well in the town was revealed to him.

Bashīr-ud-Dīn presides over a community whose members are not only energetic but are organized to direct their energy into constructive channels. As a result Rabwah has developed rapidly with the con-

[7] This assumption was confirmed by Bashīr-ud-Dīn in his Court of Inquiry testimony (*The Pakistan Times*, January 17, 1954).

[8] Nazīr Aḥmad was arrested and jailed during the anti-Aḥmadī riots.

struction of several hundred buildings of various types. The larger permanent buildings in Rabwah were built to house the various institutions of the Movement. A listing of them will serve as a good index of these activities:

Sadr Anjuman-i-Aḥmadiyya—As the name states, this is the "Chief Society" of the Movement. It also is the oldest of the institutions, having been founded at the expressed desire of Ghulām Aḥmad before his death. It is designed to conduct the affairs of the Movement as a governing body. The *Sadr* is organized as a committee of "elders," and it was the question of whether supreme authority rested in this committee or in the person of the *khalīfah* which ultimately led to the division in the Movement.

The *Sadr* occupies a building of impressive proportions near the center of the town. In this building are situated the many departmental offices of the *Sadr,* which deal with such matters as "internal" and "external" affairs, finance, law, property, and education. The finance department contains the treasury and a banking service which lends money interest free to Aḥmadī business men. [9]

Tahrīk-i-Jadīd—This building is located across the avenue from the *Sadr* building and is similar in design. The *Tahrīk* was founded in 1934 for the purpose of carrying out a "fundamental" requirement of Islam, "*Viz.,* the propagation of the Word of God to the farthest corners of the world." [10] The process of propagation, called *tablīgh,* is carried on in Pakistan and in foreign countries, Muslim as well as non-Muslim.

In carrying out this purpose the *Tahrīk* has achieved a certain degree of success. Mission centers have been established in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Indonesia, China, Japan, and a missionary to Australia is about to be sent from Rabwah. Indonesia and West Africa appear to be the places of greatest current effort, although European and American converts cause more of a stir among the people at Rabwah. Since the establishment of Communist government in China direct contact between the Chinese Aḥmadī community and Pakistan has been cut off. Another country which presents difficulties to the Movement is Spain. There, where Muslim civilization once flourished brilliantly, Islam is being carried by Aḥmadis from house to house. In the United States the Movement has established centers in New York, Washington, and Chicago and publishes a paper, *The Muslim Sunrise.* [11] Its London headquarters

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[9] The similarity to the practice of the Ismāʿīlis should be noted. The Agha Khān maintains a keen interest in the business enterprises of his followers and lends money to them for business purposes at very low interest. Both communities realize that that their economic condition is directly related to the economic well-being of their business and commercial membership.

[10] Bashīr-ud-Dīn, "Friday Sermon of November 28, 1952," *The Review of Religions,* XLVII (January, 1953), p. 31.

[11] This title is based on a tradition that in the Last Days, when Islam will

are situated on Melrose Road. The better known Woking Mosque is run by the Lahoris.

With the establishment of the *Tahrīk* Aḥmadī missions were placed on a sound organizational and financial basis. The total number of missionaries increased from five to fifty. [12] A Missionary College at Rabwah furnishes them with preparatory training, which includes the attainment of proficiency in Arabic and English. It is expected that these linguistic tools will enable them to "fill up the gap that separates secularism from religion." [13] In addition to the training of out-going missionaries, the College receives converts from foreign countries and instructs them in Islamics and Urdu. The heavy financial obligations of this program are met by the *Tahrīk* by direct contributions from the general membership of the Movement. The treasury of the *Tahrīk* is separate from that of the *Sadr,* and so is free to operate independently of that body.

The publication work of the *Tahrīk* is of utmost importance. Translations of the Qurʾān are being brought out in many languages; the total reached so far is fifteen. [14] It also handles the production of the monthly magazine, *The Review of Religions,* and many books and pamphlets of an apologetic nature. This material is published chiefly in Urdu and English. Another important publishing project is the lengthy English translation with commentary of the Qurʾān, of which three parts are now available.

Khuddām-ul-Aḥmadiyya—The "Servants of Ahmadiyya" is a young men's organization which does not yet have permanent housing at Rabwah; it is situated in a tent colony at the edge of the town. Branches of the *Khuddām* exist in local Aḥmadī communities throughout the country, and they encourage men to take an active part in the work of the Movement. Various religious projects are undertaken by the group from time to time. Literary and athletic competitions are staged in order to stimulate interest. Local branches with the best record of performance for the year are awarded prizes by the *khalīfah* at the time of the Annual Meeting.

Lajna Imaullah—This is a similar organization for women of all ages. Its program places more stress on the joint projects of the group, of which one was the building of the London Mosque, and does not include the competitive activities. The president of the *Lajna* is one of the four wives of the *khalīfah,* Mariyyam Saddiqah.

Taʿlīm-ul-Islām High School—A building is in the process of erection south of the main settlement which will house this high school

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sweep the world, the sun will rise in the west. In addition to these main centers, subsidiary centers have been organized in Pittsburgh and St. Louis.

[12] Bashīr-ud-Dīn, "Friday Sermon," *op. cit.,* p. 31.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] The most recent translation completed has been into Dutch. There seems to be little objection by the orthodox to this translation work of the Aḥmadis.

for boys. A large hostel near the school indicates that many students are expected to come from communities outside of Rabwah.[15] Co-education in high school and beyond is not permitted.

Taᶜlīm-ul-Islām College—The new quarters for T. I. College at Rabwah are scheduled for occupancy in 1954. At present the College is located in Lahore, where it migrated from Qadian in 1947, and occupies the buildings which were vacated by the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College.[16] T. I. College is affiliated with Punjab University, offering courses which prepare students for the Intermediate and Degree examinations. Of the approximately five hundred students enrolled three hundred are Aḥmadis.

Nusrat College—A sister institution to T. I. College located in Rabwah, it is sending students up for the Degree examination for the first time in 1954.

Fazl-i-ᶜUmar Laboratory—Previously in Model Town, Lahore, this is an institute for chemical research. Judging from the lack of specific information about its activities, it would appear that the Laboratory is currently not in operation.

Shahnawaz Residence—This is an elaborate red-and-white brick building near the northern boundary of the town. The owner is a wealthy Aḥmadī business man, who does not live permanently in Rabwah but has erected this house as a place of residence for himself and his guests. There are scores of smaller residences, also, in Rabwah which are used in the same way. This has proved to be an important aid in the rapid development of the new settlement since it has brought in outside capital in the investments in property and buildings from a large group of non-residents.

Once a year, in December, a *Jalsa* is held. It lasts three days, and Aḥmadis come from throughout Pakistan and from many foreign countries. Last year (1953) officials at Rabwah estimated that there was a gathering of almost thirty thousand. These throngs are entertained and fed free of charge.[17] The meeting is filled with conferences and public addresses. Near the center of town a large enclosure is fenced off with enough seating space on the ground for thousands. At one end the speaker's platform stands protected from the sun by a

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[15] Education receives special emphasis in the community and very high literacy rates for men and women are claimed. Cantwell Smith reported a claim of 100% male and 75% female literacy (*op. cit.*, p. 301). During our visit to Rabwah an Aḥmadī who holds a responsible office with the Director of Public Instruction of the Punjab Government gave us the figures of an 80% male and 95% female rate. Even if these claims are scaled down drastically they would still be much higher than those of the nation as a whole.

[16] The irony of this situation should be noted. Buildings which once housed the Arya Samaj college now house the Qadiani college. The bitterness of the opposition of these two groups fifty years ago would, under normal circumstances, have prevented either from performing any kind of "service" for the other!

[17] The money for this large scale operation is raised in advance by a special subscription.

large canopy, while above the assembly flutter the national flag of Pakistan and the black and white flag of the Movement. Aḥmadī missionaries make a special effort to arrange their itineraries so as to be at Rabwah during the *Jalsa,* and, if possible, converts from foreign countries are brought there to be introduced to the community. A spirit of close comradeship is everywhere in evidence.

The highlights of the public sessions are the appearances of Bashīr-ud-Dīn, at which time he leads the entire assembly in the noon prayer, and then delivers the main address of the day. These speeches—he spoke twice during the 1953 *Jalsa*—begin about one-thirty in the afternoon and last until sunset. His subject matter ranges from routine announcements and discussion of administrative matters to points of theology and interpretations of his visions. Many of his remarks touch on social and political issues. As they sit quietly and listen his followers are up lifted by the belief that the words they are hearing are of God. [18]

The most impressive aspect of Rabwah is the energetic organizational skill manifest by the community. Work is getting done. Slowly the town is being extended, temporary buildings are being replaced by permanent ones, market areas have been laid out and a start has been made to establish shops. Tree-lined avenues have been planned on ground that has never yet been cooled by shade. The money to support this activity comes in through a workable system of *chanda.* [19] Other possible sources of income apart from *chanda* would be income from agriculture and industry, but there appears to be little of either currently in progress. This means that Aḥmadis, as a whole, believe firmly enough in the *khalīfah* and the program he directs to underwrite the rather considerable expenditures he incurs by their direct contributions. Faith in Ghulām Aḥmad and his son, combined with an enthusiastic participation in the corporate life of the community, gives the Aḥmadī Movement as much vitality as any Muslim *jamaᶜat* in Pakistan.

Aḥmadiyyat and Communism

An approach can be made to understanding the Aḥmadiyya Movement in observing its response to two important "opposition" groups, Islamic orthodoxy and Communism. The character of the opposition from these two sources differs widely, of course. Islamic orthodoxy

[18] Meetings in other Aḥmadī centers, including Qadian, are held simultaneously with the *Jalsa* in Rabwah. Last year (1953) a fraternal delegation from Pakistan, led by the brother of Sir Zafrullāh Khān, went to Qadian taking with them vials of holy water from the Nankana Sahib shrine in Pakistan and copies of the *Granth Sahib* for presentation to the Sikh community of Qadian. In return they were given copies of the *Qurᵓān.* Such courtesies express the desire of the responsible leadership of both communities to build better relations between themselves.

[19] The Aḥmadī system of *chanda* requires that a sixteenth part of one's personal wealth be given to the Movement.

is represented by many individuals and groups scattered through all levels of Pakistani society. Normally it is amorphous and unorganized, but on occasion it can be rallied around certain issues, as happened in the *Taḥaffuẓ-i-khatm-i-nubuwwat* agitation of 1952 and 1953.

Communist opposition, on the other hand, is still very largely theoretical, consisting of a "war of ideas." The Communist Party of Pakistan, before its banning in July, 1954, was not much in evidence, and certainly was not in a position to threaten the Aḥmadis with persecution and suppression, as did Islamic orthodoxy, even if it had so desired. Despite this apparent organizational weakness of the Party, Communist theory, with its own analysis of current political and social problems, is very much in circulation among the educated. If the Movement takes seriously its own stated intention of becoming dominant in the world within fifty to one hundred years, the first step would be to get a world hearing, and in order to do this it must take into serious account Communist ideology.

In any discussion of the impact of Communism on Islamic countries and its chances for success the point is always made that Islam presupposes a firm belief in God while Communism is atheistic. A strengthening of Islam and belief in God is often considered to be, in itself, the most effective way of dealing with the problem. Without denying the truth in this point of view, it must be admitted that Muslim countries are still vulnerable to the infiltration of Communist ideas, and the kind of religious revival among the literate and the educated necessary for providing an effective barrier against this infiltration does not seem to be occurring in Pakistan. Present educational patterns do little to stimulate a genuine interest in religious matters. Instead, scientific materialism, as an intellectual orientation, is gaining ascendancy. Local college science departments are crowded with the best students. With the world of nature at their finger tips and the scientific method as the newly found tool for understanding this world, these students are being weaned away from the traditional Islamic outlook. The cumulative effect is bound to be destructive of inherited religious patterns, while leaving the coming generation receptive to political, social, and economic ideas which claim to be scientific.

A strong appeal which revolutionary Communism has for Asian Muslims is one which is rooted in the fact that many Asian countries are currently going through an idealistic phase of rebuilding their own national life, which is also, to a greater or lesser degree, revolutionary. This idealism expresses itself as a desire to bring into existence a society, based on ethical principles, in which all basic needs will be met, justice and brotherhood prevail, and the arts flourish. Something of this nature is the content of the concept of the Islamic state, an ideal which motivates many Muslims to place their hopes in a temporal solution of the problems of social existence in a way similar to the

functioning of the Kingdom of God ideal among many Christians. It reflects a basic optimism concerning the outcome of history, which optimism is shared, obviously, by the Communists. How long any particular people can continue to see this desire for a better society frustrated is problematical. The seemingly ubiquitous failing of those groups and individuals, who publicly profess an orthodox faith, in using religion as a means for gaining their own personal political ends must certainly generate doubt in the thinking of many as to the suitability of the religious approach. In some, this reaction against religion approaches revulsion. Meanwhile, the Pakistani does not have to look beyond the frontiers of his own continent to see other nations adhering to another ideology which has proved itself effective enough to transform age old cultures which contained abuses, weaknesses, and 20th-century anachronisms as disturbing as those which he sees around himself.

Aḥmadis are aware of the fact that Communism constitutes a secular movement capable of taking vast Islamic areas under its control, and in areas where this has happened, threatening the existence of Islam, itself. They rightly interpret the task of meeting this threat as one of establishing in the Islamic world a sound social order. Thus, Islam rightly interpreted involves the proper order of society. As the forerunner of a reformed Islam, the Movement should be made to conform in its social dimension as closely as possible to the ideal Islamic standard, so as to provide a living example of corporate social life on its highest level. Naturally, Rabwah, as the headquarters of the Movement, is looked upon as the community which should provide this example. As a manifestation of the Aḥmadī social ideal it occupies a position of crucial importance in answering, or failing to answer, the charges levelled against the religious orientation of life.

The authoritative Aḥmadī refutation of Communism was made by Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn in a speech delivered before the 1942 annual meeting at Qadian. A somewhat abridged English translation was issued later as a booklet.[20] In it the *khalīfah* also treated other rival social and economic systems.

From the Aḥmadi point of view the basic problem facing the world is the fact of a social and economic inequality that has been increasing with the passing years. "Differences in wealth and worldly possession have existed as far back as anyone can see, but the contrast was never so great as it is today."[21] The desire for obtaining economic justice is the key to a proper understanding of the development of political movements in Europe and Asia during the past two centuries, and it is in seeking a solution to the problem of inequality that these movements, as well as the religions of the world, can be evaluated. Ac-

[20] Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn, *The New World Order of Islam*, Qadian: Tahrīk-i-Jadīd, 1945.
[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

cordingly, democracy arose when people began to realize "... that the remedy lay not in the hands of individuals but in the hands of the State," [22] and that the various classes should be represented at the center so that their needs could be made known to it. Later, when the workers began the struggle for securing their rights, in contrast to those of the landed, commercial, and industrial interests, the governmental program which ensued became known as socialism. In the middle of the 19th century this movement among the workers "... received a great impetus and took on an entirely fresh orientation from the doctrines propounded by Karl Marx. This man was a German, Jew by race and Christian by faith." [23] Marx taught that it was futile to rely on reform and that violent revolution was the only method the workers could employ to secure their rights. Moreover, the workers had been depressed for so long it would be foolish to expect them to know what would actually be in their own interest. For this reason, a dictatorship of those who understand these facts would be necessary at the beginning.

Of the systems mentioned, only socialism and Bolshevism offer economic solutions to the problem of inequality and these, along with National Socialism, are the three secular rivals of Islam in this field. [24]

Socialism has been gaining ground in the advanced countries and has achieved a certain amount of success in raising the standard of living there. But the movement suffers from two defects. In the first place, its sympathies are confined to the countries in which socialism exists. This lack of a universal outlook makes it the secret ally of imperialism. The second defect is its secularism and under this system the spiritual needs of the people are entirely neglected.

The other great rival is Bolshevism in Russia; outside of Russia it is called Communism.

> The cardinal points of this movement are that individual effort should be replaced by collective effort; that manual workers should be secured against want and privation; that purely intellectual workers should have no claim upon the State; that all surplus wealth should belong to and be at the disposal of the State; that the State should have full control and direction over the means and sources of production; that the education and training of children should be in the hands of the State and not of the parents; and that the movement should seek to gain universal acceptance. [25]

Aḥmadi objections to Bolshevism are six in number. Firstly, it forbids individual effort. This is against human nature, because men are so made that they will work to the utmost of their ability only when personal benefit will result. The long range effect of such a prohibition will be that the general level of achievement will be curtailed drastically. The reason is biological. "Experience shows that

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[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
[24] National Socialism, of course, has been eliminated as rival system.
[25] *New World Order*, pp. 24-5.

intellectual qualities and acquirements are transmitted through heredity. That is why eminence in many arts and sciences is known to be inherent in certain families, tribes, races, or nations." [26] A generation under Bolshevism which has not achieved a high level of intellectual performance will give birth to a generation which is not able to achieve it. The result will be "... the progressive deterioration of intellectual capacity." [27] The second objection is that it uses violence to promote its ends, which turns those whom it opposes irreconcilably against Bolshevism. Thirdly, by opposing religion it has insured that those who are truly attached to religion will never support it. Fourthly, the Bolshevists have initiated a dictatorship which will tend to perpetuate itself. Fifthly, by shutting themselves off from the rest of the world they have deprived themselves of the benefits of the progress made by the non-Communists. Finally, the movement stimulates struggle between the classes, rather than eliminating class strife and promoting peaceful relations.

Leaving the subject of Communism until the latter half of the speech, where it is dealt with again as a contrast to the Islamic system, Bashīr-ud-Dīn now turns

> ... to the schemes put forward by the followers of different religions for setting up a new order. Of these religions, the principal ones are Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The followers of each of these faiths claim superiority for their particular faith and allege that by following its teachings the world can get rid of all pain and tribulation. The Hindus proclaim that they will unfurl the banner of *Om* at Mecca (which God forbid). The Jews assert that their Law is superior to everything else. The Christians try to persuade that the teachings of Jesus alone are worthy of being practiced. The Muslims claim (and rightly) that Islam alone prescribes efficacious remedies for the misery and suffering of mankind .... I am dealing with the problem of want and poverty. [28]

The chief difficulty with the Jewish scheme is that it is purely racial. The Jews claim that they are the chosen people of God and that all the world must serve them. If this religion became dominant, tyranny would increase rather than decline. Because of its racialism, Jews deal with the Gentiles in any way they wish and moral injunctions are not binding on these dealings. The *khalīfah* then cites Deuteronomy, 20. 10-16, in which verses God instructs the Children of Israel to make no peace with the Canaanites, but that "you should save alive nothing that breathes," and makes the comment: "This is the social and economic system prescribed by Judaism. If Judaism were to prevail every male Gentile would be put to the sword and their women and children reduced to slavery. ... Under this system the Jews may obtain some relief but other nations would be utterly destroyed." [29]

Christianity presents a different picture. Here is a religion which considers the Law to be a curse. Not only that, but everything that the

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[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 26.
[27] *Op, cit.*, p. 26.
[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.
[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

Law ordains or prohibits is also a curse. Failing to act upon the injunction to love, Christian nations describe as the Christian ideal anything for which they happen to be striving; whatever the dominant philosophy happens to be is called the Christian philosophy; whatever social system happens to be in effect is called the Christian system. "Christianity is thus the ally of the successful and the victorious, so that whatever system becomes prevalent, it means the spread of Christian civilization. ... Their faith is like a wax model which may be moulded into any desired shape; there is no danger of its breaking apart. Christianity, as a religion, therefore, never had and never will have a programme." [30]

In Hinduism the doctrine of Karma and the transmigration of souls has effectively blocked for all time the path to peace and progress for mankind, for Hinduism can never bring about a change in the prevailing social and economic patterns of life. These patterns are conditioned by the actions of the members of society in previous existences and are unalterable. Another barrier to a Hindu reformation of society is the fact that society is divided into castes, and the same moral standards and values do not apply to all levels. Such a society is and would be organized for the benefit of the Brahmins only.

Having described and rejected the alternative theories the *khalīfah* is free to devote himself to the "remedies suggested by Islam" for the ills which beset the world. The first social topic he takes up is the issue of slavery, and the categorical statement is made that "... Islam abolished the institution of slavery which had been established for thousands of years." [31] All other religions provide for this institution, and when the Christian world finally did abolish it the abolition was brought about "... not by anything in the teaching of Christianity but by the progress that had been made in ethical standards." [32] One point of possible confusion in the teachings of Islam on the matter of slavery is the prisoner-of-war issue. Persons with this status exist as an evil but necessary consequence of war. In Islam the treatment of prisoners is hedged about by a complicated set of rule which insures that their condition be good. They must either be released for ransom, or, if kept as prisoners, must be given employment commensurate with their abilities and inclinations. During the early years of Islam, when the Muslims observed these rules very carefully, many prisoners chose to stay on with the Muslims as captives rather than accept their release.

There is another type of slavery which is political and economic and which resulted from actions like those of Great Britain in establishing control over India, and which Islam is prepared to check. Islam teaches that everything Providence has created is for the benefit of all mankind: "Whatever there is on earth has been created for all of

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[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 38.
[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 41.
[32] *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

you" (Surah ii. 29). Thus, Islam prescribes that "... 20% of all mineral wealth that may be exploited must be paid to the State to be utilized for the benefit of the community at large." [33] It also prohibits any one people from exploiting another people, or assuming political dominion over another people. The colonial problem can only be solved on Islamic principles.

The crying need of the world is a more equitable distribution of wealth, and Islam has also provided for this in an admirable fashion. To prevent the accumulation of wealth in the hands of only a few families, there is compulsory distribution of wealth among a large number of heirs, among whom are parents, widows, sons, and daughters. Furthermore, there are injunctions against the hoarding of money. It must be kept in circulation constantly where it brings beneficial effects to a large number of people. Persons with established connections are prevented from accumulating vast sums because of the prohibition against lending money on interest. Finally, those who remain poor in an Islamic economy are provided for by *zakat*, a 2½% levy on the average upon all wealth in the possession of an assessee for one year. This tax is levied upon accumulations, also, and may amount to "... as much as 50% of the income or profits." [34] The effect of this tax is to discourage people from accumulating money.

How does Bolshevism fall short of this Islamic ideal? The answer is clear when one considers that "... the object of an ideal economic and social system should be to bring about conditions of peace and justice and to promote the spirit of progress." [35] The violent methods of the Bolshevists frustrate the achievement of this ideal. Also, "Bolshevism ignores the fact that intellectual capacity is as much an asset as property and wealth." [36] "... The reason why intellect is not regarded as a valuable asset by the Bolsheviks is that they are unable to subject it to equal distribution and to deal with it as tangible property." [37]

In contrast to this, Islam secures by "gentle persuasion" the application of all manner of intellectual talent to the service of mankind. And in spite of high-sounding principles, Bolshevism has not succeeded in achieving social and economic equality. Its violent methods give rise to resentments which lead to rebellion. "As against this, the Islamic system, being perfectly voluntary and natural, never leads to rebellion though people may often fall short of its teaching in practice." [38]

The problem of extravagance and indulgence is dealt with in Islam by prohibition of such things, rather than by holding out the promise

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[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 58.
[34] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.
[35] *Op. cit.*, p. 68.
[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 69.
[37] *Op. cit.*, p. 69.
[38] *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

to all of an income high enough to enable them to afford such luxuries. Individual effort is provided for the rich in their giving to the poor. And in addition to the compulsory taxes, there are voluntary contributions which should be made to the poverty striken classes. "And spend in the way of Allah and do not expose yourself to destruction with your own hands, and do good to others, surely Allah loves doers of good." (Surah ii. 195). In this verse Muslims are instructed to spend their surplus wealth on the poor, lest the poor rise up in resentment and take it all away from them.

When it comes to the matter of applying principles in any specific instance a certain elasticity must be provided for, since each succeeding age varies in its requirements and conditions. "An absolutely fixed and rigid system may prove beneficent at one time ... but may cease to be of any use at another time." [39] Therefore, the system in force at the time of the Holy Prophet and the first Four Khalīfahs will not prove adequate for today. This system designed for the needs of the modern age and which will lay the foundations of the New Order was revealed to Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad in 1905 and constitutes the content of his *Al-Wasiyyat*. In Surah ii. 195 the principle was laid down but not its instrumentation. Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad stated that those who wanted to win real paradise today must donate one-tenth to one-third of their wealth and properties to the Movement. This money would be used to strengthen Islam by the propagation of its teachings and by distribution of its literature. The approved method for handing over this wealth is for every Aḥmadī to make provision for this in his will. Although the scheme is voluntary, it is, at the same time, a test of faith and only hypocrites will stay out of it. This is in contrast to Bolshevism, which deprives people of their wealth by force. By means the plan of *Al-Wasiyyat*, a large proportion of all private properties will be acquired for national purposes without coercion, and "... in the course of three or four generations the greater part of private property will be placed at the disposal of the centre." [40]

It is true that at the present time, with Aḥmadiyyat confined to a small geographical area, the scheme is not a universally practiced one. A change will soon occur, however. "Under Divine Revelations and in accordance with Divine Promises we firmly believe that in the course of half a century or a century Aḥmadiyyat is bound to become dominant." [41]

The system based on *Al-Wasiyyat* will spread as Aḥmadiyyat spreads until such time when "... no State—American, Russian, English, German, Italian or Japanese—will ever have had so much wealth or property under its control."[42] *Al-Wasiyyat*, while preserving the integrity

[39] *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-3.
[40] *Op. cit.*, p. 91.
[41] *Op. cit.*, p. 96.
[42] *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

of religion, will "... prove of such benefit to mankind that they should be compelled to admit that from this backward and ignorant village of Qadian shone forth a light which dispelled the darkness of the world and then filled it with the refulgence of true knowledge,—knowledge which abolishes pain and misery and makes it possible for rich and poor, the high and the humble, to live together in affection and goodwill." [43]

This is the call which Aḥmadiyyat sends out to mankind. It remains only for mankind to respond in order for the new era to begin.

Aḥmadiyyat and Islamic Orthodoxy

On January 21, 1953, a deputation of *ʿulamāʾ* waited upon the Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazīmuddīn, in Karachi and delivered to him three demands, which were, in effect, an ultimatum. They demanded that the government should take steps, within a month, to declare the Aḥmadis a non-Muslim minority, to remove Chaudhry Muḥammad Zafrullāh Khān from the office of Foreign Minister, and to remove all other highly placed Aḥmadis in government service.[44] If these demands were not granted the *ʿulamāʾ*,representing the *Majlis-i-ʿAmal* of the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention, would resort to "direct action." The demands, however, were rejected and several leaders of the agitation were arrested. Almost immediately rioting began in the Punjab, with the result described earlier.

The rapid development of anti-Aḥmadiyyat sentiment which was stimulated by the *ʿulamāʾ*, the actual channeling of this sentiment into action, the various groups involved, and the implications of the agitation for the concept of the Islamic democratic state are all extremely interesting, but do not rightly belong in this study. These topics and many others comprise the Report of the Court of Inquiry, which was issued in April, 1954. [45] Much of the material in the Report does having a direct bearing on the beliefs and practices of the Aḥmadī community, however.

The most controversial deviation from the orthodox norm is the Aḥmadī point of view concerning the spiritual status of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad, the founder. It was an internal difference of opinion on this issue which gave rise to the Qadiani-Lahori factional split, as mentioned earlier, and the two parties have held divergent views over since. Theologically stated, the debate is over the interpretation of the principle of *khatm-i-nubuwwat* "the end of the prophethood."

According to the testimony of the *ʿulamāʾ* who represented the

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[43] *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

[44] When asked by the Court to furnish the names of other Aḥmadis occupying key posts, the *ʿulamāʾ* were unable to do so.

[45] *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953,* Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 1954.

orthodox viewpoint, Muslims believe that Muḥammad was the last of a long line of prophets through whom God has spoken to mankind, and this belief is supported by the following verses:

> Muḥammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he is) the Apostle of God, and the Seal of the Prophets: and God has full knowledge of all things. (Surah xxxiii. 40).
>
> Behold! God took the Covenant of the Prophets, saying: "I give you a Book and Wisdom; then comes to you an Apostle, confirming what is with you; do ye believe in him and render him help." God said: "Do ye agree, and take this My Covenant as binding on you?" They said: "We agree." He said: "Then bear witness and I am with you among the witnesses." (Surah iii. 81).
>
> This day have those who reject Faith given up all hope of your religion: Yet fear them not but fear Me. This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion." (Surah v. 4).[46]

They state that a belief that with the death of Muḥammad the office of prophethood came to an end is implicit in the verses. It is impossible for another *nabī* to appear. So the question is, did Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad consider himself to be a *nabī*?

The first revelation of Mirzā Sahib occurred on March 4, 1889, and was one in which he felt himself elevated to the position where he could receive *baiʿit,* or the homage paid to a king or to a religious leader by a disciple. The announcement of the revelation which led him to declare himself the Promised Messiah and the Mahdi came in 1891. Later, he tried to make his status clear in three books: *Fateḥ Islām, Tanzīh-i-Maram,* and *Izāla-i-Auhām.* These books precipitated him into the controversy which still continues.

Documentary substantiation of the actual declaration of prophethood by Mirzā Sahib is difficult to find in English. It is probably to be found in his Urdu writings which have not yet been translated by the Qadianis. The Lahoris, of course, maintain that he never made such a declaration. While testifying before the Court of Inquiry Chaudhry Muḥammad Ḥussain Chima, Counsel for the Lahori organization, *Aḥmadiyya Anjuman Ishaʿat-i-Islām,* said that: "... Hazrat Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad was never a claimant of prophethood and that his claim was only that of a 'mujadad' and challenged that one could show in any of his 90 books that he claimed to be a prophet.... Het used the word 'nabi' in a metaphorical sense.... Mirzā Sahib had always been misrepresented resulting in misunderstanding."[47]

Another incident, which is widely believed in Lahore, relating to the final days of Mirzā Sahib's life supports this contention. It is said that he sent a letter to the Lahore newspaper, *Akhbār-i-Amm,* which was published on May 8, 1908, in which he said that wherever he used the word *nabī* in reference to himself it should be understood in the root meaning of merely someone who informs or gives news. If this were going to prove a stumbling block, he would prefer that a

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[46] This translation was the one used by the Court of Inquiry, *Report,* p. 187.
[47] *The Pakistan Times,* February 27, 1954.

sharp knife be taken and the word cut from every page where it occurred and that word *muṣliḥ* "reformer" substituted.

The Qadiani belief is that in the course of one of his revelations God addressed Mirzā Sahib as a *nabī,* and therefore belief in his *nubuwwat* is mandatory. Mirza Bashīr-ud-Dīn's testimony on the point was as follows:

Question (by the Court): Do you believe that Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Sahib was a *nabī* in the dogmatic sense?
Answer: I do not know of any dogmatic definition of *nabī.* I take a person to be a *nabī* who is given that appelation by Allāh.
Q: Did Allāh describe Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Sahib as a *nabī*?
A: Yes.
Q: When did Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Sahib first say he was a *nabī*? Please give the date and reference to his writings.
A: He claimed to be a *nabī,* as far as I remember, in 1891 . . . .[48]

The question of prophethood hinges on the receiving of *waḥī* "revelation." In the following portion of his testimony, the *khalīfah* indicates that there two types of *waḥī,* which would immediately suggest that there are also two types of prophethood.

Q: Before 1891 did not Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Sahib repeatedly say that he was not a *nabī* and that the *wahī* revealed to him was not *waḥī-i-nubuwat* but *waḥī-i-wilāyat*?
A: He said in 1900 that till then he was of the view that a person could be a *nabī* only if he brought a new *Sharᶜa,* but that Allah in one of the *waḥīs* revealed to him that this was not a necessary qualification of a *nabī* and that a person could be a *nabī* without bringing a new *sharᶜa.*[49]

In this testimony Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn confirmed what the *ᶜulamā*ᵓ had been saying about Aḥmadī theology and, in their eyes, he had clearly placed himself and his community outside the pale of Islam. This justified their demand that they be declared a non-Muslim minority.

But the Aḥmadis, holding that their founder was a *nabī,* maintain that they are Muslims in every sense of the word, and that their belief in Muḥammad as *khatm al-nabiyyīn* is as sound as that of any other section of Islam. The Aḥmadis, too, translate this as "The Seal of the Prophets." "The only difficulty or disagreement that remains is with regard to the meaning."[50] Taking his stand on what he calls "accepted Arabic usage," Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn says that the phrase "... measures the spiritual stature of the Prophet. The Prophet is found to rise above all men. He is found to be the lord of the human race."[51]

This, as can be seen, does not cancel out the possibility of there being prophets after Muḥammad, although these later ones will not attain to his supreme stature. He is the ideal standard against which all prophets, before or after, are compared, and insofar as they measure up to this standard they are validated as being true prophets of God,

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[48] *Op. cit.,* January 16, 1954.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *What is Ahmadiyyat?,* p. 14.
[51] *Op. cit.,* p. 15.

in the way that a seal validates that which belongs to the possessor of the seal.

Intimately connected with the controversy over prophethood is the matter of *kufr*. In this connection the following portion of testimony, which occurred during the questioning of Zafrullāh Khān, caused a considerable stir in the Punjab:

Q (to Zafrullāh Khān): Did you during your discussion with Khwaja Nazīmuddīn tell him that you considered him a *kafir* from the religious point of view?
A: I do not think that our conversation ever took the turn of discussing this specific question, but I may have generally explained the doctrinal difference on that point.
Q: Khwaja Nazīmuddīn stated in his evidence in Court as follows: "I definitely remember that in the course of a discussion with him, Chaudhry Mohammad Zafrullāh Khān mentioned it to me that according to his *aqida* I was a *kafir* but that for political, social, and other purposes, I could be treated by him as a Musulman." Did you say this?
A: He may have himself concluded that from the explanation of the doctrinal position. [52]

With the mention of *kufr* being made in a private conversation between two members of the Central cabinet, it is not hard to imagine how the matter was handled in the lower levels of society where religious passions run high and lack of restraint is characteristic. From the point of view of the group represented by the *Majlis-i-ʿAmal* the Aḥmadis were apostates and subject to the penalty for apostacy in Islam. For their part, the Aḥmadis hold quite clearly the conviction that all those who do not accept the *nubuwwat* of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad are *kuffār*. In the opinion of the Court, Aḥmadī writings "do not seem to be capable of any other interpretation that this...." [53] Yet, in his testimony before the Court Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn defined his terms so as to indicate that the term *kufr* when used in reference to the beliefs of another Muslim does not necessarily mean that he has become an apostate.

Q (to Bashir-ud-Din): Is not the denial of a true *nabi kufr*?
A: Yes, it amounts to *kufr*. *Kufr* is of two kinds, that which turns a person out of the *Millat* and that which does not turn him out. Disbelief in the Kalima constitutes *kufr* of the first kind. *Kufr* of the second kind is constituted by lesser heresies. [54]

Another point on which there is disagreement is *jihād*. Mention has been made of the fact that Indian Muslims, generally, resented what they considered to be the servile relationship of the Aḥmadiyya Movement to the British government. The Court describes this relationship as having been "utter sycophancy." [55] During the lifetime of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad the British were engaged in fighting with tribesmen on the northwestern frontier, and were fair game at any time, being *kuffār*, for furnishing the ideal means for any Muslim fanatic to achieve

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[52] *The Pakistan Times*, January 20, 1954.
[53] *Report*, p. 199.
[54] *The Pakistan Times*, January 16, 1954.
[55] *Report*, p. 196.

his eternal reward. The Court suggests that it was with British approval that Mirzā Sahib taught that *jihād-bis-saif* was permissible only in self defence, since it not only might help to ease the pressure on the frontier but would also be of considerable help in maintaining control in the Muslim areas of India itself.

"The British . . . wanted the people over whom they were ruling to be engrossed in religious differences, so long as such controversies did not amount to a threat to law and order. If people merely disputed about one another's right to go to Heaven or their liability to be eternally condemned to Hell, and they neither broke skulls nor demanded for themselves the things of this world, the British looked upon such disputations with complete equanimity, perhaps with satisfaction. But the moment it came to the breaking of heads, he (the Britisher) was firm and uncompromising. Mirzā Sahib had fully appreciated the blessing of the British *raj* which not only allowed but encouraged such controversies. . . ." [56]

In explaining the Aḥmadī position, Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn divides all wars into two categories, those which are *jihād* and those which are not. "A war of the status of *jihād* is one which is undertaken in the defence of religion against an enemy who is out to destroy religion by force or who seeks to change a people's belief at the point of a sword." [57] The one important condition for fighting such a war "... is that the declaration of *jihād* must be made by the head of the believers." [58] Because they did not force people to change their religion, a *jihād* against the British was not indicated.

Before leaving doctrinal issues, mention should be made of the Aḥmadī view of the Qurʾān, in which they differ from the general body of Muslims. The *khalīfah* says:

"Many of my visitors . . . told me that they had heard many Maulvis say that Ahmadis did not believe in the whole of the Quran. The charge has been fabricated by the enemies of Ahmadiyyat. Ahmadis regard the Holy Quran as an unchangeable and everlasting Book of God. From the first letter of the first verse to the last letter of the last verse they regard it as the very Word of God, every point, every particle or part being as certainly revealed as every other, and every being as obligatory as every other." [59]

This means that the Aḥmadie repudiate the theory of *nāsikh* and *mansūkh* and have their own interpretation of Surah ii. 106 and Surah xvi. 101 on which the theory is based.

Aside from the theological differences between the two groups, there are other features of the Aḥmadiyya Movement which generate intense resentment among other Muslims. Most of important of these are the Aḥmadī concept of the new *jamaᶜat* and their insistence on *tablīgh*.

When asked specifically to define the status of the Aḥmadī community, the *khalīfah* replied, "We are not a separate *ummat* but a sect

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[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *What is Ahmadiyyat?*, p. 34.
[58] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.
[59] *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

(*firqa*) of Muslims." [60] The term in most common usage by the Aḥmadis in describing their community is *jamaᶜat*.

Writing in 1948 Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn went into detail describing the exact function of this new *jamaᶜat* and the reasons why it came into existence. In the first place, Aḥmadis have a right to join together and organize according to their own desires. More than this, the Aḥmadis are a group who have formed a *jamaᶜat* for accomplishing a certain purpose, that of resuscitating Islam. Not since the period of the Prophet and the first four caliphs have the Muslims of the world been a true *jamaᶜat*. Divisions have divided them and caused them to grow weak. This is especially true today, when European nations impose their will at random upon Islamic countries and the Jews were able to set up an "insignificant" state in Palestine. No single Muslim nation, or grouping of nations, will be able to unify Islam because of the nature of political life and national differences. Being non-political, Aḥmadiyyat can busy itself in the task of uniting Muslims and improving their religious life and faith, "... so as to enable them to put up a united moral and spiritual front against the enemies of Islam." [61]

The practical working out of this principle of a new *jamaᶜat* has resulted in a social exclusiveness which aggravates the alienation of the Movement from the rest of Islam. Aḥmadis worship in their own mosques and avoid saying prayers behind a non-Aḥmadī *imām*. They do not say funeral prayers with non-Aḥmadis, and they do not give their daughters in marriage to non-Aḥmadis. The symbol of this attitude for all Pakistanis was Zafrullāh Khān's public refusal to join in the funeral prayers for Muḥammad ᶜAlī Jinnah. In the opinion of many *ᶜulamāᵓ* this withdrawal from the religious life of the general body of Muslims was an indication, in itself, of the non-Muslim status of Aḥmadiyyat.

From the beginning *tablīgh* had been an important aspect of the Movement, and much of the strength and energy of the community has been expended in its missionary endeavors. If this were an attempt to convert only the Christian West to Islam, there would certainly have been few objections, except from the few orthodox *ᶜulamāᵓ* who would complain that the West was being offered a corrupted form of Islam. But the disturbing thing is that much of this effort has been toward converting Islam to Aḥmadiyyat. Muslim reactions have ranged all the way from mild concern to violence. In Afghanistan three Aḥmadis have been put to death. One of them was a certain ᶜAbdūl Laṭīf, an Afghan national who had been living with Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad in Qadian. "When he returned to Afghanistan in 1903, he was declared by the *ᶜulamāᵓ* to be a *murtadd* for having become an Aḥmadī and was ordered to be put to death. He was fixed alive in the ground up to the waist and was then stoned to death." [62]

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[60] *The Pakistan Times*, January 16, 1954.
[61] *What is Ahmadiyyat?*, p. 52.
[62] *Report*, p. 18.

Despite an uncertain reception, Aḥmadis believe that *tablīgh* is "... a religious obligation enjoined upon the believer in the Holy Quran." [63] This was stated by Bashīr Aḥmad, counsel for the *Sadr Anjuman-i-Aḥmadiyya*, who also explained "... that it consisted in convincing rationally another individual who did not agree with the interpretation of Islam as presented by the Qadiani community. ..." [64]

For Pakistani Muslims the situation became increasingly alarming when the Aḥmadis openly declared that the conversion of the province of Baluchistan was their immediate goal. This was first referred to by Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn in a *khuṭba* in 1948. Subsequently, he issued a call for the conversion of that province in 1952, and expressed the hope that it would be entirely Aḥmadī by the end of that year.

Moreover, Aḥmadī officials in the central and provincial governments appeared to be taking advantage of their positions to assist their co-religionists in their missionary efforts. Zafrullāh Khān delivered a public address in May, 1952, at the invitation of the Anjuman-i-Aḥmadiyya, Karachi, in a meeting which had police protection. He did so over the protest of the Prime Minister, threatening to resign as Foreign Minister if Khwaja Nazīmuddīn insisted on refusing him permission to take part in this sectarian meeting. [65] Two years previously there had been an open propaganda mission to several non-Aḥmadī villages in Montgomery district in the Punjab, where the administrative head of the district was an Aḥmadī. [66] In addition to these actual events, many rumors were in circulation, e.g. the Foreign Minister had purchased a large house in Washington near the White House and was spreading Aḥmadiyyat in the United States from there. The effect on the Pakistani masses was that of rendering them amenable to a call to "direct action" in 1953.

Conclusion

In summing up one's impressions of the Movement the first thing to be noted is the apparent strength of its organization, loyalty, and sense of purpose. Organizationally it appears to be capable of greatly expanded operations. Loyalty is centered in the person of the *khalīfah*, who, on a limited scale, is the prophet-statesman encountered so often in Islamic sectarianism. He is the supreme authority in religious matters as well as being the head of the *jamaᶜat*. He is a living source of spiritual inspiration and guidance, in contrast to the impersonal corpus of revelation and tradition which is the guide, through the doctors of religion, for the orthodox. The purpose for which the Movement exists is to purify Islam from within and to take this

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[63] *The Pakistan Times*, February 24, 1954.
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Report*, p. 75.
[66] *Op. cit.*, p. 261.

purified Islam to the world. It is not hard to imagine the immense attraction inherent in such a high calling.

The Movement can be viewed as a cultural counter attack against the West. In this context its strong anti-Christian bias can best be understood. It helps to explain the frequency of the following type of remark in Aḥmadī literature:

> (In Africa) Christian missionaries and workers now hesitate to confront Aḥmadiyyat. In their reports they admit that the advent of the Aḥmadiyya Jamaat in Africa has put an end to Christian work in that continent. [67]
>
> The U.S.A. is now the strongest of all Christian powers. There, also, Ahmadi missionaries have been working for 24 years. Thousands of American citizens have become Ahmadi and they now contribute thousands of rupees to the missionary work of Islam. [68]
>
> ... We can say that the battle has begun, and successes, however, small, are on our side. It is Christians who become Muslims, not Muslims who become Christians. [69]

For Muslims who feel the urgency for taking the message of Islam to the West the Movement offers itself as an ideal agency. The sight of American and European converts in residence at Rabwah and news of operations in the many mission centers in the Western world would tend to give the impression that the counter attack were proceeding successfully. On the wall of an office in the *Tahrīk-i-Jadīd* building hangs a huge wall map of the world which reveals at a glance the sweep of Aḥmadiyyat across continents and oceans. Markers indicate that in Paris and London and New York, in the very heart of the enemy fortress, congregations of Muslims gather daily to say their prayers and offer praises to Allāh.

On the other hand, there appear to be certain weaknesses in the Movement, which, at the least, serve as impediments to its progress, and, at the most, might prove fatal to the achievement of any real worldwide significance for the Movement.

The first weakness is the failure of its leadership accurately to understand the various cultural environments in which the Movement finds itself, and, more serious than this, the failure to analyze and criticize accurately rival systems, secular and religious. The Aḥmadī critique of society as found in *The New World Order of Islam* not only is often wide of the mark and very unconvincing but also occasionally contains serious misstatements of fact, e.g. the Communists place no value on intellectual achievement; cultural traits are passed on through heredity; Christian ethics had nothing to do with the abolition of slavery in the West. Informed Pakistanis know that statements of this type simply are not true, with the result that the value of the entire analysis is thereby lessened. Aḥmadī analyses are highly theoretical, taking their premises on authoritative religious sources, with little reference to historical and cultural actualities and showing no famili-

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[67] *What is Ahmadiyyat?*, p. 58.
[68] *Op. cit.*, p. 59.
[69] *Ibid.*

arity with the vast literature dealing with the same topics. Their value for us lies in the fact that they represent what Aḥmadis are thinking and not in their helpfulness in aiding us to gain new insights into social, economic, political, and spiritual problems.

In this connection the remarkable lack of understanding of their own Pakistani cultural circumstances should be mentioned. After hesitating on the Pakistan issue, the headquarters were finally moved to the new Muslim state. Here they pushed their program with the same vigor as before, evidently expecting the same general social and religious situation to prevail. They appeared not to realize that the very source of their movement, Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad's special relationship to God as a *nabī,* was as inflammatory of Muslims, generally, as any single theological disagreement could have been. The thought was expressed by the Court of Inquiry in this way: "Of course any comparison between the holy prophet and any other person, alive or dead, must cause offence to every believer." [70] Taking their stand on the premise that for Aḥmadis "... there is no fundamental difference with other Muslims," [71] they continued to push their *tablīgh,* in which *nubuwwat* played a prominent role. During the Inquiry Mian Mumtaz Daultana, who was chief minister of the Punjab at the time of the agitation, said that Aḥmadis were behaving in a very "shortsighted" manner; "... instead of mitigating their differences with the rest of the Muslims, (they) paraded and emphasised them." [72] In this way they made themselves easy targets for the organizers of the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties' Convention.

Another indication that the Aḥmadis did not understand the mind of the opposition was their complaint that "for 70 years" they were treated "as one of the sects," and so "it was surprising that all of a sudden the Aḥmadis could not be tolerated at all." [73] Through most of this time any display of intolerance toward them had been restrained by the police power of the Indian government, but the opposition was there, nevertheless. It was felt not only by the ignorant fanatics. Muḥammad Iqbāl nearly twenty years previously commented with surprising bitterness on the subject of political toleration of religious differences, with reference to the Aḥmadiyyat Movement.

> This liberal and indispensable policy in a country like India has led to most unfortunate results. In so far as Islam is concerned, it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the Muslim community in India under the British is far less safe than the solidarity of the Jewish community was in the days of Jesus under the Romans. Any religious adventurer in India can set up any claim and carve out a new community for his own exploitation. This liberal State of ours does not care a fig for the integrity of the parent community provided the adventurer assures it of his loyalty and his followers are regular in the payment of taxes due to the State. [74]

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[70] *Report,* p. 197.
[71] *The Pakistan Times,* January 16, 1954.
[72] *Report,* p. 239.
[73] *The Pakistan Times,* February 28, 1954.
[74] Shamloo, *The Speeches and Statements of Iqbāl,* Lahore: Ashraf (n.d.), pp. 97-8.

Perhaps the most serious criticism that can be made of Aḥmadiyyat as a movement devoted to the reform and purification of religion is the manifest lack of a basic moral integrity. The expectation, of course, would be to discover a sense of morality far above the average in such a movement, not yet far removed in time from its origins.

The first point to be made here relates to the use of Muslim theological terminology by the Aḥmadis. In the course of the Inquiry it soon became clear that they assign their own meanings to such basic terms as *kufr, jihād, khatm-i-nubuwwat, nabī, muʾmin,* and many others. Whenever these terms were used in publications, speeches, or conversations they appeared to mean one thing, but actually, from the Aḥmadī standpoint, meant something else. This use of variant definitions enabled Bashīr-ud-Dīn to explain his way out of many difficulties in his testimony during the Inquiry. The term *kufr,* for example, has two meanings, and, as has already been mentioned, in one sense the Muslim is not to be considered to have committed apostacy. Accordingly, whenever *kuffār* is used by the Aḥmadis in reference to non-Aḥmadī Muslims, it does not actually mean that they are apostates. To have called the whole non-Aḥmadī Muslim population of Pakistan apostate from the witness chair would have been nothing short of suicidal.

Here is an example of another exchange with Bashīr-ud-Dīn giving the testimony:

Q: Please look at Page 22 of *Zikr-i-Ilāhi,* which contains the following passage: *Mera to yih aqida hai kih dunya men do groh hain. Ek momin, doosre kafir. Is lie jo Hazrat Masih-i-Maʾood par iman lane wale hain, woh momin hain. Aur jo iman nehin laye, khah un ke iman na lane ki koi wajah ho, woh kafir.*

Is not the word *kafir* used here in contradiction to the word *momin*?

A: In this context the word *Momin* means one who believes and the *kafir* means one who does not believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Sahib.

Q: Is belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Sahib, therefore, a part of *iman*?

A: No. The word *momin* here has been used merely to convey the sense of belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Sahib, not of belief in the fundamentals of Islam. [75]

The Movement developed in an atmosphere of religious controversy which placed a high value on the art of disputation and the skillful use of terminology. But in the too clever use of the rational process a point can be reached where spiritual truths are no longer involved.

Another point of moral weakness is that the Movement operates according to a "retaliatory ethic" in its relationship to non-Aḥmadī Islam, which allows the feeling of the non-Aḥmadis toward the Movement to determine the treatment the Aḥmadis, in turn, give to the non-Aḥmadis. Thus, the reason given by Zafrullāh Khān for not

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[75] *The Pakistan Times,* January 17, 1954. "My creed, then, is this that the world is divided into two groups. One is *momin,* the other is *kafir.* Therefore, that group which has faith in Hazrat Masin-i-Ma'ood (Ghulam Ahmad) is *momin.* The other, which does not have faith no matter for any reason whatsoever, is *kafir.*"

joining in the funeral prayers for the Quaid-i-Azam was that "... since Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, who led the funeral prayers, had publicly declared the Ahmadis to be *kafirs* and *murtadds* and liable to death penalty, he could not make up his mind to join the prayers which were led by the Maulana." [76]

Along with this, is the impression that the Movement is willing to make certain adjustments in basic issues when the pressure is heavy enough. The definition of *kufr* as being of two types comes under this point, as well as a change of attitude with regard to matter of funeral prayers. In the words of the Report:

"The position finally adopted by the Aḥmadis before us on the question of funeral prayers is that an opinion of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad has now been discovered which permits the Ahmadis to join the funeral prayers of the other Muslims who are not *mukazzibs* and *mukaffirs* of Mirza Sahib." [77]

The significant thing here is not that this permission has now been granted but that this opinion of Mirzā Sahib was discovered at the moment when its general publication would do the community the most good in helping to ease some of the pressure.

Chaudhry Muḥammad Ḥussain China, counsel for the Lahoris, boasted before the Court of Inquiry that "... his Jamaᶜat believed in the doctrine of 'Khatm-i-Nubuwwat' in the most straightforward manner without mincing matters or mental reservations," [78] in what appears to be a reference to the testimony of Mirzā Bashīr-ud-Dīn during the previous month. However, his *jamaᶜat* provides a recent example of the type of unethical propaganda which both groups publish. It is an attempt to mislead the reader by distortion, insinuation, and the use of half-truths, a technique well known to American and Europeans and which reveals a tragic human weakness in the Movement which feels that it has been called of God to lead humanity back to the practice of true religion. The motive behind most of the propaganda efforts of this nature is to try and discredit Christianity. Examples can be drawn from the Qadiani booklets which have been cited previously in the course of this study, but the foremost example is a book by Khwaja Nazīr Aḥmad, *Jesus in Heaven on Earth.* [79] It purports to be a scholarly study of evidence which indicates that Jesus was taken down from the cross, revived by the use of a special ointment, and later died and was buried in Srinagar, Kashmir. Following its publication in 1952 it was banned by the Government of Pakistan on an order of the Punjab government as being "objectionable" According to the judgement of the Lahore High Court, which was handed down on a petition by the author to have the book released,

[76] *Report,* p. 199.
[77] *Ibid.*
[78] *The Pakistan Times,* February 27, 1954.
[79] See review in *The Muslim World,* Vol. xliii, 4, October, 1953, pp. 287-293.

the book is full of objectionable passages. "Offensives as they are, they are infinitely less offensive than those where phrases have been pulled out of context (of the Bible) to bear a particular meaning, where the entire purpose of the context has been perverted, where consequently among the intelligent members of the class who are well read in the Bible, it cannot but breed an intense feeling of hatred towards a treatment of their holy book which may justly be regarded as unscrupulous." [80]

The future of the Aḥmadiyya Movement will doubtless be as stormy as its past. The community, itself, expects difficulties and persecutions, and its leadership is constantly engaged in efforts to prepare its membership for them. The conclusion of one of Bashīr-ud-Dīn's lectures is reminiscent of certain New Testament passages:

> The path we invite you to is not easy. It needs sacrifice, self-denial and the ability to endure unjust accusations. But only they live in the way of God, who are willing to suffer and die. Only they find God who are ready to die for Him. Islam cannot live again unless Muslims are willing to die for it. Take courage, therefore, and hold the bitter cup to your lips. Let us make ready to die, so that Islam may live and the religion of the Prophets (on whom be peace) may become fresh and green again. If we are willing to die here, we can have ever-lasting life hereafter. Amen. [81]

The Aḥmadī community stands as a weathervane in the ideological crosscurrents of the Pakistani nation. Its treatment and future status are an indicator as to whether the nation will follow the path of the Quaid-i-Azam, who dreamed of a liberal Islamic democracy in which citizens would be primarily citizens and secondarily members of particular religious communities, or will move in the direction indicated by the Report of the Basic Principles Committee, which took its stand on "the Qurʾān and the Sunna" and which will make some form of political disability incumbent upon the sects and minorities. The problem of political or religious liberalism, generally, is that of determining how far differences of opinion on fundamental political and religious principles can be allowed to go. Islamic orthodoxy is certain that there can be only one acceptable interpretation of these principles. Islamic liberalism in Pakistan is faced with the task of convincing the nation that ideological uniformity is not an integral part of "the Islamic way of life."

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[80] *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 27, 1954.
[81] *What is Ahmadiyyat?*, p. 99.

"EACH OTHER'S FACE"

SOME THOUGHTS ON MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLOQUY TODAY

"...creeping murmur and the pouring dark
Fills the wide vessel of the universe:
From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night,
The hum of either army stilly sounds
That the fixed sentinels almost receive
The secret whispers of each other's watch...
Each battle sees the other's umber'd face."

So Shakespeare's Chorus describing the eve of Agincourt. The words might well have been written also of the encounters of the Crusades and the medieval relations of Islam and Christianity. The two faiths were physically adjacent, both in the Holy Land wars and in the common frontiers in West and East. They were physically adjacent also in the close inter-penetration of Christian communities and Muslim imperial civilization from Egypt to the Caspian. But for all their nearness, they were largely shrouded in mutual darkness. Perceptive minds there were on either side to rise above the general ignorance and suspicion in which, the one to the other, they were obscured. But these were rare. When the faiths confronted each other it was, for the most part, with "fixed sentinels": even "the whispers of the other's watch" were sadly out of the true.

Popular imagination in Christendom about Islam was always ill-informed and often libellous. Consider, for example, the anecdote about Muḥammad in William Langland's: Vision from Piers Plowman.

"A man they call Mahomet they hold for Messiah
And live by what they learnt of him and the law of nature.
There is a mention that Mahomet was a Christian man
And a cardinal at court, cunningly learned,
Who purposed to be Pope and prince of Holy Church.
So he set off for Syria, giving subtle thought
How to master men, and did it in this manner.
He took a dove and tamed it, and taught it to take food,
Having secretly slipped into either ear
Such corn as the dove should peck from his shoulder.
Whatever place he preached in, teaching the people,
There the dove would come to this cleric's ear
And make for her meat. Thus Mahomet amazed them:
When the dove came to nestle, they all knelt in duty,
For Mahomet maintained it was a messenger from Heaven,
And that dear God Himself, in likeness of the dove,
Told him and taught him how to teach the people.

So man, by Mahomet, was brought to misbelief,
And in his lore they still live, learned and illiterate.
Our Saviour suffered him to deceive the Saracens,
This Christian cleric of accursed soul."

The poet, however, is sceptical enough to add:

"And for dread of death, I dare not tell the truth
How English divines have a dove called Avarice
And take their manners from the tricks of Mahomet." [1]

Islam, in turn, had from the beginning displayed a far-reaching ignorance of Christianity, misconceiving and disallowing some of its most central doctrines and by attitudes of self-sufficient superiority casting a veil for itself over the whole rich heritage of Christian thought and worship. The faiths were near enough together to be bitterly divided. Their respective theologians throughout the medieval period shared many common areas of philosophy. But they lived in unexamined hostility, in unregretted estrangement, and these have persisted to our own time. "Each sees the other's umber'd face" seems, indeed, to express precisely the mingled acquaintance and ignorance in which the two faiths existed through so many centuries.

Though the *Summa contra Gentiles* of the great Aquinas was inspired in part by the necessity of answering the Machomestitae (i.e. the Muslims) in Spain, the author of the perennial philosophy was wise enough to confess his complete ignorance about the "heresy" of Islam and his inability to know it through its Arabic tongue. The great work was, therefore, diverted into other lines and its arguments, both for what they included and what they omitted, were clearly unsuited to Muslim needs. As apology for Muslims it discussed at too great length too many issues that were not at stake and ignored too many that were. Luther, likewise, for all his sound encouragement of Theodore Bibliander in the Latin translation of the Qurʾān, could only speak vaguely and casually about a theme he was alert enough not wholly to ignore. If modern Christian Islamic study looks back with awe and gratitude to the labors of Raymond Lull, it is as much for their uniqueness as for their quality. His erudition and fervor were solitary in the prevailing gloom.

The steady growth of Islamic study in the west in the last century, with George Sale as an 18th century pioneer, has resulted in a wide and vigorous scholarship with many notable names and achievements. Islamics in English, French, German and Dutch has essayed many of the deepest intellectual and academic issues relating to the origin, the growth and the history of Islam. It has to its credit works of scholarship, encyclopedias, concordances of Traditions, grammatical studies, Quranic research and general Muslim histories which are serving and sometimes outreaching studies by Muslims themselves. There is today

[1] Quoted, by permission, from Nevill Coghill's version, O.U.P. 1950, p. 82.

no lack of the means to Islamic studies in the west and much recognition of their importance in the contemporary scene. Not least among the factors stimulating such studies today is the new American sense of foreign involvement and the consequent necessity of informed understanding of the heritage of those areas of the world that are uncommitted in the present struggle. Islam is among the greatest forces dominating those areas.

If the past achievement and present promise of Western Islamic study are good, so that the face of Islam is no longer "umber'd" and its "secret whispers" more articulate, there are two reservations that have to be kept in mind. The one is that much modern interest quite fails to penetrate into the inner truths because its resources are too superficial or its motives too self-centered. The second, and perhaps more serious, deficiency is that the scholarship which strives to go deep, generally fails to establish a religious relationship.

Much Islamic scholarship has in fact been generated by Christian missionary concern. Some of the greatest names are those of men whose interest in Islam arose from a desire to communicate Christ and dissipate religious misconception. Muslims, however, for their part have almost invariably understood such interest as a menace and have rejected and denounced even the sound scholarship which served it. The longstanding and persistent Muslim inhospitality to genuine Christian contacts has been one of the great spiritual calamities of our time. But academic Islamics, with no Christian intention within its scientific activity, has not succeeded in coming into fruitful intercourse with Muslims at the central points of Muslim genius and life. It has no doubt been very effective in establishing mutual scholarly relations at all points that involved no conflict between its scientific 'neutrality' and Muslim sensitivity. But those points were far from covering the whole of Islam or even its most important themes. Indeed a purely academic relation to Islam is, in some sense, a self-frustrating enterprise. As long as it evades the demands of religious relationship, it remains a study about Islam, not a meeting of mind with Muslims. It thus excludes itself from the center of the theme.

The missionary Christian scholar, then, and the 'secular' Islamicist have for different reasons hitherto failed to make their orientalism a genuine colloquy with Muslims. This fact has robbed the undoubted skill, devotion and achievement of so much Western study of Islam throughout the whole century past, of much of their potential harvest of understanding and communication. If scholarship has made possible these fruits, something beyond scholarship must reap them.

It is in this context that certain recent experiments in inter-faith meeting should be seen and weighed. The 1954 Bḥamdūn Convocation under the American Friends of the Middle East (reported by the Rev. Eric F. F. Bishop, in the January issue, pp. 37-44) brought together some seventy Muslim and Christian representatives for dis-

cussion and debate on the meaning of their faiths in the modern world. The 1953 Colloquium on Islamic Culture, which convened mainly in Princeton, under the joint auspices of the Library of Congress and Princeton University's Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, concerned itself with specifically Muslim problems, such as education, social reform, history, philosophy and law. But it provided a valuable occasion of friendship and contact for numerous Muslim and Christian teachers and thinkers who, otherwise, could hardly have come together. The personnel on the Muslim side, in these two meetings, was in part common. There have been sincere expressions of gratitude from all sides for the possibility of these rendezvous and grateful admiration for the vision and organisation that went into their accomplishment. If the "conference mentality" is disciplined and harnessed so as to serve, and not replace, all the wider tasks of meeting between minds, there is promise that a new opportunity may have arrived to bring the trustees of Muslim and Christian faith and practice into closer mutual contact than has yet been possible. It is only fair to add that the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University in Montreal has been proceeding since 1952 on the conception of Islamic scholarship as a co-operative enterprise, in which Islam is best studied in close, intellectual and spiritual partnership with Muslims.

It is the bearing of these developments and the concepts behind them, upon the general Christian obligation to Islam, as understood by the historic faith and served by academic orientalism, which prompts the reflections offered here. For clearly implicit in such meetings for debate are questions of great import. There are wide possibilities and deep pitfalls.

Perhaps the most immediate of the possibilities is the hope that such intercourse will stimulate Muslims to deep, interior study of Christianity. For all its limitations as a relationship to Islam, already confessed, Western orientalism, whether Christian or 'secular,' has accomplished a staggering quantity and quality of work. It has in many areas of study both outpaced and outdistanced Muslim scholarship itself. Accidents, or rather facts, of history and opportunity may account for this state of affairs in part. In any event "comparisons are odorous." But the factors delaying or hampering Muslim studies of Christianity are now diminishing. Political passions need no longer preoccupy: self-responsibility throughout most of the contemporary household of Islam should facilitate objectivity. The defensive, introverted mentality could surely be jettisoned. The time is ripe for a patient, informed and sustained effort on the part of Muslims to make good the long deficiencies of their Christian study. It may be long years before the accumulated resources of Western Islamics could be reciprocated. But a beginning should be made. Where are the Muslim 'Occidentalists' to join minds with the Western 'Orientalists'? More important, where are the Muslim Hebraists and Greek scholars to delve into the basic

Christian documents as Quranic scholars, from Sale to Bell and Wensinck, have delved into the Quran? We cannot as yet speak of Muslim Biblical scholars. The most ambitious Muslim commentary on the Holy Bible left off in 1862, at Genesis 11. There have been occasional studies from Muslim pens of Christian doctrines and history, but all too little of them are adequately abreast of the greatness and the exactions of their theme.

Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1952 Charles Malik remarked:

> "There is an amazing ignorance of Christian literature, doctrine and life, despite the fact that Christ and His Mother are deeply revered in Islam. There is not a single Muslim scholar in all history, so far as I know, who has written an authentic essay on Christianity... There will always be fear, uncertainty, embarrassment, evasiveness, lack of joy, lack of freedom, a predisposition to self-defense, until this intellectual and spiritual balance is redressed." [2]

He would seem to have identified the most obvious duty of any such movement as that begun at Bḥamdūn, if it takes itself seriously. For it must surely be founded on the possibility of a real awareness of others. There is no suggestion, here, however, that it can be attained by insistence or that demands of any sort should be made a prerequisite of intercourse. On the contrary. The Christian community must patiently take upon itself the burden of this situation, recognizing its own share in the alienation which has been content to remain ignorant. If Muslims are ever to come into a deep interior scholarship in Christian fields it will only be by the unobtrusive and loving service of Christians.

But the attitudes which will either pre-dispose or frustrate the search after real mutual awareness must be generated by Muslims for themselves. Here is one of the plainest issues of real meeting; the will to know and to be known in the utmost fullness possible to mind and heart. This will involve some diminution of the tendency to self-sufficiency, an abandonment of the unexamined tradition that Islam perfects all other faiths and does so without the need to study how. That Quranic doctrine of the continuity between itself and all previous 'scriptural' revelation makes Christian study an internal obligation of Muslim religious education, quite apart from its necessity as a means to communion. So many of the assumptions of Muslim belief are involved in the issues of Christian New Testament scholarship. It is, therefore, plainly not enough to locate our Muslim-Christian meeting in those areas of comparative study that remain on the periphery of both faiths in their historic fullness.

It is well appreciated here that many Muslim members of the Bḥamdūn Convocation were hard pressed by their own environments, either to refrain from attendance or to limit the meeting to political or anti-

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[2] Vol. 30. No. 2. January, 1952, p. 258.

Zionist purposes. Warm tribute must be paid to the tenacity with which they resisted these pressures and to the level of spiritual exchange to which, by the contribution of all, the Convocation was held. So any plea made here for "depth in religion" is made with the utmost sense that it must be waited, yearned and prayed for, as a hard and patient hope. One conference could scarcely fructify it. A decade will be all too short to bring it to the birth. But much depends upon the set of the sails for future convocations, lest they should set a pattern of only partial ends. Appreciating that Muslim, as well as Christian participants are individuals, not plenipotentiaries, having no more power than their own opinion, can future conferences, none the less, encourage Muslim institutions to develop Departments of Christian study? Can some Universities of the Muslim world inaugurate Professorships in Christian Studies, with the accompanying language and other disciplines? Or will they extend operations into the fields of comparative theology so that Christian theologians could appropriately be appointed, to serve such studies as lay within their competence? Can this be done not simply for local Christian student personnel, but for all who seek it? The Faculty of Theology at Ankara University has at least one Christian representative and would readily develop exchange Professorships by which visiting Christian scholars would, from time to time, be brought to the campus. Will the day come when Al-Azhar will do likewise?

If it be argued that these and similar proposals are beyond the range of private convocations, that may well be so. Nevertheless there is much that can be done on the private level, through deepened friendships, intellectual hospitality and personal enterprise. Alienation, after all, has to be repaired, as rain repairs drought, by the accumulation of the insignificant. If direct and relatively unimpeded discourse among scholars and representatives does not pioneer active understanding, it is not likely that anything else will.

This first, and major, reflection leads into another point which seems to deserve attention. It is important that all such meetings as that at Bḥamdūn should be realist about the depth of Christian-Muslim divergence. There is much to be said for seeking common fronts and areas for them undoubtedly exist. But the search for them too often overlooks differences which it is confusing to ignore. "Our minaret" wrote a prominent Egyptian diplomat in Washington in a pamphlet on the new Washington mosque, "will rise high among the spires of this Nation's capital as a symbol of alliance between the Crescent and the Cross." [3] That sentiment is widely expressed in current debate on both sides. It is easy and comforting and lends itself readily to underlying political purposes that tend to intrude themselves wherever Muslim-Christian relations are discussed. But if it is not curbed

[3] "The Islamic Center in Washington D.C." by Hassan Hosny.

and informed by a truer sense of the issues it will frustrate even itself, and certainly effective meeting.

The issue of Communism is a particularly popular and, therefore, obvious illustration of this pitfall. There are those in the West, and and maybe some, fewer, in the East, who can think only in negative terms of enlisting one another to present a united, but possibly uninformed, front against Communism. Or they may simply be interested in the arranging of military bases, failing to realise that though cultures may be physically secured by alien arms, they can only defend themselves spiritually out of their own spiritual resources. We need to beware of invoking Muslim-Christian unity against Communism on too superficial a plane. It is clear that in theism and the reign of law we have the grounds of such a unity. But Communism, when adequately confronted, requires a radical assessment of the nature of man and of evil. On these points Islam and Christianity reveal profound and crucial differences. The latter bears witness to the former of a concept of man which, while sharing the anti-atheism of Islam, differs from it deeply, as also from Communism, in rejecting the perfectibility of human society on a basis of law and State alone. Confidence in such perfectibility, though there is obvious and irreconciliable diversity as to which law and which State, characterises both Communism and Islam. Much of the contemporary Muslim apologetic against Communism, with its insistence on *zakāt* as holding the panacea, fails totally to take the measure of the Communist critique, and some Christians ought to be able lovingly to tell Muslims how and why it is so. This is the kind of relationship we should aim to achieve on the Communist issue, rather than some easy and mutually patronising complacence that neither of us are Godless. It is impossible, of course, even to illustrate sufficiently,[4] still less to exhaust here this theme of Islam and Christianity and Communism. The only point now is to use it as a sample of the plea for realism and depth in inter-religious relationship.

An alert concern about the Marxist menace would surely suggest that we might begin with this as a searching mutual project. The emphasis at Bḥamdūn was on the 'resources' of the faiths in this and other struggles. Speakers in good faith set forth these 'resources.' But is there not need for frank discussion of deficiencies? Not each other's but our own? Is the 'resources' mentality perhaps in some danger of complacence? Centuries ago Christian and Muslim alike would have thanked God that they were not like each other. When we get together shall it be only to thank God that both of us are not like these atheists? A deep yearning for the redemption of the world's waywardness must surely characterize all our intercourse. In it we

[4] Some effort to do this was made in "The Intellectual Impact of Communism on Contemporary Islam." *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8. No. 2. Spring, 1954, pp. 127-138.

must be radical with each other if we would be adequate to our task.

This involves a further fact. There should be no suspicion that religion, properly understood, is primarily a means to anything else. It is so easy to have, perhaps almost subconsciously, the idea that because the world has to be made safe for democracy, belief in God should be 'mobilised' for this end. But true belief in God is commitment to Him and to His purposes. We must not be manoeuvered into a position where it might even seem that somehow we are 'mobilising' God. We must serve and seek God in the pure priority of worship. Both Islam and Christianity have realised this truth. *Allahu Akbar* —God greater than all—is the muezzin's cry. The Christian understanding of salvation, in all realms, is "that God may be all in all." Bḥamdūn has made a beginning. The important question now is the spirit and temper of the way ahead. The hope and prayer must surely be that ever present temptations to qualify the full religious quality of any future colloquy may be recognised and resisted, as jeopardizing the integrity of the common purpose. To bring together religious systems as such in the persons of their responsible followers is to be in the way of tremendous, but also highly precarious, possibilities. To strive to meet in humility, penitence and open-ness of soul, is the surest way to success. What this indicates as to the ideal aegis under which such gatherings should convene, and as to other external circumstances, is difficult here to define. Maybe the sensitivity to the issue is what finally matters.

Arising out of this obligation to be truly and fully ourselves in these meetings, it is surely necessary that there should be no either tacit or explicit commitment to an abeyance of witness. Some of the speakers at Bḥamdūn suggested that such intellectual and spiritual encounters implied that the participants had repudiated in their communions what these speakers called 'proselytism'. This word has come to have ugly and unfortunate overtones. Clearly fellowship in such meetings would be compromised if, in that context, it had any end beyond itself. Colloquy, as we have insisted above, must be sincere, and sincere means 'transparent', 'pure' and free from the ulterior. It is certainly both a Christian privilege and a Christian duty to meet with other minds on a basis of equal respect. Christianity by definition is committed to love and love means knowledge. The will to understand and to pay the price of understanding is a Christian thing.

But it must surely be recognised that this love has other duties beside knowledge and the intellectual realm. It has duties to the souls of all men and believes, as long as it is itself, that Christ is relevant to the needs and aspirations of them all. Conferences, in any event, are a kind of aristocracy, involving a very few. We cannot proceed into them on any assumption that disqualifies the claims of all men upon Christian service and witness. Conferences, too, have a limited goal and in no sense comprehend within themselves the manifold

needs of men. Those who are committed to Christ as Savior and Lord are also committed to commending His salvation to all people and to all areas of their life. No fruitful Christian communication with other traditions can be built upon an abeyance of Christianity at its vital point. Shall we effectively bring ourselves together in terms of a determination to stay always apart? For that is what, truly understood, the demand never to seek conversion (though not, of course, in conferences for study and understanding) really implies. The refusal to conceive of anyone ceasing to be what, religiously, he was born, to withhold from him the option of movement of allegiance, is to condemn religions to be by nature closed shops. This, whatever else it would mean, would be fatal to their chances of understanding.

The demand, then, for non-proselytism hides an unworthy thing under an ugly name. What is hidden is not always understood even by goodwill. We have duties to principles of toleration. No faith should be compelled either by general agreement, or by its own inner logic, to become a prison to its own adherents. And such it becomes, if these lack, *if they should want it,* (which they may not), the power to leave it. This principle of freedom of movement of thought and worship is fundamental to the whole intellectual enterprise of which any true colloquy is a part. Islam, as a missionary religion, is well able, in some of its exponents, to see and allow the right of other faiths also to express themselves within it. Both faiths, the host and the guest, will be the better for this freedom. It should not be surrendered even by implication. All that is vital can be safeguarded by the spontaneous mutuality of trust generated when men know that they are genuine with each other and will not, therefore, misapply or pervert an achievement of fellowship for an achievement of gain. But this genuine trust is not a religious possibility if it is prefaced by compromise on a point integral to faith. That which is truly believed must be held available for belief by others. It must be doubted whether I really hold what I am ready to forego sharing. A moment's reflection indicates that faith can never be monopoly. If it were, the whole of Christian history would have to be re-written and it would no longer be Christian. To say "This is a faithful saying" is to mean also "and worthy of all acceptation." The hope of winning acceptance is not, emphatically not, consistent with colloquy. But neither is the universal abeyance of will to discipleship consistent with the faith brought to colloquy. What deep losses we shall be in the way of, if we open the door to discussion only by closing it to discovery from one another, —the sort of discovery which means acceptance. In one of his poems, George MacDonald has some haunting lines in entire contrast to those from Shakespeare with which we began. He writes:

> "... Two clear souls
> That see a truth, and turning see at once
> Each the other's face glow in that truth's delight
> Are drawn like lovers."

We may be a long, long way from that climax in our current Muslim-Christian intercourse. But we shall always stay so, if we begin by renouncing the sequence which leads through discovery into new discipleship, —a sequence to which we must all be open.

There is space for one final reflection, which may be linked with the foregoing. This would be misunderstood if it is stated crudely as a plea for the specialist. In some senses the world—and religion—have had too much of specialists. In which connection there are some lines from the 4th Book of Wordsworth's *Excursion* which deserve to be recalled, where the poet insists that it was never intended that

> "... We should pore and dwindle as we pore,
> Viewing all objects unremittingly
> In disconnection, dead and spiritless:
> And still dividing and dividing still,
> Break down all grandeur, still unsatisfied
> With the perverse attempt, while littleness
> May yet become more little: waging thus
> An impious warfare with the very life
> Of our own souls."

The world of scholarship has seen much of this kind of soul-losing concentration on the parts and pieces. Muslim-Christian intercourse is certainly in many areas an open field for all men of goodwill. This is the more true in that so many of the problems of the modern world are common to us all. We can, therefore, establish a basis of colloquy on many issues that are familiar, urgent and intelligible. This is precisely what the Bḥamdūn Convocation set out to do.

Nevertheless, the truth remains that the ultimate issues of Muslim-Christian meeting require the kind of knowledge which can only be had by those who have specifically sought it. It would appear, perhaps not wholly by the fault of the sponsors, that the large majority of the participating Christians at Bḥamdūn lacked this background of sustained and careful Islamic study. Only a minority knew Arabic or had studied Islamics, as distinct from travelling in the East. Sensitivity of spirit and goodwill cannot of themselves replace necessary academic disciplines. The very vocabulary involved is the most obvious point of confusion. In the last resort as any Muslim will agree, the Qurʾān is untranslateable. Its meaning may be conveyed but the final thing is then diminished. There can, therefore, be no substitute for knowing it in the original to the utmost point the non-Arab can hope to achieve. There is a tendency in some circles in the West to read Iqbāl in English and suppose that this is equivalent to knowing Islam. The instinct to locate the Convocation in the Arab East, rather than in the United States, was statesmanlike. But is there not an equal need to locate the themes of colloquy in the areas of the Muslim mind and to expect that all participants may be able, not only to travel long

distances, but to enter fully into the eastern mental world? This would seem to indicate that future occasions should perhaps be on a somewhat smaller scale, less publicised, where the more detailed and precise issues can be broached. In this kind of 'meeting' there is no suggestion that only 'experts' are appropriate. There will always be tasks for representative Christians whose awareness of Islam remains superficial. Doubtless the first ventures were likely to be preparatory. But subsequent occasions must go beyond the points and places once reached. Only to repeat these would be re-iteration and might later decline into platitude. The way ahead clearly calls for increasing attention to history, doctrine and law, in a word, to Islamics. It would be unfortunate, if not crippling, to fail to mobilise all the academic and other resources, willing to be mobilised, and capable of serving the purpose out of a specific knowledge and experience.

There are many evidently serious tasks to which such future meetings could set themselves. The theme of the nature of man in society, his redemption and that of the social order, in the light of the Communist philosophy, is one of the most obvious. Another is the comparative study of Muslim and Christian vocabulary, with some attempt to investigate the reasons for the long-standing cleavage in religious terminology in Arabic, as between the two faiths. Close to this study of meanings is the need for a careful and reverent comparative study of the doctrine of God. So much of Muslim antipathy to Christianity rests on an entire misunderstanding of what the latter teaches—a misunderstanding which, in its extreme forms, is no less a travesty of the historic faith than was the medieval account of the Prophet quoted here at the outset. It is important that the further intellectual relations of the two communities should not continue to be harassed by failure to see that the Christian doctrine of God is no less a doctrine of unity than the Muslim. Other fruitful themes of study would be the legacy of the Muslim master-thinkers and the modern form of the issues that stirred them. The basis of such study should be an expectation of relevance, not a search to discredit; a will to clarify and serve, not a plan to discount or distort. As the study grows in intimacy and range, it must map its course in boldness and confidence, being willing to leave the shelter of the familiar and open sails to all the winds of God.

For some years now this Quarterly, in its modest way, has been calling for new ventures in Muslim-Christian relations. It was for this reason that the Bḥamdūn Convocation, and its plan for future renewal of contacts, have been followed with eager interest. In saluting the initiative generously taken, these reflections do no more than think aloud on the nature and criteria of what should follow. Why not, as well as other colloquies *min waqtin ilā ākhar,* a Muslim Institute for the Study of Christianity, as an adjunct to some eastern intellectual center of Islam?

Hartford, Conn. KENNETH CRAGG

BOOK REVIEWS

The Middle East — A Political and Economic Survey. By the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London and New York, pp. 590, xviii, 2 maps.

As the preface of this book puts it, "a spate of books [on the Middle East has been] appearing in Britain and the United States" and this reviewer is probably not alone in feeling that a moratorium should be declared on further publication. Such a hope is, of course, forlorn, but it is just conceivable that the present work will, if not quench, at least dampen the ardour of would-be authors by anticipating much of what they have to say. As a general survey of the region, *The Middle East* will not be supplanted for a long time to come, and students should now turn their attention to more intensive research on much more limited and specific questions.

The present work follows the pattern of its predecessor, published in 1950, but like most revised editions it is both bigger and better. In an eighty page introduction, the geography, climate, resources and strategic location of the region are briefly described, its history and politics from the Arab conquest to the present day are outlined, an account is provided of its faiths and sects and a short but excellent discussion of its economic background is given; the last-mentioned would have gained from more extensive treatment of oil. There follow ten chapters devoted to Arabia, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Persia, the Sudan, Syria and Lebanon and Turkey. Most of these are subdivided into the following topics: the land and the people, history and politics, government and administration, economic survey, social survey. A short preface attempts to give the reader the "feel" of the region and a short postscript carries the story up to 12 April 1954. The Appendices contain important international treaties and useful statistical tables and are followed by a reading list, a good index and two maps.

On the whole, the standard achieved is high, the information provided is abundant and the views expressed are judicious. Nevertheless, there are several inaccuracies. Thus in the chapter on Egypt (p. 223) there is a confusion between the High Dam project and a non-existent nearby alternative; these projects are declared capable of irrigating 5½ million acres, instead of under 2 million; and the distribution of the agricultural population is jumbled up. On page 229 Egypt is described as one of the six largest producers of cement (there are at least 24 larger producers); and on page 247 malaria is described as having been eradicated while life expectancy at birth is put at 15-20 years (instead of 35-40). In the chapter on Syria, industry is declared to contribute "about half as much as agriculture to the gross national production" (p. 492), the true figure being less than a quarter. Similarly, there are numerous misprints, for example Hussain ibn Ishaq instead of Hunain (p. 55), Cheks, instead of Chekka (p. 496), Commerce du Liban, instead of Commerce du Levant (p. 503) etc.

Another criticism concerns the general attitude of the book. The present reviewer is not, himself, free from prejudice but he cannot

help feeling that some of the authors of the book do not show enough understanding of and sympathy for the position of the Arab states and Persia, in contrast to Turkey and Israel. Two small but significant examples may be noted. As a result of the decline of Islam in the Arab states and Persia, it is said that "a whole generation has been left spiritually and politically rudderless" (p. xvi); this judgment, as regards spiritual matters, surely applies at least as much to Turkey. And, after a description of United States' aid to Turkey and Persia, it is said that "there are difficulties about being equally generous to countries which are still legally at war with one another—the Arab states and Israel," (p. 78) a statement which somewhat understates the amount of help received by Israel. But these criticisms do not detract from the value of a book, which certainly achieves its object of being "useful both to the general reader who is unacquainted with the Middle East and to the professional who wants a quick reference source."

New York CHARLES ISSAWI

Oil in the Middle East: its Discovery and Development. By Stephen Helmsley Longrigg, London: Oxford (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, pp. 273, appendices, maps, index to 305, $4.00.

The discovery and development of oil in the Middle East is a story of high adventure; of faith, struggle, defeat, and victory in the lives of pioneering men, with the fortunes of whole peoples as the stake of their success or failure. Yet little of the dramatic has crept into Brig. Longrigg's pages. He has chosen, rather, a sober, factual presentation, giving us with almost monotonous regularity, chapter by chapter, a great amount of data on oil concessions (both active and abandoned), exploratory drilling (not forgetting the many dry holes), and exploitation, with proper attention to the social amenities provided by the various companies and the names of their respective general managers. This body of information is both detailed and accurate, and the book is therefore valuable as a reference. But as a means of appreciating the story's deeper significance in human terms, *Oil in the Middle East* does not contribute very much. The author himself senses the book's limitation, and well illustrates its tone, in a sentence which constitutes the opening paragraph of his section on Kuwait: "If the reader of Middle Eastern oil history runs the risk of weariness at the repeated tale of discoveries, development, and rapid increases in output, the record of the Kuwait Oil Company ... is sufficiently remarkable to interest the most jaded mind."

While one may voice the highest regard for the mass of data which Brig. Longrigg has assembled, it is still necessary to register a few reservations on the manner of its presentation. The division of the book into chronological periods not determined primarily by oil developments (The Beginning, Before the First World War, The First World War and After, Oil under Riza Shah, etc.) robs it of continuity even within each unit. This makes it most difficult for the reader to keep clearly in mind, for example, the whole story of oil in Iran, which properly told should lead in one sweep from the concessions

of Baron de Reuter and Mr. D'Arcy to nationalization and Dr. Mosaddeq.

A more serious criticism can be raised than this one of arrangement. It is Brig. Longrigg's evident partiality for the oil companies, undoubtedly derived from his own long association with them. He also appears to believe in the White Man's burden—including the cross that must be borne in dealing with the immature and unpredictable governments of underdeveloped countries. His undoubtedly sincere convictions lead him into an air of patronage toward Middle Eastern governments when they are submissive, and into a spirit of righteous indignation when they do not react according to the accepted behaviour pattern of a Western nation such as Great Britain. In passages dealing with disputes between the oil companies and the governments of the Middle East, the discussion comes close to being an apology for the companies—notably the British. In the chapter entitled "The Tragedy of Persia," for example, it is only in the final paragraphs that Iran's grievances are given a cursory and incomplete listing, in a manner which implies that even this amount of space is more than they deserve. In the same connection, it is of possible significance that nowhere in the text or among the footnotes and numerous valuable tables, is an attempt made to estimate the net earnings of the oil companies. The amounts can be surmised only from their payments to governments since the 50-50 profit-sharing agreements began to come into effect in 1951.

If this brief review has dwelt on what appear to be the limitations of Brig. Longrigg's book, it is with no intention of detracting from the very valuable service he has performed in unearthing and presenting in authoritative fashion a great deal of factual information. Our intention has been merely to indicate that the true drama of oil in the Middle East, in terms of the men who have shaped its course and the peoples who are experiencing its impact, remains to be told.

Middle East Institute, Washington HARVEY P. HALL

The Structure of Spanish History. By Américo Castro, translated by Edmund L. King, Princeton University Press, 1954, xiii pp. 689, index and 8 illustrations, numerous notes, $ 10.

This significant study of the interaction of Christian, Muslim and Jewish life in Spain and Portugal is an enlargement in English of the author's *España en su Historia,* published in 1948. It is probably the crowning work of a renowned scholar who was born in Brazil, was educated in Europe, has long taught in the United States (at Princeton since 1940), and has been honored by many institutions.

If a humble reader has digested as well as he has enjoyed this volume, the author may be summarised as follows:

Especially between the 10th and the 15th centuries, Spain was a land of Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Their mutual influences shaped the historic character of the Spanish people in their "dwelling place of life." The Christians had some measure of Roman and Visigothic heritage, with a neglected tradition of Arian Christian learning. Despite the fairly early accommodation of Spanish Christianity to the norm of

the Catholic Church (with, however, proud independence for long because of possession of the shrine of Saint James of Campostela), the economic, managerial, and cultural dominance of Muslims and Jews resulted in orientalization of the Spaniards and the Portuguese. They became—in psychology and outlook, in social organization, and in the supremacy of religion and custom throughout their later history—different from other peoples of Europe. They had no fully developed feudal system because of the intrusion of Muslim and Jewish officials, government agents, etc., between rulers and common people. The Iberians, and their offshoots in former colonies of Ibero-America, have remained (as one may say in a general sense) orientally and subjectively "vitalistic" instead of becoming objective and rationalistic, even in an era of science and technology. Spain, for all the spreading of her colonial empire, did not develop a national commerce until the 19th century. A few brilliant scientists have existed, without an active national scientific tradition or a national corps of technical experts. There has been no great philosopher to follow Maimonides, Averroes, Luis Vives (16th century), and Spinoza. And all of those, indeed, were of Oriental origin, and only one of them, Spinoza, superimposed upon his Oriental learning the Graeco-Roman tradition dominant in Western philosophy. Failure to develop properly the economic resources of their country (a failure in which Brazil for a considerable time imitated the mother peninsula) was and still is due to the long dependence in the past upon Muslims and Jews in agriculture, crafts, merchandising, and functions of management and government. It is due also to the fundamental lack of interest in such matters on the part of the Christians, who coupled with their psychology, referred to above, were infatuated with the supreme value of the person over that of material things. Personal values, to them, have always resided on the inner throne of one's being, in the quality of one's life, in performing little or big acts of moral value, in doing great deeds, in achievements in the arts. While always resisting any imposition of systematization on their lives by the government, they have bound themselves by tradition and custom—which are part of the corporate life of the people—and, similarly, they have in the majority remained loyal to their religious faith. However, religion has most often been what the people themselves understood it to be, and not what it was interpreted to be by Rome.

Continuing, the author says (p. 29): "They preserved without essential change their 13th century language, and with it hammered out artistic creations of universal validity." Even in the 13th century (p. 474) there appeared "in the court of Alphonse X the Learned ... great works of history, law, and astronomy, written in Castilian rather than in Latin ... in a language understood by all." The production included a translation of the Bible in the common tongue.

Again (p. 627):

"The history of Spain becomes meaningful when it is conceived not as a continent of objectively organized culture but as an immense archipelago of great individual and collective figures—heroes, kings, saints, religious orders, great lords, poets in prose and in verse, artists,

guerilla-fighters, insurrectionists, and every other kind of thing along this line."

There is not space for detailed outline of the author's rich material on many phases of the subject and in many excursuses therefrom (including one on the origin of Portugal). He treats of the national cult of Saint James and its place in the reconquest; the influence of Islam on Christian mysticism and on the religious-military orders; Moorish and Spanish personalism-integralism; the Castilian epic of *Mio Cid* and the *Chanson de Roland*; Raymond Lully (Lull) and his *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* (p. 310: "... delightful ... one more example of literary mudejarism ... a mingling of the maqāmah-like neo-Platonic-Christian love and Moslem mysticism ..."); the Archpriest (Juan Ruiz) of Hita and his *Libro de Buen Amor,* which is a "Christian-Muslim ambiguity" including motifs of Muslim eroticism; the place of the Jews in Spanish literature, thought, and life—including, according to Professor Castro, the preponderance of converted Jews and their immediate descendants in leadership of the Inquisition which harried the non-converts. There are also interesting discussions of the influence of the Oriental Spaniards—Arabs and Jews who used Arabic—on the language, literature, thought, and everyday life of the Peninsula. These include new treatments of recently discovered materials of Andalusian poetry, and essays on the Moorish and Jewish influence in the rise of Spanish lyric poetry and the poetry of the troubadours.

The few translation "bobbles" are too minor for mention. A little strange to many eyes is Servet for Servetus (see index). Kahled (p. 293) must be for Khālid—like the stubbornly perpetuated error by which the American publisher of (Jibran) Khalil Jibran keeps entitling him as Kahlil Jibran! Only by deduction, from the juxtaposition of Averroes and Avén Ruiz in the index, will many readers recognize the latter as the former, or Ibn Rushd (cf. p. 606, Avén Ruiz). Of course a mere slip led to the statement (p. 143) that a *History of Joseph the Carpenter* was current in the 4th and 5th centuries, in Arabic. Graf (*Gesch. der Christl. Arab. Litt.,* I, p. 235) considers that even the basic material—in Buhairic Coptic—must be from the 7th century instead of the 4th. The reference (p. 425) to the *Chahār Maqālah* of Niẓāmi-i-ʿArūḍī-i-Samarqandī (*q,* not *k*) is to p. 13 f., not to p. 32, of Vol. II, Browne, *Literary History of Persia* —at least in the 1951 reprint. Mahnū and Leila (p. 435) is surely for Majnūn and Leilā (or Lailā), of the famous Persian love story, very popular also as rendered in Turkish and as adapted in Arabic; see index of Browne, under *Laylá and Majnún.* The form *amsā* (p. 234) is of course from the root *masā,* not *massā,* which is the second form, as mentioned; and the root and its derivatives have other meanings, though not here pertinent.

P. 81: "The Moors came to Hispania sustained by ... political unity and the impetus of a newly born religion ... everything that the body and soul of the Bedouin could long for." History teaches that the first generalization is too sweeping, and the second is only partly true—and, even so, only so long as there is a forceful leader, both magnetic and

successful. P. 373: The placing of private passions "above law and traditional good sense" is not any more "quite proper in a Moslem court" than in others, and King Sancho IV is not the only non-Muslim ruler, or non-Oriental ruler, who has been known to have done so.

Finally, "Saint John of Acre" (St. Jean d'Acre; Arabic: ʿAkkā) does not appear in the index—nor, more strangely, does Brazil.

This is a rewarding volume, for the reading of which one may happily devote his spare time for several weeks.

Dhahrān, Saudi Arabia CHARLES D. MATTHEWS

Glimpses of Iqbal's Mind and Thought. By H. H. Bilgrami, Lahore, Orientalia, pp. 124. Rs. 4/2.

Though sixteen years have passed since the death of Muḥammad Iqbāl, the fascination of his thought and of his poetry seems to increase. The lectures which constitute the present volume on him were delivered in England on various occasions dedicated to the poet such as "Iqbāl days" and meetings of "Iqbāl societies," testifying to the devotion that he still inspires. Iqbāl has become something of a spiritual symbol for Pakistan. As the largest of the Muslim states, Pakistan would be a leader among them. In Iqbāl without a doubt there exists the inspirational material for such leadership. He who has been called "the mainspring of Muslim renaissance" desired above all to inspire the Muslim nation to new achievement.

Dr. Bilgrami has undertaken in these lectures to present the salient ideas from Iqbāl's writing. The principal source for such an analysis is the poet's book on *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. The guiding thoughts of this book are illustrated by many quotations from Iqbāl's matchless poetry. Inevitably, since the lectures were delivered before various groups, there is an absence of a clear connecting line of thought between them. But for one who goes through them all, Iqbāl's main concerns stand out clearly.

Most apparent is Iqbāl's dominant desire to reorganize individual and national life on the basis of Islam, and more specifically on the basis of the primary Muslim affirmation of *Tawḥīd* (oneness), "There is no god, but God." This faith is shown to be the source of all action. Much as Iqbāl glorified action and tried to stir up his long slumbering people, it should not be forgotten that his call was only for action grounded in faith. *Tawḥīd* is expounded also as the foundation stone for Islamic culture and Islamic democracy. The oneness of God indicates the unity and equality of men. Therefore Islamic culture is concerned for all men and Islamic democracy grants equal rights and tolerance for all. Yet the spiritual purpose and basis of Islamic democracy keeps it from being satisfied with the mere counting—rather than weighing—of men and the economic utilitarianism which so roused Iqbāl's wrath against the democracy he saw in Europe.

It was not only action but also knowledge that Iqbāl demanded for the revivifying of the Muslim nation (*ʿilm* as well as *ʿamal*). He stood in the line of those who tried to break the grip of classical Greek thought on Muslim scholasticism. Like many Christian thinkers at-

tacking the same Greek influence on Western though structures, he denied that the sensory world was alien to the real world. He wanted not only the serenity and sweetness of the mystics, but initiative and leadership for the world of men. Thus in his understanding of action and of knowledge, of culture and of democracy, he tried to enhance those elements in Islam which would encourage Muslims to fresh endeavor in this world. This book about him is clearly aimed at the same goal and is dedicated to making Pakistan the fulfillment of Iqbāl's desires.

Yale University, New Haven CHAS. W. FORMAN

Under Three Flags. By Stephen Neill, N.Y. Friendship Press, 1954, pp. vi & 185, Reading List, Index.

The years since 1947 have brought great changes to the 'unchangeable' East. The three geographic units under consideration in *Under Three Flags*—Pakistan, India, and Ceylon—are brilliant and parallel examples of this fact. The reason for the writing of this book is to further a study of the Christian movement in the setting of this fluidity, in the midst of intense activity on all fronts cultural, political, social, economic and religious. The Rt. Rev. Stephen Neill has been so intimately a part of these developments in India, Pakistan and Ceylon that his selection as the author of a book to inform the American churches of this geographic area of Christian activity was a natural one. Bishop Neill's acknowledged leadership in things ecclesiastical and his sensitivity to Christian nurture and development equip him adequately for this task.

The sweep of Christian history, against the backdrop of controlling new forces is an inspiring and dramatic recital. Bishop Neill has projected grippingly and realistically the path to world leadership in church union of the Church of South India. The bearing of nationalism and cultural pride on the Church's at-homeness in these areas, the aspects of the expressional forms of the Churches and the reasons for the Christian Indian's suspicion of Western domination are all sensitively and sympathetically presented to an American audience.

In his concluding chapter Bishop Neill makes the following evaluation:

> The political independence of the three countries has laid new and great responsibilities on their citizens and brought them face to face with all the problems of life in a revolutionary world. What contribution will Christians make to the life of their countries in these days of rapid change? We may never say, "Christianity is a useful antidote to communism; therefore, let us spread Christianity in India." The gospel stands by its own claims and by nothing else. But it is evident that the churches, if they are faithful to their vocation, have much to give that is urgently needed in the now fluid society in the midst of which they live. In politics, in economic regeneration, in social reconstruction, by integrity, by compassion, by self forgetful service, they have a contribution of incalculable value to make. Already Christians are exercising far greater influence than their small numbers would suggest.
>
> The spiritual independence of the churches has made them conscious in a new way both of their dignity as living branches in the one body of Christ and also of their spiritual poverty in the face of the new tasks that he has laid upon them. There was a danger for a time that the churches might become

so deeply occupied with their own affairs as to forget their wider responsibilities. Now it is evident that they are taking seriously the task of making Christ known throughout their countries. It is not surprising that they feel uncertain of their strength to carry out so vast an enterprise.

What will be the attitude of the West, overburdened as it already is with its own problems, to the newly emancipated East?

The fulfillment of the purpose of this little book will rest very largely in the answer to this question in the minds of the church membership of the West.

It is inevitable that in a work of interpretation of this kind there will be areas of possible and even violent difference of opinion. Two of these areas of specific interest to readers of this Quarterly occur in the first chapter, called 'Learning Independence.' In a sketch of Hindu-Muslim political relationships, two of the most sensitive areas are dealt with rather too summarily for complete understanding. In the case of the forced accession of Hyderabad to the Indian Republic there is no sense of the extreme complexity of the problem and its background and certainly no suggestion of the human suffering and anguish which led to the reluctant decision of the Indian Government, in the interest of law and order, to 'invade' the state. Those of us who were in the immediate vicinity at the time would scarcely agree with the facile implications of the blunt statement "India refused to admit the Nizam's right to independence and sent an army to invade the state."

Again in the Kashmir issue the perfunctory treatment prejudicial to India's action leaves one most uncomfortable. The instrument of accession to India was signed not because the ruler was a Hindu but because a Muslim prime minister had to seek outside aid to repel aggression from the Pakistan border. The Raja of Kashmir has had little or nothing to say about the fate of his state since August 15, 1947. 'Aggression' against Kashmir preceded rather than followed the accession to India.

One of the values of this book is that it faces frankly for the non-administrative reader the whole problem of the 'foreign' missionary. The apparent tightening of governmental restrictions imposed upon foreigners particularly in India has been an enigma to many whose interest in the missionary movement has been of long standing. Bishop Neill has done a very great service to the church in making these actions plausible and at the same time maintaining sound evaluation. The quotation above will suggest that the direction of activities of the church must be the responsibility of the people who are the Church.

Hartford, Connecticut MALCOLM S. PITT

Beyond Romance, A true story from the heart of India. By F. Balph, Christopher publishing house, Boston. First ed. 1942, ned ed. 1954, pp. 134, $ 2.50.

The author and her husband, before embarking on the enterprize described in this book, had worked for seven years in India with the United Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions; the one teaching tailoring in an industrial home for boys, the other building schools and hospitals. In both burned the desire "to help evangelize that broad

expanse of unoccupied territory that lies across the whole of Northern India where thousands, and even millions, behind isolated mountain barriers, lie sick and spiritually dying without a hope."

Resigning from their Board, backed by a few friends, facing innumerable obstacles and without any visible assurance that they would be able to stay, they came with two friends to Poonch. By faith had they begun and by faith only were they able to endure.

After the initial curiosity had passed the Muslim zealots commenced their counteraction. It began with persecution which did but purify and strengthen the converts. Then they turned to friendliness, administering doses of poison in form of flattery, promised good, desired gain. With that kindly pressure suited to the weakness of each individual convert, they plundered and stole away and scattered the small flock.

But it was not only external influences that diminished the Christians, but their own selves and the surroundings in which they lived and had been brought up. Also sickness and weariness dulled the life of the community. Yet it was death that proved to be the turning-point. "Not a tear was shed, not a wail went forth. The like of such proceedings Poonch had never witnessed. Instead of the mournful dirge and death wail, hymns of praise and promise echoed.... Breast-beating was replaced with joyful expressions of hope and victory. The Christian funeral was a living testimony to the truth that had been preached to the crowd...: O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?" Malicious tongues were silenced.

Thus, in face of persecution and boycott, in prayer and in the preaching of Christ crucified and risen, preaching through word and deed, these missionaries won the hearts of the people and planted the seed of the Christian faith. And even if no organised visible Church exists yet in Poonch, the Church is there, for today Poonchi Christians are preaching the Gospel. Just as there is seed time there is a harvest too.

The book is a vivid and thrilling story, a stirring tale of deep need and heroic endeavor. One is reminded over and over again of Hebrews 11. Furthermore it shows that there are ways to the Muslims, if only we would rid ourselves of false standards of success and realize that we are called not to be successful but to be faithful. There is, however, one danger with this sort of work—its temporary and transitory character.

Hartford, Connecticut HANS VON SIGARD

Revolution in Missions. By Willis Church Lamott, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1954, pp. vii and 228.

This brief study does not attempt to be a handbook but rather takes a broad and comprehensive view of missionary trends and evaluates the achievements of the church in foreign lands. The thesis of Prof. Lamott may be summed up in the transition from "foreign missions to the world mission of the church." He brings to the survey experience as an educational missionary in Japan and as director of missionary education for the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. He is now Professor of Christian Missions at the San Francisco Seminary.

One may question the choice of title for the book, *Revolution in Missions*. In the first chapter the inference is made that in the early stages almost the entire concern of missions was the conversion of individuals from non-Christian religions, while today the emphasis is upon the church,—thus the revolution. However, the author shows that William Carey and his colleagues as far back as 1805 were dealing with problems of church organization (p. 26).

Following the introductory chapters the changing forms of missionary work are treated under the following headings: The Younger Churches and the Foreign Missionary, Evangelism, Education, The Medical and Social Mission, Community Witness. The remainder of the book deals with the Younger Churches, their Life and their relationship to the World Church.

The chapter on Christianity and the Non-Christian Faiths serves as a good example of the method followed by the author. Instead of any detailed attention to the tenets of different world religions he reviews briefly but pointedly the various approaches made. Dogmatic discussion has won few converts. "The great gains of Christianity have been made among animists in Africa and Oceania, among the outcastes of India, and among the spirit worshipers of Korea." The alliance against secularism was strongly advocated at Jerusalem in 1928, and the book, *Rethinking Missions,* published in 1932 proposed sharing not proselyting as the necessary strategy. The Biblical realism of Kraemer, which had strong advocates at Madras in 1938, prevailed in so far as "it brought not only non-Christian systems but Christians and the Christian system—"empirical Christianity"—...before the Judgment Seat of Christ." Madras listed Nationalism, Scientific Scepticism, and Communism, as the secular faiths that challenged the Christian world mission. The issue is more critical today. "The tide can be dammed only by some particular form of religion... Religion never exists in the abstract. It can, therefore, not be set up as a bulwark against any form of secularism." (p. 152). This chapter indicates the need for presenting Christianity in such a way as to meet the problems set for followers of other faiths by their own religions. "Through it all the concern of the evangelist is for people, not for religious systems." (p. 153).

The Near East reader will be disappointed that particular attention is not paid somewhere to his area. Outside of Turkey and Iran, little mention is made of its lands. Unfortunately the only reference to the Protestant community in Egypt gives the misleading statistics of the World Christian Handbook of 1949. (The edition for 1952 has attempted to correct these.) Latin America suffers too from lack of consideration. China, Japan, India and Africa serve as the fields in which mission policy and progress are exemplified.

Questions arise as the reader attempts to weigh the import of changing conditions. The visits of leaders from the Younger Churches to the West seem to herald a day when foreign missions will be reversed. Members of the Younger Churches coming "to join us in challenging our own particular American brand of heathenism" would

have to come entirely on the initiative and at the expense of their churches if the parallel is to be complete.

The chapter on Education is very valuable in reviewing the problems that have beset mission schools and colleges. Maintaining the Christian character of a school is paramount. The author says, "if these schools can be closely integrated into the Younger Churches their Christian character can be assured." (p. 58). The question arises whether there is any assurance that national leaders will not be influenced to accept government grants or be subjected to local and national pressures just as foreigners have been.

The fact that the book provokes so many questions in the reader's mind is ample proof of its value. Any one planning mission strategy in the future will need to be aware of issues discussed in *Revolution in Missions.*

Temple University, Philadelphia E. E. Elder

Islam in India and the Middle East. By S. M. Ahmed, Abbas Manzil Library, Allahabad-3, India, 1954, pp. 265, Rs. 5- (sh 7/6).

The author of this interesting volume is a retired officer of the former United Provinces Civil Service before the date of independence, August 15, 1947. He is now serving as the Honorary General Secretary of the *Abbas Manzil Library Trusts* of Allahabad and is also the editor of their Islamic series. In this series they had hoped to include reprints of "four English books, *viz., The Preaching of Islam* by Sir Thos. Arnold, *The Legacy of Islam* by the same author and his associates, *The Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* by Duncan Black Macdonald, and *The Spirit of Islam* by Sir Amir Ali ..." However, this was found impossible because of existing copyrights, so the editor himself was commissioned to produce four books under the following titles: *Islam in India and the Middle East*; *Islam in China and the Far East*; *Islam in Africa and the Near East*; and finally *Islam in the U.S.S.R., Europe and Turkey.* It is no wonder that he confesses he has found this to be an almost Herculean task.

Interestingly enough, he frankly admits his great debt to "Arnold, Mark Sykes, Lane-Poole, Hunter, Risley, Moreland, Irvine, Law and hosts of other Indologists and orientalists who could be very easily recognised in this concoction." He adds: "I have retained their own vocabulary and phrase in preference to my own poor English." At the same time this method of handling such important sources, without reference footnotes, is greatly to be deplored, nor has it been a means of improving the author's English as finally developed in the text!

The scope of the book is quite complete in its seven chapters,—I. Military Conquests, II. Peaceful Penetration, III. Political Conditions, IV. Social and Religious Conditions, V. Economic Conditions, VI. Intellectual Life and Activities, and VII. Statistical Surveys.

The specific countries under consideration, of course, are Iran, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. But why Pakistan is left out of the title is a puzzle which can perhaps be solved by a careful reading of

pages 135-140 of the chapter on Political Conditions where the author definitely assails the underlying political philosophy of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Father of Pakistan.

In this same chapter we find a curious mixture of criticism of the British, Hindus and Muslims as well. The British are criticised for their reluctance to grant India independence; the Hindus are taken to task because their political leaders "always talked India in terms of Hindu polity" to the exclusion of Muslim interests; while the Muslim League, which came into existence in 1907 ... "from the very beginning was the mouthpiece of British imperialism ..." at least until such time as Muhammad Ali Jinnah introduced his famous Lahore resolution advocating the partition of India between Hindus and Muslims.

From here on the author proceeds to argue that Pakistan is a mistake, declaring that following partition the forty million Muslims of India were facing the "same annihilation and forced immigration as the Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan" had it not been for Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who knew no difference between Indian and Indian ... "Under his wise guidance India gave in her constitution the same rights of citizenship to Muslims as to other Indians of different creeds and our future has been guaranteed."

Rightly or wrongly the author asserts that "Pakistan, the creation of Muslim folly and obstinacy is built on Islamic sentiment, a rickety foundation." The author further predicts that Pakistan as it is today will not endure, and asserts that it "will sooner or later give way to a united federal government ... comprising Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, Punjab and Sindh" ... and that East Bengal will one day be reunited along with West Bengal and Assam "where the proportion of Hindu-Muslim by fifty-fifty will give no opportunity to any fool or knave to raise the Bogey of Islam or Hinduism in danger."

In spite of its various deficiencies this book meets a current need for those who are interested in this area of the Islamic world.

Westminster, Maryland MURRAY T. TITUS

Essentials of Modern Turkish. By Herman H. Kreider, Washington: Middle East Institute, 1954, pp. 328, $5.00.

The publication of Mr. Kreider's "Essentials of Modern Turkish by the Middle East Institute is an event as welcome as it is long awaited. Mr. Kreider's *First Lessons in Modern Turkish,* published in Istanbul in 1945, was the first adequate introduction to modern Turkish available to English-speaking students. It was a most valuable book, but, as its author would readily acknowledge, it had many shortcomings both in substance and form. In his new book, Mr. Kreider presents us with a far more professional product, better arranged, more comprehensive and greatly improved in format and printing. In his preface, Mr. Kreider states "... the student who has familiarized himself with the material in these lessons can go forth in self-confidence, knowing that he will encounter no unexplored territory." Serious students will find that this bold claim is justified to a remarkable degree. Turkish is a

difficult language but once the pupil has mastered *Essentials of Modern Turkish* he will find his further progress limited only by his ambition; he should then (with dictionary at hand), be able to unravel almost any passage of modern Turkish, and to a considerable degree, express himself correctly in writing.

The book contains 42 lessons. Each lesson explains concisely a grammatical principle or group of related principles, with a number of illustrative sentences; these are followed by a vocabulary and exercises. Each lesson can be easily fitted into an average day's class assignment; the explanations are clear and concise, the vocabulary generally well chosen and the exercises thoroughly test the student's ability to use the principles he has just learned. Each set of exercises consists of translation of sentences from English to Turkish and of translating from Turkish to English a short passage from a well-known Turkish author; these passages, interspersed with several amusing "Nasrettin Hodja" anecdotes, are presented in serial form in the later lessons, thus providing a continuity of style and interest. The table of contents, a key to the first nineteen exercises, and a 165 page Turkish-English and English-Turkish vocabulary, make up the rest of the book.

Essentials of Modern Turkish contains, in addition to the essentials, a certain amount of detail which will be appreciated by beginning students, such as complete verb conjugations and other tables, yet it avoids confusing the student with a number of exceptions and rare forms. It clearly bears the mark of Mr. Kreider's fifteen years of classroom experience in introducing Americans to the Turkish language.

We can, of course, still wish for further improvements in a future edition. The most obvious need is for exercises and illustrative material containing more sentences which are applicable to every day situations. Such sentences as "Look out that the rope in your hand doesn't tear," or "Because this season's potatoes are turning out very wrinkled, we were unable to benefit from the potato peeling machine," or "When the head cook was unable to find the recipe you gave him, he made a kind of pastry out of lemons," may illustrate admirably the grammatical principles involved, but surely they could be improved upon from the standpoint of the needs of the average student. Similarly, though less obviously, the Turkish-English translation exercises, which are attractive examples of contemporary Turkish writing, over-emphasize the rural and small community aspects of life and are full of colloquialisms which are not always explained. A greater variety of selections, including some which deal with urban life and with political and international affairs and similar matters, drawn from the daily press, would be helpful to most students.

We would also question the desirability of devoting more than half the book (165 pages out of 328) to a supplement of Turkish-English and English-Turkish vocabulary. Words essential to the student might better be restricted to the individual vocabularies found in each lesson, together with the notes to the practice reading exercises. Most students will in any case want to own dictionaries, since nothing short of this can be very satisfactory even to a beginner. An index would be a great

convenience to users; also, brief subject headings for each numbered paragraph in the text would facilitate reference as well as focus the student's attention. One conspicuous lapse is noted: the heading of Lesson XXVII is "Passive, Causative, Reflexive and Reciprocal Verbs," yet the text itself omits any mention of either reflexive or reciprocal verbs.

The shortcomings noted above are unimportant in relation to the overall value of "Essentials of Modern Turkish," and Mr. Kreider deserves hearty congratulation for this solid addition to the tools available to the steadily increasing numbers of students desiring to learn this challenging and rewarding language.

Princeton, N.J. FREDERICK P. LATIMER, JR.

Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953. Lahore, 1954, pp. 387, Rs. 5-4-0.

An adequate review of this most interesting Government document requires some excursus into the issues implicit in the formation of Pakistan and in the drafting of its Constitution. In 1949 the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (which remained the federal legislature of Pakistan until its dissolution by the Governor General in Oct. 1954), passed an "Objectives Resolution." It began with the words "In the name of Allāh, the Beneficent, the Merciful," and contained the clause "the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah" (Islamic tradition.) The Basic Principles Committee reported at the end of 1952. It re-iterated the Objectives Resolution referred to above, and opened with a chapter on the "Directive Principles of State Policy." This suggested among other things

1. That "facilities should be provided for Muslims to understand what life in accordance with the Holy Qurʾān and the Sunnah means, and the teaching of the Holy Qurʾān to Muslims should be made compulsory."

2. That there should be "Prohibition of drinking, gambling and prostitution in all their various forms."

3. That "Steps should be taken for bringing the existing laws into conformity with Islamic principles, and for the codification of such injunctions of the Holy Qurʾān and the Sunnah as can be given legislative effect."

This third provision was obviously very difficult to reconcile with Jinnah's vision of a secular state. The more so because the second chapter of the Basic Principles Committee's report contained plans for implementing it. This began with the clause "No legislature should enact any law repugnant to the Holy Qurʾān and the Sunnah", and went on to propose that the federal government and each unit (i.e. state) government should constitute for a period of five years a board consisting of not more than five persons well versed in Islamic laws who will be responsible for making sure that no bill is repugnant to the Holy Qurʾān or the Sunnah.

What would have happened had Jinnah been still alive no one can say. By the end of 1952 when the above Report appeared, the orthodox Muslim theologians or *mullahs* had gained great influence and the politicians hesitated to alienate them. In November, 1953 the Constituent Assembly decided that Pakistan should be entitled an Islamic Republic, and endorsed the Directive Principles. At the same time, however, they added among other clauses one to ensure that in harmonizing the laws with Islamic principles, the personal laws of minorities would be duly safeguarded. They also included guarantees of religious liberty in exactly the same terms as the Indian Constitution, which is designed for a secular state. This wording guarantees to every citizen the right not only to profess and practise but also to propagate his faith.

As matters stand, therefore, Pakistan aims both at being an Islamic state and at incorporating some of the characteristic features of a secular state. Is this a tenable position? The answer to this question is obviously of supreme importance both for the whole future of Pakistan, and more especially for the prospects of Christianity and the Church. The Report of the Court of Inquiry of the Punjab Government answers the above question with a most emphatic negative.

It gives a detailed account of the development of the agitation against the Aḥmadiyya Movement. For it was the issues here involved which compelled the Court to some definitive discussion of the ultimate meaning of Islamic Statehood in Pakistan. There were two main demands against the Aḥmadis:

(i) That they be declared a non-Muslim minority.

(ii) That they be removed from all key posts, and in particular that Chaudhri Zafrullāh Khān be deprived of the office of Foreign Minister.

The conjunction of these two demands is significant. According to one interpretation of the idea of an Islamic State, non-Muslim minority communities may be tolerated and even welcomed, provided they recognise that they are a "tolerated minority" or *milli*. This means that they are a kind of second class citizens, not eligible for high office or other positions of leadership. By concentrating on these demands the Ahrār agitators were making a bid for the support of the more rigid and orthodox Muslims, and at the same time seeking to commit the authorities to their interpretation of an Islamic State.

A landmark in the agitation was an "All Muslim Parties Convention," held in Lahore in January 1953, to which representatives of fourteen Muslim parties were invited. The leaders of these parties nearly all had the title of Maulana or Maulvi, and were religious leaders with claims to theological learning; but they were also semi-political organisations.

The police had for a long time been warning the government that the agitation was becoming more unrestrained and dangerous, and suggested that preventive measures should be taken and some of the leaders arrested. The government were most unwilling to take strong action, fearing that the full force of Muslim orthodoxy would be

moblised against them. In certain cases public meetings were prohibited and speakers who defied the ban were arrested. They then made the speeches in mosques and defied the government to interfere. A serious consequence of all this was that local branches of the Muslim League began to pass resolutions criticising the authorities for interfering with Muslim religious activities.

The situation deteriorated rapidly. The governments in Karachi and Lahore refused to grant the agitators' demands but still hesitated to suppress them. Finally there was rioting for a week in Lahore and the situation got completely out of hand. At the very last moment the Chief Minister, M. K. Daultana, virtually offered to surrender by publishing a letter in which he personally undertook to support the agitators' demands if they would co-operate in the restoration of law and order. Perhaps it was fortunate that by this time things had become so bad that there was no alternative to martial law. There was widespread looting and arson in the city, government clerks and the railwaymen were all on strike, the electric supply had been cut off, and the police themselves were beginning to lose their morale. At this point, on March 6th, the civil government abdicated in favour of the army, who quickly brought the situation under control.

This account has been given partly to explain how the Court of Inquiry came to be set up, and partly to indicate some of the dangers inherent on the combination of democratic institutions with a theocratic conception of the Islamic State.

The Court consisted of two very senior Muslim Judges, both of whom had been judges of the High Court, and one Chief Justice. The first half of the Report describes the background and history of the agitation. The last sections discuss the responsibility for the troubles and the adequacy of the measures taken by the civil authorities. They are most outspoken in their criticism of the weakness of the government. "The Ahrar behaved like the child, whom his father threatens with punishment for beating a stranger, but who, knowing that he will not be punished, beats the stranger again. Then, out of sheer embarrassment, since other people are watching, the father does strike him, —but gently." Their last paragraph is even more significant in view especially of the action taken by the Governor General in Oct. 1954, suspending the Constituent Assembly, and appointing a cabinet not responsible to the people. "We are prompted by something they call a human conscience to enquire whether, in our present state of political development, the administrative problem of law and order cannot be divorced from a democratic bed fellow called a Ministerial Government, which is so remorselessly haunted by political nightmares. But if democracy means the subordination of law and order to political ends—then Allah knoweth best and we end the report."

But the most interesting part of the report is the middle section. In this the Commission first examines briefly the doctrinal differences between the Aḥmadiyya and other Muslims. These turn chiefly on the questions whether the Aḥmadiyya leaders claim to supersede the teaching of the Qurʾān on the status of Christ, and on the question of the *jihād,* the duty of making holy war against non-Muslims, which

the Aḥmadiyyas re-interpret. The Commission did not think it their duty to decide the rights and wrongs of these disputes. But they point out their significance in the present context arising from the assumption that Pakistan is an Islamic State and, therefore, only orthodox Muslims can be full citizens.

They therefore enquired from a large number of the ʿulamāʾ or Muslim theologians as to the definition of a Muslim. No two of them agreed. Some gave a very simple definition, e.g. "I consider a man to be a Muslim if he professes belief in the *kalima,* and leads a life in the footsteps of the Holy Prophet." Another said that he is one who performs all the essentials of the faith, but that these are too numerous to mention. The judges' conclusion is "If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all the others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ʿulamāʾ, we remain Muslims according to the view of that one, but kafirs according to the definition of everyone else."

The heart of the Report, therefore, is the enquiry, what is an Islamic State, and is it practicable to-day? It is pointed out that nearly all the ʿulamāʾ when asked to given an instance of such a state in the past could only name the Islamic Republic of 632 to 661 A.D., though some added the short reign of ʿUmar II. The judges then examined in some detail the implications of the principle (already publicly accepted by the Constituent Assembly) that no legislation shall be valid unless it is in accordance with the Holy Qurʾān and the Sunnah. They point out that in general there can be neither sovereignty nor legislation in the commonly understood sense in an Islamic State, since the Law already exists and is immutable. They then consider certain particular aspects of the question.

(1) The position of non-Muslims. According to most of the orthodox theologians they will be in the position of *dhimmi,* i.e. subject minorities, with "no voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law and no right to hold public offices."

(2) Apostacy. "Apostacy is an Islamic State is punishable by death. On this the ʿulamāʾ are practically unanimous."

(3) A number of the ʿulamāʾ held that the same penalty should attach to the preaching of any non-Islamic religion, including the Aḥmadiyya faith.

(4) *Jihād*—the holy war. A number of them roundly declared that the Islamic Law of war differed fundamentally from present international law, and e.g. included the right to make slaves of prisoners who will not accept Islam.

(5) Finally a number declared that no Muslim could ever be a loyal citizen of a non-Islamic state, and the Commission naturally pointed out the obvious implications of this for relations with India.

The conclusions on this matter are stated with almost brutal frankness. "The Quaid-i-Azam's (Jinnah's) conception of a modern national State, it is alleged, became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949, but it has been freely admitted that this resolution, though grandiloquent in words, phrases

and clauses, is nothing but a hoax and that not only does it not contain even a semblance of the embryo of an Islamic State, but its provisions, particularly those relating to fundamental rights, are directly opposed to the principles of an Islamic State." Later they continue: "If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense."

Several reflections are prompted by this Report.

(1) Its outspoken courage in challenging traditional Muslim orthodoxy is a testimony to the continuing independence of the Judiciary. This had always been most carefully fostered under British rule, and it has so far continued to flourish in a noteworthy degree in both the successor states, India and Pakistan. A striking instance occurred recently in India, when the Bombay Government issued an order forbidding Indian children to be educated in the medium of English in the special schools intended primarily for Eurasians. This order was pronounced invalid by the Bombay High Court and later on an appeal by the Federal Court also, on the ground that it discriminated against a certain class of citizens, in spite of the fact that it was strongly supported by nationalist political leaders. It is a good omen that the same independence is being displayed in Pakistan also.

(2) Its publication by the Government was made easier by the fact that the Chief Ministers both of the Central Government (Mr. Nazīmuddīn) and of the Punjab (Mr. Daultāna) who are severely criticised, had both been already dismissed before the Report was ready. The present Governor General (Ghulām Muḥammad) and Premier (Muḥammad ʿAlī) are both administrators rather than politicians, trained in the British service, and the same is even more true of their colleagues, including two generals, called in after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in October 1954.

(3) The judges who formed the Commission make it perfectly clear that while they scornfully reject the current orthodoxy of the ʿUlamāʾ they consider themselves to be good Muslims.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has been declared to be an Islamic Republic. Which interpretation of this is to prevail? If it is the liberal one upheld in this Report, there seems to be a good prospect that Christians will not only be tolerated but given a real place in the state as equal citizens. It has already been noted that clauses to this effect have been actually included in the constitution, though they conflict with the orthodox idea of an Islamic State. The further question then arises, can such a liberalised Islamic faith really provide a basis for a healthy and progressive democratic state in the modern world? Only history can answer this question. In the meantime, Christians must certainly welcome this liberal trend, while still bodly witnessing to their own conviction that only the fuller faith in God the Father revealed in Jesus Christ can ultimately bring fulfilment to any people.

London, England CAMPBELL S. MILFORD

Oriente in Nuova Luce. By Sabatino Moscati, G. C. Sansoni, Florence, 1954, pp. 172 and Index.

The author, a Professor at the University of Rome, has already established his reputation as a careful and assiduous Islamic scholar. This series of eight lectures on diverse topics has grown out of addresses given to University audiences in Italy, Spain and the U.S.A. Some have also been broadcast. They concern recent archaeology in the Near East, Arabia Felix, the ᶜAbbasid Revolution in Islam, myths and legends of Ugarit, Islamic Culture in the West, the sources of the Divine Comedy of Dante and the civilization of ancient Israel. The book takes a worthy place in a popular sequence of low-priced books in Italian on cultural and scientific subjects.

Coins of the Spanish Mulūk al-Tawā'if. By George C. Miles, Hispanic Numismatic Series, No. 3, the American Numismatic Society, New York, 1954, pp. 168 and xv, Index.

The third monograph in four years from the sponsoring society on the subject of Spanish coinage, this well-produced and illustrated volume deals with Islamic coinages from the time of the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate in Spain until the arrival of the "Almoravides" from North Africa. The time was one of political instability and of kings in rapid succession, so that the numismatic researcher has a tangled task. The book modestly describes itself as "a simple catalogue rather than a definitive treatment," since the collections of the Hispanic Society and the American Numismatic Society are not sufficiently large for the latter. A commendable piece of work: yet for all their fascination coins give so little of the past to the historian. Only dates, names and conventional formulae and pieces in a barter that is no more.

The Living Christ and Dying Heathenism. By Joh. Warneck in the German. Authorised Translation by Neil Buchanan, Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1954, pp. 308 and Index, $3.95.

This new printing of an old missionary classic is a tribute to its continuing vitality as a study of primitive cultures on the part of a great missionary-evangelist. Dr. Warneck wrote out of a conviction that observant anthropology was part of the equipment of the missionary. What he wrote is an important document in that realm alone. But he also sought to discover whether there was data for the theologian in his analysis of pagan psychology. Here, then, is a forceful investigation into the significance of missions for theology, from an angle sometimes overlooked. The third part of the work takes up practical questions of Christians witness. References to Islam are rare and incidental.

Global Epidemiology: A Geography of Disease and Sanitation. Vol. 3, The Near and Middle East. By Drs. J. S. Stevens, T. F. Whayne, G. W. Anderson, H. M. Horack, and Associate Author R. A. Thomas and Collaborators, J. P. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1954, pp. 346 and Index.

A fascinating volume, this work presents up-to-date public health information on the following countries; Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,

Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Aden, Bahrain, Kuwait, Muscat, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Trucial Oman, and Yemen. Under each area it discusses geography and climate, population and socio-economic conditions, environment and sanitation, health services and medical facilities and prevalent diseases. Its aim is to offer a comprehensive summary of the main health hazards and the major factors bearing on the health of the population. It is the third in a series covering all five continents, which grew out of the war-time medical research of the United States Army. Egypt is not included in this volume, since it was dealt with as a part of Africa in the second volume.

This competent, matter-of-fact survey, imaginatively read, becomes eloquent in the extreme. Statistics of hospital beds, physician distribution, nutritional standards, population growth, housing and miscellaneous health matters, are prosaic enough, until they take fire in the soul and become pieces of mortality, of wistfulness, of wretchedness and poverty. Excellently printed, well indexed and equipped with detailed bibliography, the book is a model of efficiency. But who is to bring into the same tidy well-being the human situation here depicted? Truth exists in many realms. Certainly every serious student of the Middle East and its human problems will want to have this volume on his shelves. But it will be exacting if he takes it also into his heart.

The Septuagint Bible. The Translation of Charles Thomson, as edited, revised and enlarged by C. A. Muses, The Falcon Wing Press, Indian Hills, Colorado, 1954, pp. 1426, $6,50.

This translation was made by the Secretary of the Continental Congress of the United States, a friend of Franklin, Jefferson and Washington. It represents the work of more than twenty years. It is now re-issued after revisions, based on study of versions not available to Thomson. The students of the Missionary Training Institute, Nyack, New York, have supplied verse references to the Authorised Version. The present editor remarks: "We have confined ourselves to changing Thomson's work only where the facts of the text required it or where another translation was called for preferentially by the oldest mss. tradition." Additional material from the LXX Book of Esther, omitted by Thomson, has been inserted. It is a pity that this well-printed and painstaking volume should have an evident missprint on its dedication page. Is it only unfamiliarity that makes a reader feel the English falls short, especially in Isaiah and certain Psalms? But the new accessibility of a great work is itself a thing of joy.

Treasury of Philosophy. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes, Philosophical Library, New York, 1954, pp. 1257, Index, $ 15.00.

A shorter notice of a book having over twelve hundred pages may seem any injustice. But it is no more injustice to this volume than the volume itself does to its more than 350 philosophers, East and West. The wisdom of a volume of this style may well be doubted at the outset: and denied on investigation. With all the will in the world, it is impossible to convey Kant in five quoted pages and Aquinas in the

same number. An extract of forty lines from Berdyaev, with twenty-five lines of 'biography,' is of dubious help in understanding him. Six Muslim medieval thinkers are included: Al-Ghazālī, Al-Kindī, Ibn Bajja, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Tufail. The Prophet Muḥammad is also included with under two pages of Quranic extracts, the Surah numbers and details of translation being omitted. The introduction remarks that the first third of the 114 Surahs were "conceived" in Mecca: — a statement which is not true, either serially, numerically or quantitatively. It was certainly a feat to bring all these extracts into a single edition, but a smaller net, more deeply cast, would have brought up a better haul. Philosophers, for good or ill, do not readily lend themselves to ready reference.

The Ancient Near East in Pictures Relating to the Old Testament. By James B. Pritchard, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 340 and Index, 769 illustrations, $ 20.00.

A triumph of scholarly care and publishing skill, this volume is a treasure. It presents a large and unique collection of photographs, each carefully annotated, portraying the diverse features of daily life, of religion, warfare, crafts, arts, writing, myths and histories, among the peoples of the ancient world in Old Testament times. It is intended as a companion volume to the author's *Ancient Near East Texts*, published by the Princeton University Press in 1950. Gods, kings, weavers, potters, hunters, farmers, are all here and there are four maps indicating the main archaeological sites. A quarter of a century of archaeological activity is epitomised in this book, and how many centuries of human strife and pomp, misery and might.

Mélanges: I, Dār al-Maaref, Cairo, 1954, pp. 195.

L'Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire has decided to publish annually a volume under the above title, in which members of the Institute will present items of individual research, especially in the history of ideas in the Arab world. This first appearance of M.I.D.E.O. is warmly welcomed, not least for a discussion of recent attitudes in Quranic exegesis by J. Jomier, O.P. There are contributions from S. de Laugier de Beaurecueil on ᶜAbdallāh Anṣarī; F. Jabre on a reconsideration of al-Ghazālī based on the Ṭabaqāt of Subki; and G. C. Anawati on ancient Arabic texts edited in Egypt during 1953. Notices and items of scholarly interest are also presented.

Behind the Balkan Curtain. Mr. Ernst Max Hoppe of Heidenau bei Dresden, sends us the following account of Bible colportage work among the Muslims of the Balkan countries.

"In the world of Islam, men and women often separated by miles and miles, stand as servants of the living God, spending all of their lives as witnesses to God's love and sovereignty among our Muslim brethren. For their encouragement and for the joy of all who work among Muslims, I want to relate some of my experiences from the Balkans, before 1939 and the subsequent results.

"Here long before World War II missionaries had to leave because of the strong influence of Hitler. Through all those years I received letters from converts and by letter I have been able to do some spiritual counselling both for the individuals and for the Church which has grown there. The Muslims of Bulgaria, the Pomaks, are estimated to be 200,000. They live mainly in the Rodope mountains in southern Bulgaria. During the rule of the Turks they were forcibly converted to Islam. They continued as Muslims under the new Turkey. Laboring hard, I called the Bulgarians to work for the evangelisation of the Pomaks. With fellow laborers to help, the Qur'ān was translated into the Bulgar language (which the Pomaks speak) so they could know it in their own tongue and compare it with the New Testament. Many of the educated people of Bulgaria, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Public Instruction, favored the project as did some of the leaders of the Bulgar National Church. The American Christian Literature Society for Muslims assisted me in printing 20 books or booklets for Muslims. These were distributed free of cost to all societies throughout the country. Other bodies helped, including the literature department of the American Board Mission in Turkey and the Bible Societies.

"Once I was even called to address a meeting of Orthodox Christians in Sophia, where I pleaded against any compulsion to the wearing of hats, kalpaks or caps instead of the Muslim fez. For there is no room for human force in the love of God. A prokurator became so enthusiastic that he undertook to help his fellow men and placed 75 Gospels in various mosques to encourage comparative study.

"One of the Pastors of the Bulgar Church came with me on a tour of the Pomak villages in the Rodope mountains, where eagles, wolves and bears are still to be found. We watched the eagles, flying higher and higher, carried up by warm, rising winds, without a motion of their wings. I will never forget the small paths through forests and over mountains, that carried us to the villages of the Bulgar Muslims. All this was before the Second World War.

"Recently there came to me news of the growth and steadfastness of the Christians I had met and news also of the ferment in the Pomak soul. Many young Bulgar Muslim teachers are urging their brethren to give up agelong fanaticism and to open their doors to modern ideas and to the spirit of freedom. They are realising something of the fact that in their origin they were Christians. The old customs and

the old dress are being given up in places. Also Turkish names are being changed for ancestral Christian names. One of the Muslim teachers, arguing from the evangelistic books we had circulated, urged his Muslim hearers to forego fanaticism and to come nearer to the truth of the old Greek philosophers: 'Man, know thyself: to fight thyself is the most difficult battle.' Another teacher at the same conference said: 'We must come closer to Jesus the unique teacher of mankind, to Him Who said: "Seek and ye shall find" and "The truth shall make you free."'

"The triumph of Christ was won quite solitarily. This I hear of is going on behind closed borders. There is no limit to the power of the Gospel of God. One convert writes to me: "We have been enemies of Christ. We spat at the brother who brought us the Gospel. We wanted to show him our contempt and see whether he would take the knife and fight. He could have done so, for he was stronger than we. Now we had to see how he wept at our blind hatred and prayed for us. He confessed that he used to be as fanatical as we were. Add to it that he was not to be persuaded to stay away. We stopped our abusing of him realising that such love and patience could not be human only. We came to know the Divine Love that had changed his heart. So we became Christians. Pray that we may become true followers of Him."

"So let us remember that God's open doors lie behind the closed borders."

Zakāt in Pakistan. An interesting development was set under way by a decision of the *Zakāt* Committee, appointed in 1950, to recommend official recognition of *Zakāt,* or alms-payment, by the Central Government. The latter has accepted the recommendations of the Committee. These provide for the sale of *Zakāt* stamps in all Post Offices, the proceeds of which will go to *Zakāt* funds and be distributed in accordance with *Zakāt* purposes.

After some discussion, the Committee decided against the view that considered payment of *Zakāt* either implicit in, or a discharge of, the ordinary fiscal obligations of the Muslim citizen. Payment of *Zakāt* must be in addition to Government taxes and these cannot be deducted from *Zakāt* responsibilities. Nor can legal taxes, even though expended in part on social welfare, be regarded as a discharge of *Zakāt* duty. For such taxes are levied by State law and are not assessed according to the concept of *Zakāt,* which is a part of worship.

Acceptance of the recommendations does not make *Zakāt* mandatory as a matter of civil law. It simply facilitates payment, by the availability of "stamps" and serves to keep before the Muslim citizen the religious duty that is upon him. It does something to restore the idea that the State has an obligation to foster *Zakāt* even though it remains an individual duty.

The money so collected through *Zakāt* stamps will be credited to a Fund to be divided between the several provinces and administered through trustees on behalf of orphans, widows and other charitable needs.

Communism in the Arab World. Moscow and Baghdad terminated full diplomatic relations in January with the recall of Iraqi representatives to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. followed suit by withdrawing its Legation from Baghdad and asking Iran to watch over its interests there.

An Egyptian Military Court in January passed sentence on forty-four persons, accused of Communist activity, within an organization called "Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Homeland." Terms of imprisonment of up to seven years were imposed as well as heavy fines. It was later announced that Communists would be tried before civil courts.

The Ministry of the Interior in Jordan is amending the Communist Control Law with a view to tightening its surveillance of suspected members of the Communist Party. Delegations from religious leaders in Jordan, both Muslim and Christian, have been pressing for more active educational measures against Communism, especially in the refugee camps.

Local Elections in Turkey, held late in 1954 for aldermen seem to confirm the strong position held by the Democratic Party in the country. The national elections in May, 1954, gave the Democratic Party a very large majority. In the local elections some 77 % of the elected posts went to the same Party, namely 26,669 out of 33,257. At the same elections in 1950 the percentage was only 49 for the Democratic Party and 35 for the Republican.

The Muslim Brotherhood. The execution of six leading members of the Brotherhood in December 1954 and the subsequent imprisonment of many more have led to widespread antagonism and criticism in many parts of the Arab world. Shaikh Muṣṭafā al-Ṣibāʿī, the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood in Syria, flew in person to request King Saud of Arabia to intercede with the Egyptian Government for the stay of the executions. King Saud refused to do so, on the ground that this would constitute internal interference in Egypt's affairs.

There were street demonstrations in Damascus against the executions and some twenty thousand took part. In Iraq organizations of various kinds protested strongly against the Egyptian policy. Friday, December 10th, was observed as a day of mourning in Amman, though street demonstrations were here curbed firmly. Jordan has also instructed a prominent member of the Brotherhood, recently deprived of his Egyptian citizenship, to leave the country.

Judgements by the Egyptian People's Court against Brotherhood members are announced from time to time, including a proportion of acquittals .Out of 88 whose fate was the subject of an announcement in January, three were sentenced to death, 39 to prison terms with hard labor of from ten to fifteen tears, and 45 were freed. Some one thousand were being held at the end of 1954, representing most of the leading personnel. The Government was also engaged on extradition proceedings against certain other leaders outside Egypt.

When members of the Brotherhood at the International Conference

of Muslim Youth in Karachi in January attempted to distribute leaflets against the Egyptian régime, Pakistani police forces and the organizers of the Conference intervened to prevent it.

The Prophet's Birthday Torch Disaster in Beirut brought many active expressions of sympathy and generous gifts, including large donations from King Saud and the Shaikh of Kuwait. About 40 persons died in the tragedy and well over 230 were detained in hospital. It was caused when dripping oil from one of the torches being carried in procession ignited the clothes of a participant, who in panic threw down the torch and spraved his neighbours with burning oil. These in turn stampeded and others in the frightened throng were trampled underfoot in the chaos. The blaze extended over an area of more than one hundred square yards.

International Assembly of Muslim Youth. The first meeting of the Assembly—a "creative, cultural effort for global Muslim Renaissance",—was held at Karachi, Pakistan, during the first seven days of 1955. "We want the youth of Islam to avoid confusing Muslims for Islam" said the invitation. "The tolerant, rational and dynamic principles of Islam must once again be set to work throughout the whole Muslim world." Islam is "the ideology to counteract effectively the other materialistic ideologies of the world."

The Assembly organised working committees to discuss the social, economic and political implications of Islam as well as a Colloquium on "The Living Islamic Ideology." There was also an extempore speech competition on the theme: "Muslim Youth on the National and International Plane."

An Exhibition of Muslim History was also organized to co-incide with the assembly, in which there were rare examples of Muslim calligraphy, wellknown literary works, and paintings, charts, maps and replicas of historical interest.

Writing from Jakarta, Indonesia, the Chief Organizer, Inamullāh Khan, declared: "We want to study the day to day problems of our people, the problems of hunger, of disease, of illiteracy, of high prices and low earnings, of machine's competition with man and so on. We do not want to be content with philosophic explanations or with theoretical solutions but to find practical remedies to all topics of burning and common interest."

The delegates who assembled from various Muslim countries were enthusiastic about the aims and achievements of the Assembly.

Library Services in Arabic. The leading article in the *Unesco Bulletin for Libraries* of November-December, 1954, describes the activities of the Arab States Fundamental Education Centre (ASFEC), which began operations in December 1952 with 49 trainees selected from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Gaza area of Palestine. The ASFEC library development and training program was begun in April 1953, and an additional 43 trainees were admitted in December of that year. The program has been accepted as

a Unesco associated library project, and ASFEC would be glad to receive professional library literature in English or French, manuals on all aspects of public and school library organization and activities, and files of important library journals, as well as books for children and books suitable for adults with limited reading skill.

Islam and the West. A somewhat unusual aspect of this theme is reflected in an Editorial in *The Light*, the Lahore Aḥmadiyya journal, of November 1st 1954, (Vol. xxxiii, 38). After referring to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, as segments of Islam whose "idea of the revival of Islam is the revival of what passed for Islam in the medieval age of our history," it goes on to argue that truly Islamic attitudes are often found outside the Muslim communities. "Many an Islamic virtue and habit of life is conspicuous today by its absence in the Muslim community of our times and its presence in societies owing no formal allegiance to Islam. That being so, our indiscriminate hostility to the Western culture and the Western nations as they are today will mean only a defeat of our own object, if it be the establishment of the Quranic virtues and culture in the world ... In our blind opposition to the West we may very well fail to recognise these and other virtues of the kind *as our own property.*"

These sentiments are clearly another facet of the underlying issue: What is Islam? They contrast strongly with the common opinion that Islam is *sui generis,* that all its need is for isolation and self-sufficiency and that it is in no need of co-operation with, or study of, other systems. An insistent advocate of the latter view has been Sayyid Quṭb of Cairo.

Yet the Editorial in *The Light* is headed "The Only Spiritual Movement." Surely it would be well if in such recognition of the common quality of the world's problems, the thinking Muslim could go further, and take some cognisance of the travail of Christian and other thought, rather than merely claim attractive virtues elsewhere as 'our own.' Perhaps the fuller hospitality of mind is, in some sense, implicit in these opinions and may grow from them.

The State and the Faith in Pakistan. The recent statement of the Pakistan Minister of the Interior, Major General Iskander Mirzā disallowing "the mixing of politics with religion" has evoked a new instalment of the great debate on the true nature of an Islamic society.

The Jamaat-i-Islami issued a vigorous reply to the Minister's statement warning the ʿulamāʾ not to dabble in politics. It suggested that the Minister's action was a clue to the real meaning of the Central Government's declaration of emergency. It would seem, says the Jamaat-i-Islami's manifesto, that the Constituent Assembly was showing too strong a disposition to a true Islamic State to please the Government. It asserts that there is no truth in analogies sometimes drawn from Europe or Turkey to prove the unhappy consequences of religion's being involved in politics. For neither Europe nor Turkey had a true concept of religion and the dangers of priestcraft and op-

pression said to lie in 'political religion,' as those areas may have known it, do not obtain where true Islam is concerned. The paper goes on to ask: "If Pakistan rejects Islam as a way of life it will have inevitably to surrender before Communism... If in Pakistan religion and politics are to be separated what foundation remains for the very establishment of Pakistan and the two nation theory that gave birth to this country? Is it not this very theory of the separation of religion and politics which the Congress, Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu organizations presented in opposition to the Pakistan movement?"

To the Minister's demand that it keep to religious activity only, if it wishes to remain unmolested, the Jamaat retorts that it is such a 'religious' society. But clearly the assessment of 'religion' is vitally contrasted.

Voices have been raised on the other side in support of the Minister as having stated, sternly perhaps but unequivocally, the necessity that faces a progressive Pakistan. The nation cannot afford, say these critics, to remain at the mercy of the ᶜulamāᵓ in some kind of theocracy. That word 'theocracy' is much bandied about; repudiated in any sinister sense by the conservatives; but defended in so far as it describes what one of them calls a 'theo-democracy'—or rule of a people devoted to the Divine Law, as interpreted by those who are competent to do so.

Some other aspects of the debate in Pakistan as raised in and by the Report of the Enquiry into the Punjab riots can be found in the review on pp. 196-200. We hope to print a study of the issues in Pakistan Constitution building in the July number of the Quarterly.

Miscellanea. The Librarian of the Muslim University, Aligarh, Sayyid Bashīruddīn, and the Chief Librarian of the Dahir Branch Library of the Egyptian National Library, ᶜĀdil Kāẓim, are among some thirty public librarians from various parts of Asia who are making an extended visit to the U.S.A. to study library facilities and administration. Each librarian is to serve a three month internship in a public library in line with his special interests. They will also participate in the annual Conference in July of the American Library Association.

The ninth session of the Arab League Cultural Association convened in Jidda in January. It was headed by Dr Ṭaha Ḥusain of Cairo. Meanwhile two scholars under the Arab League Directorate of Education are at work in Saudi Arabia transcribing and photographing important Arab manuscripts found in libraries, public or private, in that Kingdom.

The Egyptian Government has announced that two palaces of the former King Farouk are to be leased to foreign companies for conversion into rouletter and baccarat clubs, on condition that Egyptian nationals will be free to participate in the clubs' activities. The Minister of Justice in Cairo proposes to introduce a new law permitting the establishment of such gambling clubs.

The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces consideration of a plan to open a Legation of Jordan at the Vatican.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Molleson Foster
Union Theological Seminary Library

I. GENERAL

Annotated Bibliography of the Principal Publications Concerning the Middle East issued by the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. *International Social Science Bulletin*, Paris. Part 4, 1953. pp. 732-765. Containing more than 250 entries, the work also lists social science periodicals dealing with the Middle East or published in the Middle East.

Arid Zone Research. G.M.W. *The Geographical Review*, New York. April, 1954. pp. 296-298. A review of studies, mainly about the Middle East.

Developments of the Quarter: Comment and Chronology. *Middle East Journal*, Washington, D C. Summer, 1954. pp. 321-338. Covers March 1-May 31, 1954. with emphasis on the Turkish Election of May 2nd and on the agreements between Turkey and Pakistan and Pakistan and the United States.

Excavations at Beth She'arim. N. Avigad. *Israel Exploration Journal*, Jerusalem. Number 1, 1954. pp. 88-107. An illustrated account of 1953 findings at the ancient seat of the Sanhedrin in the days of the Patriarch, Judah I.

Iqbal: Poète et Philosophe. E. Meyer Ovitch. *Église Vivante*, Paris. Vol. 6, no. 2. pp. 218-224. Presents many extracts, in French translation, from Iqbal's poems.

Le Jourdan et la Mer Morte. Louis Joubert. *Foi et Vie*, Paris. Septembre-Octobre, 1954. pp. 410-424. A study of Biblical geography.

New Light on Arabic Translations of Aristotle. Richard Walzer, *Oriens*, Leiden. June, 1953. pp. 91-142. Discusses the work of Khalīl Georr and of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī.

Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan. I. Topa. *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad. October, 1953. pp. 225-241. "A study in social thought"—the thinking influenced by Western ideas.

II. ARABIA

La Chronologie Sud-Arabe du Premier Siècle avant Notre Ère. Jacques Ryckmans. *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Leyden. November, 1953. pp. 205-211. Summarizes recent progress in this field due, in part, to American excavations in the ancient Qatabinite quarter.

Economic Changes in Yemen, Aden and Dhofar. Alexander Melamid. *Middle Eastern Affairs*, New York. March, 1954. pp. 88-91. Describes the great alterations caused by oil revenues.

Note sull' Irrigazione, l'Agricoltura et le Stagioni nel Yemen. Ettore Rossi. *Oriente Moderno*, Rome. August-September,

1953. pp. 349-361. The article is based on studies made in 1936-1937, giving methods used and accompanied by examples of folklore.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM

An Arabic Account of the Province of Safed, I. Bernard Lewis. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* London. Part 3, 1953. pp. 477-488. Text of the Tārīkh Safad of Muḥ. b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-ᶜUthmānī, written between 1372 and 1376.

The Arabs and Their History. Nabih Amin Faris. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Spring, 1954. pp. 155-162. To live in the present and plan well for the future, the Arabs should pay attention to the past—especially the period from the fall of Baghdad in the 13th century to the Arab awakening in the 19th.

Elections in Turkish History. Tarik Z. Tunaya. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. April, 1954. pp. 116-119. Surveys the subject from 1876 to 1950.

Die Eroberung Konstantinopels in Jahre 1453. Gotthard Jaeschke. *Die Welt als Geschichte,* Stuttgart. Part 4, 1953. pp. 210-220. Presents an account of the conquest of the city by Muhammad II.

The Historical Role of the Turkish Empire. Denis Sinor. *Journal of World History,* Paris. October, 1953. pp. 427-434. Describes the effects of Byzantine Greeks and Sassanian Persians on the development of the early Turks.

How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom. Milton J. Clark. *The National Geographic Magazine,* Washington, D.C. November, 1954. pp. 621-614. Fleeing from Sinkiang and its red conquerors, four thousand *families* set out to seek refuge, but only 350 *individuals* reached safety in Kashmir.

The Long History. Frederick H. Cramer. *Current History,* New York. April, 1954. pp. 201-207. Gives the historical background of North Africa and discusses its bearing on present-day problems.

Muḥammad Ibn al-Qāsim. N. B. Baloch. *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. October, 1953. pp. 242-271. A study of the background, life and personality of the 8th century Arab conqueror of North West India.

Les Souverains Seljoukides et Leurs Sujets non-Musulmans. Osman Turan. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. Part 1, 1953. pp. 65-100. Traces a policy of great tolerance towards subject races.

Textes Prémonitoires et Commentaires Mystiques Relatifs à la Prise de Constantinople par les Turcs en 1453. Louis Massignon. *Oriens,* Leiden. June, 1953. Discusses the contents of early texts, some dating from the 9th century.

IV. QURᵓĀN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

Another Kaᶜb Al-Aḥbār Story. Moshe Perlmann. *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* Philadelphia. July, 1954. pp. 48-58. A Cairo manuscript tells of Kaᶜb's conversion to Islam.

ISLAMIC LAW AND THEOLOGY IN INDIA. Asaf A. A. Fyzee. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Spring, 1954. pp. 163-183. "An attempt to apply 20th century legal and historical principles to the understanding of the fundamental problem in Islam, and to propose a tentative method for a modern critique of Sharī'ah."

MUHAMMAD ALI'S ESCHATOLOGIES. T. Linthorst, S.J. *Het Missiewerk,* Nijmegen. Part 3, 1954. pp. 163-175. Presents the beliefs of the exponent of "Neo-orthodox modernism" in Islam.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS. Syed Waris Ameer Ali. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. April, 1954. pp. 134-145. Gives an historical account of the descent and former great influence of these still important organizations.

NEW SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF MUHAMMADAN THEOLOGY. Joseph Schacht. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. Part 1, 1953. pp. 23-42. Introduces new interpretations of old sources as well as newly discovered ones.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HERESY IN THE HISTORY OF ISLAM. Bernard Lewis. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. Part 1, 1953. pp. 43-63. If the new opinion did not tend to threaten the status quo, it was tolerantly received, especially if it were theological and not political.

A ZAIDI MANUAL OF ḤISBAH OF THE 3RD CENTURY. R. B. Serjeant. *Revista degli Studii Orientali,* Rome. 1953. pp. 1-34. Arabic text and English summary, with annotations, of the "Kitāb al-Iḥtīsāb" by Al-Nāṣir li-Ḥaqq.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

THE ARAB DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY'S PROJECT IN JERICHO, Jordan. Cecil Hourani. *International Social Science Bulletin,* Paris. Part 4, 1953. pp. 317-323. Describes a vocational training centre for children.

THE BIRTH RATE AND FERTILITY TRENDS IN EGYPT. El-Sayed Abdel Hamid El-Daly. *Égypte Contemporaine,* Cairo. October, 1953. pp. 1-12. Estimates a population of 78 millions by 2037 and believes that Egypt will become an industrial country—thus raising its standard of living.

CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. R. Clemens. *International Social Science Bulletin,* Paris. Part 4, 1953. pp. 766-786. A report of the 1952 Athens' symposium dealing with the results of technical developments.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MOSLEM FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. *International Social Science Bulletin,* Paris. Part 4, 1953. pp. 341-357. Treats of marriage, family ties and the status of women.

MIRI SIRF LAND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ. Hassan Mohamed Ali. *International Social Science Bulletin,* Paris. Part 4, 1953. pp. 713-717. Summary of achievements and future plans in land reform.

NATURAL RESOURCES OF ISRAEL. C. Tadmor. *Middle Eastern Affairs,*

New York. May, 1954. pp. 154-158. Statistics for copper, iron and steel, fertilizers, chemical plants and the Dead Sea industries.

Nomads and Farmers in Southeastern Turkey. Wolfram Eberhard. *Oriens,* Leiden. June, 1953. pp. 32-49. Discusses the problems of settlement for both these classes.

La Propriété Agraire en Égypte avant et après la Réforme. Maurice Sachs. *Égypte Contemporaine,* Cairo. October ,1953. pp. 29-37. Describes agrarian conditions from the time of the English occupation to to-day.

The Shaikhdom of Kuwait. Elizabeth Monroe. *International Affairs,* London. July, 1954. pp. 271-284. Points out the amazing changes caused by the wealth brought to the Kuwaitis by oil development.

Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army. David Ayalon. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* London. Part 3, 1953. pp. 448-476. Describes methods of promotion and general organization.

The Wadi Azum. Michael Barbour. *The Geographical Journal,* London. June, 1954. pp. 174-182. Tells of the life and progress of a section of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in the province of Darfur.

Women in Israel. Shulamith Schwartz. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. March, 1954. pp. 80-88. Sketches the position of women from the Bilu Movement in 1882 to to-day, when they are well represented in the Knesset.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Antichristliche Bestrebungen im Vorderen Orient. F. Taschner and G. Jaeschke. *Christen und Antichristen,* Hiltrup. 1954. pp. 182-192. Nationalism and dislike of European "imperialism" cause most of the anti-Christian demonstrations.

The Arab-Asian Bloc. Sherman S. Hayden. *Middle Eastern Affairs.* New York. May, 1954. pp. 149-154. Describes the confederation of states in the U.N.—generally without influence because of inner dissension, but often disturbing and not constructive.

The Arab Minority of Israel. Don Peretz. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Spring, 1954. pp. 139-154. The author gives a sad and discouraging account of the conditions arising from Jewish antagonism and mismanagement.

Current History. New York. April, 1954. The entire issue is devoted to North African problems.

The Druse Community in Israel. I. Ben-Zvi. *Israel Exploration Journal,* Jerusalem. Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 65-76. Depicts the historical background and present state of this independent race, which is increasing quite rapidly (9,150 in 1931 and 13,500 in 1949).

Essai de Psychanalyse des Protectorats Nord-Africains. Gabriel Puaux. *Politique Etrangère,* Paris. March, 1954. pp. 11-28. Reviews North African history, stressing the psychological effect of foreigners on the natives.

Foreign Investment in the Middle Eastern Region, 1944-1953. Hedley V. Cooke. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. April, 1954. pp. 109-115. A statistical article.

Lyautey et les Rapports Franco-Musulmans. Patrick Heidsieck. *Études,* Paris. October, 1954. pp. 62-69. The Marshal's phenomenal success in administration was due to his consistent treatment of everyone as an individual and not as someone to be adapted to a formula.

Middle Eastern Instability. Joseph G. Harrison. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. March, 1954. pp. 73-80. The author advocates matching arms aid with economic assistance.

Spain in Africa. John D. Harbron. *Current History,* New York. April, 1954. pp. 215-221. Discusses past history and present pro-Arab policies which lessen the danger of agitation for independence.

Tunisia: A Challenge to American Foreign Policy. Lorna H. Hahn. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. May, 1954. pp. 159-167. The United States eventually will have to stand for Tunisian self-determination and independence or be false to its democratic principles.

Upheaval in Syria and Egypt. M. Perlmann. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. April, 1954. pp. 120-129. Covers developments from February 1 to March 31, 1954.

VII. MISSIONS TO MUSLIMS

Problems and Prospects in West Pakistan. J. W. Sweetman. *The International Review of Missions,* London. July, 1954. pp. 301-310. The author believes there is every reason to expect a policy of toleration for minorities, especially when the long-awaited Constitution comes into being.

The Role of the Missionary in the Near East. John S. Badeau. *The International Review of Missions,* London. October, 1954. pp. 397-403. The article contrasts the problems to be met to-day compared with those face in 1820 by Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons, pioneer representatives of the American Board.

HENRY MARTYN SCHOOL OF ISLAMIC STUDIES

ALIGARH, U.P., INDIA

This School serves the Churches of India and Pakistan and was established to provide training and facilities for research for missionaries and nationals in subjects related to Muslim evangelism.

In addition to courses in Islamic subjects, tuition is provided in Arabic, Persian and Urdu. Facilities are now available also to those working in East Pakistan, Bengal, Southern and Western India, for the study of Musalmani, Bengali, Musalmani Tamil and Musalmani Gujerati.

A limited amount of accommodation is provided for resident students during the winter. Extension courses are given in Northern and Southern hill stations during the summer.

The Rev. Harold Spencer, Principal